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Abstract
Essays on Inequality and Social Cohesion
Anselm Rink
This dissertation comprises three essays that explore determinants of inequality
and social cohesion. The first essay explores the role of inheritance customs in
spurring social equality. Using historical data on inheritance customs in Ger-
many, I document that municipalities that historically fairly shared wealth among
siblings see higher levels of social equality today. I point to two mechanisms that
help explain the correlation: increased wealth equality and stronger pro-egalitarian
preferences. Interestingly, I also find that equitably inheriting communities are as-
sociated with higher incomes and greater income inequality. I interpret this finding
to mean that equitable inheritance levels the playing field by rewarding talent not
hereditary status. The second essay analyzes how Protestant missions affect com-
munity cohesion. Exploiting variation in missionary activity in southeastern Peru,
I document that villages exposed to missions have lower levels of community co-
hesion compared to non-exposed villages. I adjudicate between two mechanisms
that may explain this finding—social networks and pro-social preferences—and
find the latter to be more plausible. The third essay expands on this finding by
implementing a field experiment with a missionary group in South Sudan in order
to parse out the causal effect of Protestant evangelism on social capital. Using
attitudinal and behavioral measures, I document that missionaries lower group-
level social capital while increasing individual-level pro-social behavior. Taken
together, my dissertation adds theoretical considerations and empirical evidence
to a broad debate in the social sciences that tries to make sense of variation in
social equality and cohesion.
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1
Introduction
This dissertation explores why some polities are more socially equal and cohesive
than others. In so doing, I draw on evidence from three settings (Germany, Peru
and South Sudan), discuss two explanatory variables (inheritance customs and
Protestant missions) and use a variety of methodological approaches and data
sources.
The first substantive chapter tackles a broad question that has interested schol-
ars for the better half of two centuries: Why are some societies more socially equal
than others? Drawing on the French and American revolutionaries, I point to equi-
table inheritance customs—the equal division of property among heirs—as a likely
determinant.1 I test this hypothesis by exploiting municipality-level variation in
inheritance customs across German municipalities. Comparing neighboring mu-
nicipalities that adopt different inheritance customs, I document that equitably
inheriting municipalities are more socially equal: their local councils include more
women and ethnic minorities, and local elite Rotary clubs include fewer Aristo-
crats. Drawing on historical sources, I explore two mechanisms that may underlie
this relation. Using historical as well as contemporary data, I demonstrate that
1This chapter builds on joint work with Hanno Hilbig who is a graduate student in political
science at Harvard University.
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equitably inheriting communities historically had lower levels of land inequality
and lower support for Hitler’s fascist NSDAP party in 1933. Finally, I explore
the role of economic growth. Here, I find that equitably inheriting communities
are associated with higher incomes and greater income inequality. I interpret this
finding to mean that equitable inheritance levels the playing field by rewarding
talent not hereditary status.
The second substantive chapter explores cohesion in the context of a develop-
ing country. Specifically, I hone in on the relation between Protestant missions
and community cohesion. Drawing on a long standing theoretical literature and
qualitative interviews conducted in southeastern Peru, I point out competing log-
ics about Protestant missions’ effects on community cohesion. One the one hand,
Protestant missionaries teach charity and establish regular venues of social inter-
action. On the other hand, Protestant missionaries propagate individual salvation
and provide an identity along which communities may separate. The effect of
the missions on community cohesion is, hence, unclear. To make headway on
these conflicting predictions, I take advantage of variation in missionary activity
in southeastern Peru. I document that villages exposed to Protestant missions
have lower levels of community cohesion compared to non-exposed villages. I
empirically assess two potential mechanisms that may explain the reduction. In
particular, Protestant missionaries may reduce community cohesion by lowering
pro-social preferences and by weakening social networks. Using a mediation frame-
work, I point to sparser networks as the more plausible mechanism.
The third substantive chapter is intended to solidify the causal argument dis-
tilled in Peru. I present evidence from a field experiment implemented in coopera-
tion with a missionary group in South Sudan, which randomly assigned sixty local
villages to a two-week intensive evangelism intervention. Using attitudinal and
2
behavioral evidence gathered after the missionaries leave, I find no differences in a
pre-registered aggregate social capital index across treatment and control villages.
However, I document that group-level indicators of social capital are lower, while
individual-level indicators of social capital are higher in treated villages. The find-
ings imply that missionaries are akin to a network interruption, buttressing the
results from Peru. Missionaries seemingly undermine structural determinants of
social capital, but increase individual-level pro-social behavior.
Drawing on evidence from three diverse contexts, my dissertation cautions that
social inequality and cohesiveness exhibits profound variation even within small
polities. I find that neighboring villages in Peru are shaped by starkly different
cooperation patterns owing to the presence of Protestant missions. Similarly,
in Germany I see differences from one village to the next in the degree to which
women are represented in local councils due to different inheritance customs. What
may be most surprising is that differences in cohesiveness are not only pronounced,
but can change at short notice. As much demonstrates the field experimental
evidence from South Sudan. Taken together, I hope that the three chapters—
in addition to their careful treatment of causality and mechanisms—add to a
literature on social equality cohesiveness (and related outcomes) by demonstrating
that both outcomes exhibit profound variation at the local-level, and are more
volatile than I would have expected before writing this dissertation.
In addition to these academic insights, the empirical findings may also be of
interest to policy makers. Perhaps most intuitively, the chapter on inheritance
customs may add to a debate whether equitable inheritance should be legally
required. Given the normatively desirable effects of equitable inheritance within
families on social equality, one may also wonder whether a more equal distribution
of wealth across families might further push social equality. What is more, how-
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ever, inheritance also seemingly affects broader social outcomes such as income
and income inequality. Given that inheritance, to this day, is shared inequitably
among heirs in many societies, my results may help inform a debate about the
societal consequences of passing on wealth.
The chapters exploring the repercussions of Protestant missionaries may add
to a policy debate on religious freedom and tolerance. Traditional missionaries
may be less widespread these days. But religious entrepreneurs are many and
active—not just in developing countries. A variety of studies have linked Protes-
tant (and other) missionaries to desirable social outcomes. My dissertation marks
a cautionary counterpoint. I show that missionaries fragment social networks and
lower community cohesion. Thus, my dissertation may help forge a more nuanced
debate about religious freedoms, including conversion. After all, the freedom to
convert may come at the expense of societal cohesion.
Following this short introduction are the three substantive chapters of my dis-
sertation. Each chapter is self-containing with its own supplementary information.
I offer concluding remarks in chapter five.
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2
Inheritance and Inequality
2.1 Introduction
Why are some societies more socially unequal than others? While inequality,
broadly conceived, occupies social scientists and commentators alike, “research on
the roots of inequality,” laments Boix (2010), “remains rather limited.” Given
that egalitarian-spirited societies witness higher levels of self-reported happiness,
Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2012, 3) pointedly ask: “can’t we all—meaning
all nations of the relatively developed world—be more like Scandinavians?” What,
then, explains variation in social inequality?
One salient determinant of social equality, highlighted during the French and
American revolutions, are inheritance customs. Many influential revolutionaries,
like Alexis de Tocqueville (2003, 31), argued that to achieve social equality society
had to fairly distribute wealth within families (known as equitable inheritance).
By contrast, inequitable inheritance—particularly primogeniture, the passing of
wealth to the firstborn child—was seen as the main culprit for the strict social
hierarchies of the ancien régime (Beckert, 2007, 91-92). In 1790, the French rev-
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olutionaries therefore abolished inequitable inheritance. Their declared goal was
to ascertain “‘equal rights’ and ‘equality before the law’ ” (King and Smith, 2005,
80), to empower women, and to put an end to aristocratic domination that had
shaped France for centuries.
But does equitable inheritance succeed in leveling the societal playing field?
This chapter empirically explores Tocqueville’s hypothesis, analyzing whether eq-
uitable inheritance customs are associated with greater social equality. My empir-
ical focus is on historical agricultural inheritance customs in Germany. I scrutinize
agricultural inheritance because the passing of wealth, throughout most of mod-
ern history, took the form of transferring agricultural property (Giesey, 1977).
I use Germany as the primary empirical case because it exhibits pronounced
municipality-level variation in inheritance customs (see Figure 2.1). Particularly
in Germany’s South-West, inheritance customs regularly vary from one village to
the next.
The historical roots of this variation are debated among scholars. Three broad
theories can be delineated. The traditionalist theory contends that equitable in-
heritance is a remnant of Roman culture (e.g., Schulz, 1926). A peasant liberation
theory argues that equitable inheritance developed where farmers obtained suffi-
cient economic autonomy (e.g., Kölb, 1978). A final economic theory stipulates
that equitable inheritance is linked to profitable crops (e.g., Röhm, 1957). While
the theories help explain broad trends across Germany, they fall short of explaining
pronounced local-level variation within counties and even municipalities.
Moreover, when regressing an indicator of equitable inheritance on proxies for
the three theories, I reject the null hypothesis of joint significance. As such, inher-
itance customs may be sufficiently old and sticky to function as an independent
variable. Several historians support such an interpretation. Forst, for example,
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argues: “institutions as deeply linked to the ethical perceptions and economic ne-
cessities, as long standing and intertwined with the lives of peasants as inheritance
customs cannot be fundamentally changed” (1921, 21).
Having made a plausible case for exogeneity at the local level, I then test
whether inheritance customs are associated with modern-day outcomes pertaining
to social equality. Using data on inheritance customs across 24,500 historical
German municipalities and a novel geographic matching procedure, I demonstrate
that equitably inheriting communities show greater levels of social equality today.
Specifically, these communities elect more women and ethnic minorities into local
councils. And, members of local elite clubs (Rotary International) are less likely
to be aristocrats. In sum, I present evidence that equitable inheritance plausibly
increased social equality by attenuating differences across socially salient strata.
In a second step, I explore two mechanisms that may help explain this finding.
Specifically, Tocqueville and other revolutionaries argued that equitable inheri-
tance fosters social equality by fairly apportioning wealth and by engendering
pro-egalitarian preferences. I test these mechanisms using historical as well as
contemporary data. Regarding wealth inequality, I confirm that equitably in-
heriting municipalities had lower levels of land inequality in 1895. Regarding
pro-egalitarian preferences, I confirm that equitably inheriting communities were
more likely to oppose Hitler’s fascist NSDAP party in the decisive 1933 election.
And, to this day, these communities vote in greater numbers for left-leaning politi-
cal parties and express greater support for disadvantaged groups. Taken together,
I thus point to wealth equality and pro-egalitarian preferences as two plausible
intermediate outcomes that may link equitable inheritance to social equality.
In a final step, I explore the role of economic growth. The French and Ameri-
can revolutionaries did not form testable hypotheses about equitable inheritance
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customs’ effect on income, while historians and social scientists express conflicting
predictions. One set of scholars argues that equitable inheritance lowers labor su-
pervision costs, given that all children have an incentive to work, which increases
incomes. These scholars also contend that equitable inheritance plausibly lowers
population growth, given that families have an incentive to prevent the atomiza-
tion of their property, which, too, increases incomes. By contrast, a different set
of scholars maintains that equitable inheritance leads to fragmented farms, thus
lowering incomes.
We explore these hypotheses using historical census-based data on per capita
income in 1892 and 1901 as well as data from 50 million German tax records in
2014. Our models show a consistent positive correlation between equitable inher-
itance and per capita income. Interestingly, however, I also find that equitable
inheritance correlates with greater levels of income inequality in 2014 (historical
income inequality data is not available). I interpret this finding to mean that
equitable inheritance fosters social, but not economic equality. It thus achieved
what the American revolutionaries had intended: an “equalitarianism [...] among
pioneers, [whose] only inequalities were those of ability” (de Visme Williamson,
1976, 102).
The outcomes discussed in this chapter connect to several distinct literatures
in political science. First, I present a new explanation for variation in representa-
tion of ethnic minorities and women in political offices (e.g., Kostadinova, 2007;
Roberts, Seawright and Cyr, 2013). Second, I add to a literature scrutinizing
wealth and income inequality, pointing to inheritance customs as a salient deter-
minant (e.g., Keister and Moller, 2000; Boix, 2010). Third, I connect inheritance
customs to pro-egalitarian preferences and, by extrapolation, preferences for re-
distribution (Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Scheve,
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Stasavage et al., 2006). More broadly, the chapter draws attention to inheritance
as a pivotal institution that shapes societal outcomes. While sociologists and
historians have recognized the profound influence of inheritance customs, political
scientists have mostly focused on the effects of inheritance on regime stability (Shin
and Kim, 1985; Gates et al., 2006; Kokkonen and Sundell, 2014), and political vi-
olence (Midlarsky, 1988; Muller, Seligson and Midlarsky, 1989; Lichbach, 1989).
In so doing, I offer support for an old explanation why some polities are more so-
cially equal than others: equitable inheritance customs. Last, the chapter makes
a methodological contribution by presenting a new way to analyze geographic
discontinuities. Based on Keele and Zubizarreta (2015), I present an adjacent ge-
ographic unit matching design, which compares bordering municipalities in order
to isolate causal effects.
To assess the relation between inheritance and social inequality, this chapter
studies two mutually exclusive and widely practiced inheritance customs, equi-
table and inequitable inheritance. Research on inheritance abounds in the social
sciences (e.g., Stiglitz 1969; Alston and Schapiro 1984; Todd 1994; Baker and
Miceli 2005). To our knowledge, however, no empirical study has systematically
assessed the link between inheritance customs and the broader political develop-
ment of modern society, particularly inequality. This is surprising. After all, writes
Habakkuk (1955, 4), “differences in inheritance systems [...] left permanent marks
on [society’s] social and economic structure.” In what ways, then, may inheritance
customs affect the social fabric of society?
2.1.1 Inheritance and Social Inequality
In 1790, at the height of the French revolution, the French Constituent Assembly
partly abolished primogeniture—the passing of wealth to the firstborn son. The
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revolutionaries’ declared goal was to overcome the rule of the feudal aristocracy,
and the strict social hierarchies of the ancien régime. The new French society, in
Marx’ words, marked the victory of “bourgeois ownership over feudal ownership
[...], of the division of land over primogeniture” and of “the family over the fam-
ily name” (cited in McPhee 1989, 1266). The abolishment of primogeniture—a
structurally unequal manner of transferring wealth—was widely believed to be a
pivotal mean to achieve social equality and became a center point of the heated
revolutionary debates. Beckert (2007) writes:
“In France, inheritance law also became an important focus of political
debate at the time of the Revolution. Particularly, the institutions of
primogeniture and entail were rejected as structural elements of the
ancien régime which were seen as incompatible with the revolutionary
principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity.”
Beckert (2007, 91-92)
The American revolutionaries, too, believed in the effectiveness of fair inher-
itance customs to achieve social equality. In Democracy in America, Alexis de
Tocqueville writes that “the law of inheritance was the last step to equality”
(2003, 31). In particular, Tocqueville argues that equal inheritance customs had
democratized the United States. He writes: “the last trace of ranks and heredi-
tary distinctions is destroyed; the law of successions has hastened the process of
leveling everywhere” (cited in Giesey 1977, 271). Tocqueville goes so far to claim
that equitable inheritance is a sufficient condition to achieve social equality. He
writes: “[once] the legislator has [...] regulated the law of inheritance, he may rest
from his labor” (2003, 32).
In revolutionary France, the most immediate effect of the abolition of primo-
geniture was felt among women and aristocrats. Equal inheritance meant that
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women could inherit. It also meant that the feudal class was hard pressed to
maintain the cohesion of family wealth. After all, writes Hurwich (1993, 699) in a
careful historical analysis of the German nobility, “primogeniture or other forms
of impartible inheritance was [...] [a] method by which noble families could avoid
subdivision of their estates and consolidate wealth to hand on to future genera-
tions.” Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison second that “[primogeniture] concentrated
wealth in the hands of a few dynastic families,” which “were entrenched within
a centralized power system” (2002, 658). With reference to France, Rose (1986,
178) writes:
“In March 1790 the Constituent Assembly began by abolishing primo-
geniture for formerly noble property, at the same time as it abolished
nobility itself. This meant that all the heirs of a property-owner could
inherit, including daughters, and not just the eldest son or other male
descendent, the previous practice. Two years later, in March 1793, the
Convention extended equal inheritance rights to all kinds of property,
and moreover this legislation was made retroactive to 1789. So that
legally, brothers had to hand back a share of their property to their
sisters; and many women exercised their rights, to the confusion of the
courts.”
Rose (1986, 178)
Taken together, the historical experience in France and the U.S. points to
a logic whereby equitable inheritance customs attenuate social inequalities. This
holds particularly true for traditionally disadvantaged groups such as women. The
“losers” in this process are first-born sons. Moreover, equitable inheritance un-
dermines the hereditary social classes of higher status, notably, aristocrats. Such
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families are no longer able to keep economic assets apiece, thus decreasing their
economic and social clout. Our main hypothesis is thus as follows:
• Hypothesis 1: Equitable inheritance customs reduce social inequality
2.1.2 Mechanism 1: Wealth inequality
The most prominent logic linking equitable inheritance to social equality pertains
to the distribution of wealth. Inequitable inheritance, by apportioning the entire
plot of land to the eldest son, leaves the remaining children with little or no
wealth. Equitable inheritance, on the other hand, achieves wealth equality by
splitting property fairly among all children.
Before exploring this logic further, however, it should be noted that in Germany
non-inheriting children at times received monetary compensations, calculated ei-
ther on the basis of the property’s value (Verkehrswert) or its profits (Ertragswert)
(Habakkuk, 1955). Even within aristocratic families monetary compensation was
not unheard of. Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison (2002, 658) write: “primogeniture
could induce landless sons to remain bachelors, thereby reducing the pool of eli-
gible heirs. Dynastic families considered it a duty not only to have children but
also to care for them, which meant [...] launching them into the adult world with
some measure of economic security.” Besides monetary compensations, the authors
point to the church as an insurance for non-inheriting sons. They write: “the me-
dieval church served the landed aristocracy as a kind of insurer, or employer of
last resort [...]. Moreover, female children could also find ready ‘employment’ in
the church.” This held particularly true in Catholic areas. As Fichtner (1989, 52-
53) notes: “Catholics had a better way to enjoy the advantages of primogeniture,
yet live with their consciences over the treatment of younger sons. They could
still arrange appropriate livings for their offspring in the church.” Last, it should
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also be pointed out that in other European countries, primogeniture was some-
times avoided (Brodrick, 1881, 99). Evidence for systematic avoidance, however,
is scarce in the German context.
The link from equitable inheritance to a more equal distribution of wealth is a
common argument among social scientists. Blinder (1973), for instance, presents
a theoretical model and Menchik (1980) delivers empirical evidence demonstrating
a firm link between equitable inheritance and a more equal distribution of wealth
within families and within society at large. Thus, Menchik concludes: “economies
that feature primogeniture will have a greater degree of inequality than those fea-
turing equal division” (1980, 299). Similarly, discussing primogeniture in Europe
more broadly, Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison (2002, 67) write: “primogeniture en-
couraged the concentration of wealth”. And, in a historical analysis of Lombardy,
Roberts (1953) notes that its nobility constituted a mere 1 percent of the popula-
tion, but owned nearly half of its property. The author attributes this inequality
in land to one particular institution: primogeniture (1953, 67). Our second hy-
pothesis is thus as follows:
• Hypothesis 2: Equitable inheritance customs reduce wealth inequality
2.1.3 Mechanism 2: Pro-egalitarian preferences
Besides a rather mechanical economic effect on the distribution of wealth, histo-
rians also point to habitual effects of equitable inheritance customs. Habakkuk
(1955, 4), for instances, writes that “inheritance systems exerted an influence on
the structure of the family, that is, [...] on the relations of parents to children
and between children.” French sociologist Todd (1994), in his book La destin des
immigrés, argues that equitable inheritance customs foster a symmetric family
structure where the equality of siblings is taken for granted. By contrast, in-
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equitable inheritance leads to an asymmetric family structure, which prizes the
firstborn son. As a result, argues Todd (1994), equitable inheritance foster pref-
erences for equality among children. Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison second that
inequitable inheritance caused “untold bitterness within the family” (2002, 658).
Beckert (2007) makes a similar argument drawing on evidence from revolu-
tionary France. He demonstrates that equitable inheritance was widely seen as
instilling in people a sense of the equality of all citizens. Beckert writes: the “un-
equal legal treatment of different social ranks and of family members based on
ascriptive characteristics was seen as a violation of natural equality” (2007, 92).
A debate in the Assembleé Nationale in 1791 underlines this logic:
“I would not know, Gentlemen, how it should be possible to reconcile
the new French constitution, where it heads with regard to the great
and admirable principle of equality, with a law that allows a father, a
mother, to forget in relation to their children, these sacred principles
of natural equality, and to enlarge thereby in society the differences
that result from the diversity of talents and from industry, instead of
correcting them through the equal division of the household wealth.”
Mirabeau in Assemblée Nationale, April 2, 1791, 513 [cited in Beckert
2007]
Similar arguments about equitable inheritance’s influence on pro-egalitarian
preferences are found among political theorists. Hirschmann (2008), for instance,
highlights that John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty singles out inequitable inheritance,
particularly primogeniture, as an immoral institution. According to Hirschmann
(2008), Mill “opposes primogeniture and claims that parents have a moral obli-
gation to bequeath to their children who are ‘unable to provide for themselves’ ”.
14
The idea, here, is that equitable inheritance customs induce in children an idea to
care for others less fortunate.
The link between equitable inheritance and pro-egalitarian ideals has also been
pointed out among scholars of Protestantism in Germany. Fichtner (1989), for
instance, argues that Protestant areas encouraged equitable inheritance as it epit-
omized the Protestant ideal of “equality among brothers” (1989, 14). Her argu-
ments, however, have come under criticism for lacking a sound statistical basis
(Soergel, 1990). Moreover, as I demonstrate in Table 2.2, Protestantism is a poor
predictor of equitable inheritance customs.
Taken together, equitable inheritance may increase social equality by fostering
a belief in the fundamental equality of all humans. I therefore formulate the fol-
lowing secondary outcome, which possibly mediates the relation between equitable
inheritance and social inequality.
• Hypothesis 3: Equitable inheritance customs increase pro-egalitarian pref-
erences
2.1.4 Inheritance and Income
The French and American revolutionaries strongly believed in the power of eq-
uitable inheritance to ensure social equality, by fairly distributing wealth and by
spurring pro-egalitarian preferences. Meanwhile, the effects of equitable inher-
itance on per capita incomes was a contested issue. Social scientists, too, have
formed conflicting predictions about the effect of equitable inheritance on incomes.
On one hand, Alston and Schapiro (1984, 281) note that inequitable inheritance
leads to “larger estates and agricultural wealth.” Evidence from the United States
buttresses this conjecture. Large plantations, particularly in the South, were his-
torically almost exclusively inherited using primogeniture (Gray, Thompson and
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Esther, 1933). Conversely, equitable inheritance is argued to fragment farms,
which renders them economically futile.
On the other hand, there are also arguments that link equitable inheritance
to income growth. Alston and Schapiro (1984), for instance, argue that equitable
inheritance may lower labor supervision costs as all children have an incentive to
work. Bertillon (1911), too, argues that income increases under equitable inheri-
tance given that it leads to lower population growth as peasants aim to counter the
atomization of their property.1 And Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison (2002) argue
that “partible [equitable] inheritance should also play a role in economic growth,”
by fostering “competition and capitalist exchange” (2002, 666). In sum, then, it is
unclear whether equitable inheritance customs de- or increase per capita income.
I formulate the hypothesis that has received stronger support in the historical
literature.
• Hypothesis 4: Equitable inheritance customs increase per capita income
Besides an effect on incomes, an inquiry into the interplay of inheritance and
inequality should explore whether inheritance affects income inequality. Income
inequality is distinct from social inequality—defined here as a state where a soci-
ety’s resources are distributed unevenly along lines of socially salient categories of
persons. Indeed, if equitable inheritance leaves but one inequality, namely abil-
ity, it may well have a positive effect on income inequality. Such an argument is
in line with a common finding that economic growth increases income inequality
(Kuznets, 1955; Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999).
Such considerations were also common among the commentators of the French
and American revolutions. As Martineau (1842, 15) writes, in America “[f]ew
1This link, however, is disputable. For instance, the German kingdom Baden, which relied
on equitable inheritance, witnessed substantial population growth, while the neighboring Wü,
which predominantly relied on inequitable inheritance, did not.
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are very wealthy; few are poor; and every man has a fair chance of being rich.”2
Indeed, de Visme Williamson (1976, 102) argues that the early American society
was shaped by a “equalitarianism [...] among pioneers, [whose] only inequalities
were those of ability and work”, which may lead to an unequal distribution of
incomes if talent is sufficiently skewed. I therefore formulate our final hypothesis
as follows:
• Hypothesis 5: Equitable inheritance customs increase income inequality
2.2 Determinants of Inheritance Customs
To assess the relation between inheritance and inequality, I draw on empirical ev-
idence from Germany. The country exhibits pronounced historical municipality-
level geographic variation in inheritance customs (see Figure 2.1, which depicts in-
heritance customs circa 1900). Particularly in Germany’s South-West, inheritance
customs regularly varied from one village to the next. Red and yellow areas (eq-
uitable inheritance) are juxtaposed with green and light-green areas (inequitable
inheritance). While there are broad trends (e.g., Bavaria in the south-east adopt-
ing inequitable inheritance), the variation is clearly visible in the federal states
Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and North Rhine-
Westphalia.
Importantly, the historical inheritance customs continue to be implemented
to this very day. While there is undoubtedly a general move toward equitable
inheritance, vast areas of Germany still see wealth passed on to the firstborn child.
Contemporary evidence, however, is scarce. For this reason, I rely on the data
2It should not be forgotten, however, that such economic equality only prevailed among white
men and “was surrounded by an array of other fixed, ascriptive systems of unequal status, all
largely unchallenged by the American revolutionaries” (Smith, 1993, 549).
17
produced in Figure 2.1. But, I conducted five qualitative interviews with farmers
to buttress that both inheritance customs are still practiced today. One farmer
hailing from the Münsterland, for instance, stated: “It may come as a surprise,
but agricultural inheritance is still done like we did it two hundred years ago: it’s
given to the oldest son. We just want to keep the farms intact. [...] As a matter of
fact, it’s not just agricultural inheritance. In this area, even non-farmers inherit
like that. It’s partly due to the fact that the oldest son has a responsibility for the
family’s wealth.”
What explains the variation in inheritance customs across Western Germany?
Historians have proposed three competing theories. First, a cultural theory stip-
ulates that inequitable inheritance is a remnant of Germanic customs, while eq-
uitable inheritance has its roots in the Roman legal tradition. Second, a political
theory contends that equitable inheritance was driven by peasant liberation during
the Middle Ages, while inequitable inheritance is observed in areas where peasants
did not experience such autonomy. Third, an economic theory argues that equi-
table inheritance is linked to fertile soils, while inequitable inheritance is present
in areas less suitable to agriculture.3 The theories, which are mostly at odds with
one another, are laid out and assessed in turn. To adjudicate between them empir-
ically, I estimate a series of empirical models to explore how much of the regional
variation of inheritance can be explained by the theories (Section 2.4.5).
3A possible fourth theory is that equitable inheritance is linked to Protestantism. The logic
here is that Protestants value human equality more so than Catholics and therefore prefer equi-
table inheritance (see, Fichtner, 1989). This argument, however, is widely disputed. I therefore
do not discuss this explanation in depth. I do, however, control for Protestantism (specifically,
a commonly used instrument for Protestantism—the distance to Wittenberg) in the empirical
analyses in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Map of West-German inheritance customs
Notes: Based on (Röhm, 1957). Dark green depicts inequitable inheritance, red depicts equitable
inheritance, light green depicts mixed (historically inequitable) inheritance, yellow depicts mixed
(historically equitable) inheritance.
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2.2.1 Culture
A first set of scholars argues that cultural differences explain variation in inher-
itance customs. According to this theory, inequitable inheritance is a remnant
of Germanic practices, while equitable inheritance is a vestige of Roman culture
(Schulz, 1926; Huppertz, 1939). While reliable historical evidence is sparse,4 Ger-
manic inheritance customs are widely believed to have been structured in reference
to families (Sippe). All members of German families—save families in serfdom—
owned the land together. The death of the patriarch did not substantially alter
the structure of the land; it remained in the family, which was led by the eldest son
(Grönbech, 1937). On the contrary, Roman inheritance customs were rooted in a
firmly individualist tradition (Kölb, 1978). Property belonged to individuals, not
entire families. As such, Roman inheritance customs would make it more likely for
property to be divided among children, given the absence of any norm stipulating
that land must stay apiece within the family.
Taken together, the cultural theory argues that areas in modern-day Germany
with greater exposure to the Roman empire (i.e., areas south of the Limes) are
more likely to adopt equitable inheritance customs. In contrast, areas with a
firmly Germanic tradition are more likely to rely on inequitable inheritance. A
cursory analysis of inheritance practices (see Figure 2.1), shows that equitable
inheritance is, indeed, more prevalent in the former Roman areas of modern-day
Germany. Yet, there is still sizable historical variation in Germanic as well as
4One of the first accounts on German inheritance customs can be found in Tacitus’ On the
Origin and Situation of the Germanic Peoples, published around 98 AD. Tacitus remarks that
the Germans “till every year new fields, and there is still (untilled) land left over” (Tacitus
1999; Chapter 26). Early commentators interpreted Tacitus’ remark to mean that the Germans
engaged in a form of agricultural communism whereby properties are kept in one piece within
families and communities (Ernst, 1926). Most modern historians, however, agree that the Ger-
mans endorsed private property early on. Only select areas of villages, such as hunting grounds,
were common property (Weller, 1927).
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Roman areas, which the theory fails to explain. The Rhineland, for instance, is
shaped by equitable inheritance despite having little relation to the Roman empire.
Bavaria, by contrast, mostly relies on inequitable inheritance despite having been
part of the Roman area.
2.2.2 Politics
A second set of scholars contends that political developments, particularly the
liberation of peasants, gave rise to variation in inheritance customs. According to
this peasant liberation theory, equitable inheritance is closely linked to peasants’
freedom to own (Abel, 1956). Scholars adopting this view commonly take the
advent of the Carolingian dynasty as their starting point. The rule of Charles the
Great (c. 742 to 814 AD) led to a profound re-configuration of the peasant class.
While in classical antiquity, peasants and noblemen had not differed substantially
in terms of their income and political clout (Lütge, 1966), the rein of Charles
marked the German nobility’s steady rise to power. The elite’s appropriation of
new lands led to an ever-growing number of serfs who cultivated the demesne
lands. Importantly, the logistical burdens implicit in this growth meant that serfs
had to be granted significant personal liberties. The result was the emergence of
semi-free peasants.5 The growth in personal liberties and economic prowess sig-
nificantly increased the peasants’ confidence. They began to demand what they
deemed rightfully theirs: the right to own and inherit property. As a result, sev-
eral regions of modern-day Germany witnessed new forms of peasant inheritance.
Examples are the Landsiedelleihe or the Freistift—two forms of leasing property.
Thus, writes Kölb (1978, 58), “the improvement of property rights in the form of
5This included semi-free peasants such as Ackerbürger and Grundholde. Of particular impor-
tance for the Carolingians were Königsfreie (King’s freemen)—a class of semi-free peasants who
were part of the Carolingian army.
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inheritance led farmers to partibly inherit their property, because they wanted all
their descendants to share in their possession.”6
In sum, peasant liberation theory contends that equitable inheritance is more
likely in areas where peasants demanded or were granted significant autonomy.
In contrast, areas where peasants lacked such autonomy were more likely to rely
on inequitable inheritance, where property stayed apiece so as to maintain power
of (aristocratic) families. Taking the exposure of municipalities to the German
peasant wars (circa 1522 to 1525) as a proxy for peasant’s propensity to demand
basic property rights, equitable inheritance is more likely close to the historical
center of the wars. Yet, peasant liberty theory fails to explain the significant
variation that remains. Notably, as can be seen in Figures 2.8 and 2.10 in the
supplementary information, the starting region of the Peasant wars—the area
around the town St. Blasien—historically relied on both equitable and inequitable
inheritance.
2.2.3 Economy
A final group of scholars has proposed an economic theory of inheritance customs,
whereby equitable inheritance is linked to fertile soils and profitable crops. Schol-
ars proposing such economic considerations typically use the High Middle Ages as
their starting point—a period of increasing peasant migration and professionaliza-
tion. Schulze (1974), for instance, demonstrates that the Königsfreie—peasants
who were granted significant autonomy by the Carolingians, which included the
right to inherit property—mostly settled in border areas of Francia. These areas
had traditionally offered little profit, partly owing to poor infrastructure; Agri-
6Some rulers, particularly in Northern Germany, reacted to the growing demands from peas-
ants by instituting the Meierhof system, whereby farms of the noble or ecclesiastical classes
were occupied by administrators. The system was aimed at effectively countering inheritance,
particularly of the equitable kind.
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culture was notoriously hard. As a result, these areas did not witness equitable
inheritance as would have been predicted by peasant liberation theory (Abel,
1956). Rather, the low returns on investment meant that property was passed on
to only one son (inequitable inheritance) so as to prevent the land from getting
too small to make a profit. Röhm notes that “where parceled corridors existed or
still exist [...], the division of land [...] is observed more often than in areas with
more or less scattered settlements.” (1957, 3).
Taken together, scholars proposing an economic theory argue that favorable
climate and soil conditions determine whether a given area can afford to adopt
equitable inheritance. Areas with unfavorable soil and climate conditions, on the
other hand, must rely on inequitable inheritance. Though theoretically intuitive,
this theory does not seem compelling when comparing climate and soil condi-
tions in modern-day Germany (see Figure 2.9 in the supplementary information)
to historical inheritance customs. There is no apparent correlation between in-
heritance customs and agricultural suitability at the municipality-level. As such,
Kölb (1978) argues that “poor soil and unfavorable climate did not spread closed
inheritance customs”.
2.2.4 Inheritance Data
To judge the explanatory power of these theories more rigorously, I collected data
from a variety of sources. Before laying out these data sources, however, I will first
introduce the key data source of this chapter, namely, our measure for inheritance
customs.
To our knowledge, the most comprehensive data on German inheritance cus-
toms was collected by Helmut Röhm (1957) as part of an effort by a history
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commission to map Germany’s agricultural landscape.7 Röhm sent a detailed
questionnaire to all 24,547 German municipalities (Verwaltungsgemeinde)—the
smallest administrative unit—which was to be answered by local-level administra-
tive officials.8
The resulting map was printed in the Atlas der Deutschen Agrarlandschaft and
is provided in Figure 2.1. The map provides information on agricultural inheri-
tance customs historically prevalent in a given municipality. The two key variables
of interest are (1) equitable, which refers to municipalities where inheritance was
historically evenly split among heirs, and (2) inequitable, which refers to municipal-
ities where inheritance was given to the eldest born. In addition, the map conveys
information on whether a municipality has witnessed a change in inheritance cus-
toms since circa 1900, producing two further variables: Mixed (inequitable) refers
to communities that historically relied on inequitable inheritance, but have grad-
ually witnessed the adoption of equitable inheritance customs. Mixed (equitable)
refers to communities that traditionally adopted equitable inheritance, but have
witnessed the adoption of inequitable inheritance in recent years. Finally, the
map has information on areas where no agricultural inheritance was passed on.
This mostly refers to public and forestry areas (Forest). Once again, it should be
pointed out that inheritance customs were never standardized across Germany. To
this day, agricultural (and non-agricultural) property is frequently passed on to the
firstborn child. Systematic evidence about inheritance customs today, however, is
not available.
Since West Germany continuously reduced the number of municipalities (8,670
7A variety of historical sources have assessed German inheritance customs. Notably, Sering
(1900) collected detailed information around the turn of the century. These records, however,
did not use uniform measurements across municipalities and were insufficiently granular to afford
a local-level empirical design.
8To our knowledge, the survey was answered by all officials. The questionnaire is provided
in Figure 2.12 in the Supplementary Information.
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Table 2.1: Inheritance customs across German municipalities
ca. 1900 ca. 1950
Equitable 28% 16%
Inequitable 66% 52%
Mixed (equitable) 12%
Mixed (inequitable) 14%
Forest 5% 5%
as of 2015), I overlaid Röhm’s map with Germany’s current municipal administra-
tive boundaries. To convert the map’s information into a numerical vector I used
an algorithm that counts the number of pixels associated with a given inheritance
custom. Given that the 2015 municipalities tend to be larger than the municipal-
ities of 1959 and given that the algorithm has random measurement error,9 the
resulting treatment measure is continuous. However, I also construct a dichoto-
mous treatment indicator, where the treatment variable with the highest share of
pixels gets a 1, while all others are assigned a 0. The dichotomous measure is
shown in Table 2.1.
As can be seen, in 1900 inheritance customs were split between equitable (28%)
and inequitable (66%). By 1950, these numbers had reduced to 16% and 52%,
respectively, where the remaining municipalities are either public forest land or
adopt a mix of both systems. I use the 1900 inheritance customs as our key
independent variable. This variable, notes Röhm (1957), is a good proxy for
historical customs and had, at the time, been stable for centuries. Yet, future
work may find it worthwhile to explore why certain municipalities have shifted
from one form to the other between 1900 and 1950.
9The algorithm counts the number of pixels of a given treatment color in Röhm’s map. Thus,
areas with imperfect coloring or with city names are not counted appropriately. Such error,
however, is plausibly random.
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2.2.5 Balance
Having laid out the inheritance data sources, I turn to our key quantitative check
regarding the determinants of the customs. Specifically, I collected data on Ro-
man rule (cultural theory), peasant liberation (political theory) and agricultural
suitability (economic theory).
We measure Roman rule using data from the Digital Atlas of Roman and
Medieval Civilizations (McCormick, Huang and Gibson, 2007). I construct a di-
chotomous Roman rule variable, which takes on the value one if the municipality
is situated within the 137 CE borders of the Roman Empire, and zero otherwise.
We measure peasant liberation by digitizing a map provided in Putzger (1970),
which contains information on the extent of the peasant wars between 1522 and
1525. Since the Putzger data is less detailed than the Röhm data, I measure
peasant war involvement on the county level. For each county, I obtain a variable
ranging from zero (not involved in the peasant wars) to one (wholly involved
in the peasant wars). The Putzger map and our adaption are printed in the
supplementary information (Figure 2.8 and 2.10, respectively).
To measure agricultural suitability, I have collected several variables: mean
and SD of elevation (the source is NASA; Jarvis et al. 2008), mean temperature
(the source is the German National Climate Data Center; Kaspar et al. 2013), and
soil organic carbon content (the source is the European Soil Database; Panagos
2006).
To assess to what degree the three theories can explain variation in inheritance
customs across municipalities, I regress a dummy for equitable inheritance customs
on proxies for the three theories (Table 2.2) state fixed effects. In so doing, I also
include the variable Distance to Wittenberg in order to proxy for Protestantism
(see Footnote 3). As can be seen, the coefficient sizes are consistently small and
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Table 2.2: Pre-treatment covariates and equitable inheritance
Equitable
(1)
Cultural: Roman rule -0.005
(0.018)
Political: Peasant wars 0.804
(0.402)
Economic: Mean elevation -0.734
(0.095)
Economic: SD of elevation 0.001
(0.0002)
Economic: Ruggedness -0.002
(0.001)
Economic: Mean temperature 0.001
(0.006)
Economic: Soil carbon content -0.007
(0.006)
Protestantism: Distance to Wittenberg 0.002
(0.005)
Observations 8,657
Notes: Regression of salient pre-treatment covariates
depicting theoretical determinants on binary equitable
inheritance dummy. County fixed effects included.
Models control for longitude and latitude.
27
measured with noise. What is more: the effect signs are not in line with the
theoretical predictions. The cultural theory stipulates that Roman rule led to
equitable inheritance. Yet, I estimate a negative coefficient for the Roman rule
variable. The political theory argues that peasant liberation led to equitable
inheritance. While the coefficient for peasant wars points in the right direction, it
is estimated with significant uncertainty, despite an overall sample of over 8,500
municipalities. Finally, the economic theory argues that suitable soil conditions
led to equitable inheritance customs. However, the estimates for the soil data are
consistently small, insignificant and tend to point into the wrong direction. The
most direct measure, soil carbon content, for instance, yields a negative coefficient.
2.2.6 Exogeneity
Taken together, the historical discussion coupled with the empirical analysis con-
firms that the precise determinants of inheritance customs remain unclear. The
three theories, given their weak empirical backing and conflicting logics, raise an
important question: To what degree can inheritance customs be conceptualized
as an “independent” variable that affects social outcomes? Two epistemological
positions are defensible.
First, one may take the view that inheritance customs cannot, by principle, be
viewed as an independent variable, given that they were not exogenously manip-
ulated. Here, then, the theories can provide useful guidance as to which causal
pathways must be adjusted for in an empirical analysis. An empirical model link-
ing inheritance to social equality should then adjust for three important causal
pathways. These are a region’s (1) exposure to Roman culture, (2) the degree to
which peasants were free during the Middle Ages, and (3) the geological suitability
of agricultural lands.
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Second, given that the three most salient theories could not be confirmed quan-
titatively, one may argue that inheritance customs are sufficiently old and sticky to
act as independent variables.10 Historians support such an interpretation. Röhm,
for instances, notes that up until the 1930s German “agricultural inheritance cus-
toms were neither influenced by scholarly doctrines nor by legislative changes”
(1957, 2).11 Forst (1921) takes the view that German inheritance customs have
not fundamentally changed, whatsoever: “institutions as deeply linked to the eth-
ical perceptions and economic necessities, as long standing and intertwined with
the lives of peasants as inheritance customs cannot be fundamentally changed –
not even by law.” (1921, 21).12
In the empirical section, I try to accommodate both views by conducting simple
regression analyses as well as a careful geographic matching designs, whereby ad-
jacent villages are paired and observable differences minimized across communities
adopting equitable and inequitable inheritance.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Social inequality
My main outcome of interest is the degree to which local German municipalities
can be characterized as socially equal. I define social inequality as a state where a
society’s resources are distributed unevenly along lines of socially salient categories
of persons. Two groups are particularly salient in the historical discourse: women
10We define exogeneity as E[ε|X] = 0.
11The Prussian Enquete in 1929 “Agricultural Inheritance Customs in Germany” came to a
similar conclusion.
12Such a reading is supported by case studies outside of Germany. For example, in South
Tyrol-Alto Adige—Italy’s northernmost province—inequitable inheritance (geschlossener Hof )
was introduced in the 6th century by the Bavarians. Since then, the institution has been firmly
entrenched (Mori and Hintner, 2013). Attempts by the Italian government to impose Italian
inheritance customs—i.e., equitable inheritance—were unsuccessful.
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and aristocrats. The former marks a historically disadvantaged group, while the
latter marks a historically favored group. I measure social equality in three ways,
capturing the status of women, ethnic minorities and aristocrats.
Female representation. My first measure of social inequality is the share of
women in municipal councils (Caul, 1999, 2001; Htun and Weldon, 2010). In
so doing, I draw on fine-grained data collected by Ruth Ditlmann and Rafaela
Dancygier (ongoing research project). For each municipality, I calculate (1) the
percentage of female members in municipal councils, and (2) the percentage of
female members in municipal councils, restricted to women that are members of
the five largest parties. Currently, the data by Ditlman and Dancygier is limited
to municipalities with more than 2000 inhabitants. Therefore, all results on female
representation are based on a subset of about 46% of all municipalities in West
Germany.
Minority representation. My second measure of social inequality is the share
of ethnic minorities in municipal councils (Togeby, 2008; Dancygier, 2010). Here,
I use the same dataset as outline above. In particular, for each municipality
I calculate (1) the percentage of members in local councils that do not have a
German last name, and (2) the percentage of members in local councils without
a German last name, restricted to the five major parties.
Aristocratic representation. My third measure of social inequality is the share
of aristocrats in local elite networks. To measure elite networks, I obtained a list
of all members of Rotary International in Germany. Rotary members are mainly
composed of business and civic leaders and consider themselves to be part of the
social elite. Based on this list, I am able to determine (1) the total number of
members of each chapter as well as (2) the number of members from aristocratic
families. To identify aristocratic members, I use German naming conventions that
30
are unique to aristocrats.13 For each municipality where a Rotary chapter exists,
I calculate the share of aristocratic members. Rotary is only active in roughly 600
(mostly larger) German municipalities, which reduces our sample size significantly.
2.3.2 Mechanism 1: Wealth inequality
My most immediate mechanism, which plausibly links equitable inheritance to
social equality, is the fair transmission of wealth. In order to scrutinize the histor-
ical effect of equitable inheritance on wealth equality, I use data on agricultural
land inequality in 1895. The data was originally collected by Ziblatt (2009), who
obtained it from the 1898 agricultural census in the German Empire. The cen-
sus contains information on the size of over 5 million agricultural units in 1,004
counties in 1895. In each county, agricultural units are divided into 18 size cat-
egories. For each of these categories, the total number of farms, as well as the
area held by those farms, is recorded. Ziblatt aggregates the data to the level
of the electoral district (Reichstagswahkreis) and then calculates the GINI index
of agricultural landholding. To combine our inheritance data with the landhold-
ing GINI, I aggregate Röhm’s measure of inheritance customs to the level of the
1895 German electoral districts. This leaves us with an overall sample size of 219
electoral districts.
2.3.3 Mechanism 2: Pro-egalitarian preferences
A second hypothesized intermediate outcome, linking equitable inheritance to
social equality, are pro-egalitarian preferences. I use three measures for pro-
egalitarian preferences in order to capture historical as well as contemporary pref-
13For example, names may include the words “von” or “zu” (meaning “of”), which indicate
the geographic origin of an aristocratic lineage. Oftentimes, titles are also officially part of a
name, like “Graf” (count) or even “Prinzessin” (princess).
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erences.
First, to parse out the historical effects of equitable inheritance on pro-egalitarian
preferences, I obtained data from the 1933 election. A long literature has asso-
ciated preferences for social equality with parties on the political left (see Orren,
1985, 387). As Boix (1998, 5) writes “left-wing or social democratic parties [...]
especially care about [...] equality,” while conservative parties tend to “reject any
equalization process” (see also, Hewitt, 1977). I use the 1933 election given its
decisive influence on world history. Specifically, I assess the vote share for Hitler’s
fascist NSDAP party as a revelation of anti-egalitarian preferences. In so doing,
I use data collected by Hänisch (1989). The data contains detailed information
on election results in 925 German counties (Kreise). For each county, I define
NSDAP vote shares as the number of votes for the NSDAP, divided by the total
number of votes cast. Since our inheritance custom data is on the level of current
German municipalities, I aggregate it, and then merge it with 1933 election data.
In the end, I have complete information for 605 counties. The remaining counties
are located in the Eastern parts of Germany, for which I do not have data on
inheritance customs.
My second measure of pro-egalitarian preferences is today’s vote share of left-
leaning parties. Here, I collected the vote share for all major German parties in
the four most recent elections: The federal elections in 2009 and 2013, as well
as the European elections in 2009 and 2014. Older electoral outcomes are not
available for the 2015 municipalities. The data was obtained from the Statistisches
Bundesamt.14 In the empirical analysis, I focus on the five most important parties:
the conservative CDU (and its Bavarian sister party CSU ), the liberal-conservative
FDP, as well as the three left-leaning parties: SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
14https://www.destatis.de
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(Green party) and Die Linke (Left party). The summary statistics of the electoral
outcomes are presented in the supplementary information (Table 2.5).15
My third measure for pro-egalitarian preferences is a survey item administered
in the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP). SOEP is a longitudinal
survey containing socioeconomic information on private households in Germany.
The SOEP has been fielded since 1984. It contains information on the location of
all households in the survey. Therefore, I was able to exactly match the equitable
inheritance variable to the SOEP. Given circa 8,500 municipalities, I thus have
an average of 2.5 respondents per municipality. Following Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln (2007), I measure pro-egalitarian preferences using four items, asked
in the year 2002, concerning the role of the state in providing social security.
The main question reads “At present, a multitude of social services are provided
not only by the state but also by private free market enterprises, organizations,
associations, or private citizens. What is your opinion on this? Who should be
responsible for the following areas?” I selected four areas: “financial security in
case of unemployment,” “financial security in case of illness,” “financial security
for persons needing care” and “creation of employment opportunities.” Answers
are recorded as five-point Likert scales ranging from one (only the the state is
responsible) to five (only private organizations are responsible).
2.3.4 Income
To measure inheritance customs’ effects on income, I use two measures—one his-
torical and one contemporary.
I measure historical incomes using data from the Prussian Economic History
Database (iPEHD; Becker et al. 2014). The iPEHD data base contains a rich set
15We use the so-called second vote (Zweitstimme) when analyzing electoral results at the
federal level, given that it is the more salient electoral outcome.
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of county-level variables taken from Prussian censuses in the years between 1816–
1901. Specifically, I obtain average daily wages for male laborers in 1892 and
1901, measured in Marks. For each year, wages are recorded separately for urban
and rural laborers, which leaves us with a total of four outcome variables. The
Prussian territory, however, only covered part of contemporary Germany, leaving
out large areas in Southern Germany including Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg.
Moreover, I only have income data for 190 of the available 281 Prussian counties
in the data base. The overall sample size is thus rather low. In 21% of those 190
counties, equitable inheritance is the most prevalent inheritance custom.
I measure contemporary incomes using data from the German Federal Statis-
tical Office. Specifically, when preparing their tax forms, German citizens com-
municate their annual income to the relevant tax authorities. I gained access to
these data—subject to strict privatization restrictions. I constructed a variable,
monthly income, that divides the yearly income by 12. The data is summarized
in Tables 2.6 to 2.7 in the Supplementary Information.
2.3.5 Income Inequality
My final outcome of interest—though analytically distinct from social equality—
is income inequality. I was unable to obtain reliable historical data on income
inequality. Moreover, measuring today’s income inequality at the local level is
similarly daunting task; in our case it requires data on the distribution of incomes
at the municipality level. Most surveys that include information on personal in-
come have too few observations to make statements about income distributions
at the municipality level.16 To bridge this problem, I was able to gain access to
16To give an example, the 2002 German Socio-Economic Panel has about 19,000 observations.
Given 8,500 German municipalities, this leaves two individuals per municipality, assuming that
participants are distributed equally, which makes statements about distributions impossible.
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data from all German tax records. The data was provided to us by the research
data center of the German Federal Statistical Office. The office keeps records of
roughly 50 million tax records. I collaborated with the office, providing them with
appropriate statistical code in order to construct local GINI indexes at the mu-
nicipality level. This unique source of data—heretofore untapped—is our primary
measure for income inequality. I summarize the data in Tables 2.6 to 2.7 in the
Supplementary Information.
2.4 Results
In this section, I estimate the association between inheritance customs and social
equality. In a first step, I regress the respective measure of social equality on the
equitable inheritance variable using the following benchmark specification:
Yi = α + x′iβ1 + β2Equitablei + εi (2.1)
where, Yi represents the outcome of interest. The variable Equitablei is a dummy
that takes on the value one if equitable inheritance is the dominant custom in
municipality i, and zero otherwise. Finally, xi is a vector of covariates presented
in Table 2.2, and εi is an error term. In a second step, I then adopt a geographic
matching procedure in order to establish more suitable counterfactuals.
2.4.1 Social Inequality
In a first step, I regress the share of women in local councils on the equitable
treatment dummy. In Table 2.3, I show that equitable inheritance is associated
with a rise in the share of women by roughly four percentage points (Model 1).
The estimated effect is smaller when restricting the analysis to the five largest
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parties (Model 2). The difference may be owing to the fact that gender norms are
more standardized within large parties, particularly on the political left.
In a second step, I regress the share of members with non-German names in
local councils on the equitable treatment dummy. Model 3 in Table 2.3 shows
an estimated effect of roughly 1 percentage point, with a small accompanying
standard error. The effect is, again, slightly smaller when restricting the analysis
to the five major German parties, though it remains highly significant (Model 4).
In a third step, I regress the share of aristocrats in Rotary chapters on my
treatment indicator (Model 5 in Table 2.3). This analysis is less precise, given
that there are only roughly 600 chapters in Germany. In line with my theoretical
expectation, I find that equitably inheriting communities see significantly fewer
aristocrats in local elite clubs, like the Rotary. Specifically, I estimate that equi-
table inheritance customs are associated with a 1.4 percentage points reduction of
Aristocrats in Rotary chapters, which is precisely estimated.
Taken together, the linear models presented in this section provide a first piece
of evidence for my first hypothesis. Equitable inheritance is associated with an
improved representation of women and minorities in local parliaments. At the
same time, members of the nobility are less likely to be members of local Rotary
clubs—an institution that prides itself as representing the social and economic
elite.
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Matching procedure
In a next step, I develop a new geographic matching procedure in order to create
more suitable counterfactuals at the local level. As was highlighted above, the
distribution of inheritance customs in Germany has the unique property that the
spatial variation is pronounced even on small geographical levels. It is not uncom-
mon that two neighboring municipalities historically followed opposite inheritance
customs.
I use this fact to develop a new geographic discontinuity matching method,
which, to my knowledge, has not been implemented before. Conceptually speak-
ing, if two adjacent municipalities follow different inheritance customs, this can be
thought of as both being close to the “cut-off” between equitable and inequitable
inheritance. Comparing such municipalities invokes a crucial assumption, namely,
independence of conditional outcomes and treatment given that two municipalities
are adjacent:
Y (T = 1), Y (T = 0) ⊥T |A
Let A be a vector that includes longitude and latitude, so that adjacent mu-
nicipalities get very similar values for A. The two adjacent municipalities are thus
highly comparable, and treatment assignment can be considered “as-if random.”17
I implement this geographic discontinuity method by matching each treated (eq-
uitable) municipality to an untreated adjacent (inequitable) municipality. If there
are multiple matches, I choose the match with the longest common border. I then
17The precise matching procedure is as follows: Let i, j be two municipalities with treatment
statuses T (i), T (j). The function A(i, j) takes on the value one if the two municipalities are
adjacent, and zero otherwise. Finally, let B(i, j) denote the length of the common border
between municipalities. I match municipality i to j∗ if all of the following two conditions hold:
(1) T (i) 6= T (j∗) (different treatment statuses) and (2) A(i, j∗) = 1 (municipalities adjacent).
If this is the case for one i and multiple j, I match i to j∗ if j∗ =j∗ B(i, j∗). The matching
algorithm is greedy, i.e. I always choose the ‘best’ match for a given municipality i.
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estimate the average differences between matched municipalities using a paired
t-test.
In Figure 2.2, I revisit the results presented in Table 2.3. The adjacency match-
ing procedure corroborates the evidence from the linear OLS models. Indeed, all
estimated coefficients gain in strength and precision when using the local-level
matching procedure. First, I confirm that municipalities that rely on equitable in-
heritance are significantly more likely to elect women into local councils. Female
representation is two to three percentage points higher in equitably inheriting
municipalities. The effect holds across both the five largest parties as well as all
represented parties. I should remind the reader, however, that this analysis suffers
from a loss of precision, given that the local council data covers only about 46% of
all West German municipalities. Second, I confirm that equitably inheriting com-
munities have a 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points higher representation of minorities in
local councils. Again, the result holds within the five major parties as well as all
represented parties. Finally, I repeat the matched analysis with the Rotary data.
Since the data is skewed, I log-transform the aristocratic share in local chapters. I
confirm that equitable inheritance is associated with about 30% fewer aristocrats
in Rotary clubs. In sum, the fine-grained adjacency matching analysis confirms
that equitable inheritance is consistently associated with a more socially equal
society.
2.4.2 Mechanisms
Having provided evidence in favor of Tocqueville’s hypothesis, I now turn to the
two main hypothesized mechanisms: wealth equality and pro-egalitarian prefer-
ences.
The most immediate mechanism is wealth equality. Both the French and Amer-
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Figure 2.2: Equitable inheritance and social inequality
Nobility in Rotary
(N = 600, Mean = 0.0208)
Migrant representation
(5 largest parties)
(N = 2584, Mean = 0.0075)
Migrant representation
(all parties)
(N = 2584, Mean = 0.0088)
Female representation
(5 largest parties)
(N = 2634, Mean = 0.1474)
Female representation
(all parties)
(N = 2620, Mean = 0.2307)
-0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Notes: The Figure plots the difference (dot) between equitably and inequitably inheriting mu-
nicipalities regarding the three social inequality headline outcomes. For the first four coefficients,
the estimates are based on paired t-tests after the adjacency matching of municipalities as de-
scribed in Section 2.4.1. The coefficient for the last outcome, nobility presence in Rotary clubs
(log-transformed), is taken from an OLS regression. Here, the unit of observation is the Rotary
chapter. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
ican revolutionaries hypothesized that equitable inheritance spurs social equality
by reducing wealth inequality. In Figure 2.3, I provide evidence from a linear
model, where I regress inequality in land ownership in 1895 on the equitable treat-
ment dummy. The analysis, though it merely includes 295 units, showcases that
equitably inheriting communities are associated with a drop in the land inequality
Gini index by 0.8. The result thus shows that equitable inheritance is associ-
ated with lower levels of wealth inequality. I note that I am unable to repeat the
geographic matching analysis given the low number of clusters.
A second less immediate downstream outcome, which plausibly reinforces the
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Figure 2.3: Equitable inheritance and land inequality in 1895
Land inequality GINI
(N = 219)
(Mean = 0.6688)
-0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.00
Notes: The Figure plots the difference (dot) between equitably and inequitably inheriting mu-
nicipalities regarding land inequality in the German Empire in 1895. Estimates are based on
OLS regressions. The line represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
link from equitable inheritance to social equality, are pro-egalitarian preferences.
As indicated above, I utilize three measures for pro-egalitarian preferences.
First, in Table 2.4 I report estimates from linear models regressing the vote
share for the fascist NSDAP party for the decisive 1933 election on the treatment
dummy. Model 1 shows that equitably inheriting communities were 2.5 percentage
points less likely to vote for Hitler’s fascist NSDAP party. The effect is precisely
estimated, though the sample size is rather low. For that reason, I cannot repeat
the analysis using the geographic matching design.
Second, in Table 2.4 I regress the vote share for the main German leftist par-
ties in the four most recent Germany-wide elections. Here, too, I report strong
treatment effects that range from 1.9 percentage points in the 2013 federal election
(Model 3) to 6.5 percentage points in the most recent EU election (Model 5). I
confirm these findings in Figure 2.4 using the aforementioned adjacency match-
ing. The Figure shows that equitable inheritance is associated with a rise in the
vote share of left-parties by up to two percent in the 2009 EU election. The only
election for which the effect cannot be traced is the 2013 federal election.
Finally, in Figure 2.5 I measure pro-egalitarian preferences using data from
the SOEP. The Figure shows a coefficient plot from a regression of the indicated
outcomes depicting pro-egalitarian preferences on equitable inheritance customs.
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Table 2.4: Equitable inheritance and left-parties’ vote shares
NSDAP % Leftist % Leftist % Leftist % Leftist %
Federal Federal Federal EU EU
1933 2009 2013 2009 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equitable −0.025 0.033 0.019 0.066 0.065
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 605 8,262 8,360 8,262 8,340
Notes: OLS regression of the indicated vote share on equitable inheritance.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Figure 2.4: Equitable inheritance and left-parties’ vote share (matching)
EU 2009
(N = 5864)
(Mean = 0.3489)
EU 2014
(N = 5928)
(Mean = 0.389)
GER 2009
(N = 5864)
(Mean = 0.3984)
GER 2013
(N = 5936)
(Mean = 0.3691)
0.00 0.01 0.02
Notes: The Figure plots the difference (dot) between equitably and inequitably inheriting mu-
nicipalities regarding the leftist-parties’ vote shares based on a paired t-test after adjacency
matching of municipalities. The line represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 2.5: Equitable inheritance and pro-egalitarian preferences (regression)
Unemployed people
Job creation
Sick people
People needing care
0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09
Covariates included No covariates
Notes: The Figure plots point estimates (dot / square) and 95 percent confidence intervals (lines)
of regressions of the equitable inheritance customs on the indicated measures of pro-egalitarian
preferences. Dots represent regressions without covariate adjustment, squares represent regres-
sions without covariate adjustment. Covariates include the following SOEP variables: gender,
age, marital status, employment status and education. County fixed effects cannot be estimated
due to privacy restrictions imposed by the SOEP. I therefore put in state fixed effects.
To ease interpretation, I first reverse the scale of the equality items, and then stan-
dardize them. The Figure shows that pro-egalitarian preferences are consistently
more pronounced in municipalities that adopt equitable inheritance. Estimates
range between 0.03 and 0.07 standard deviations. This final piece of evidence
thus points to pro-egalitarian preferences as a plausible mechanism. Its theoreti-
cal direction is clear, and empirical backing is solid—though effect sizes are rather
small.
2.5 Income and Income Inequality
Thus far, I have largely confirmed Tocqueville’s hypothesis. Equitable inheritance
is associated with more socially equal municipalities. Two plausible mechanisms—
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wealth equality and pro-egalitarian preferences—were also shown to be positively
associated with equitable inheritance. The hypothesized association between eq-
uitable inheritance, income and income inequality, however, was less clear. In
this section, I therefore assess the association between equitable inheritance and
incomes, using historical and contemporary data. Thereafter, I turn to income
inequality.
In a first step, I assess whether equitably inheriting communities had higher
per capita incomes in the 19th century. To do so, I rely on data from the Prussian
census. In Figure 2.6, I show that equitably inheriting communities are associated
with higher wages in 1892 as well as 1902. The positive estimates are detectible
for both urban as well as rural wages. The confidence intervals, however, are wide
due to the low number of clusters. For this reason, I am also unable to conduct
local adjacency matching. Still, the evidence is in line with my third hypothesis,
namely, that equitable inheritance leads to higher incomes.
Second, I assess whether equitable inheritance customs are associated with
greater per capita income in 2014. In Figure 2.7, I show that equitable inheritance
customs are associated with an increase in the logarithm of income, based on a
paired t-test after adjacency matching of municipalities. Specifically, equitable
inheritance is associated with a rise in mean incomes by 3 percent and a rise in
median income by 1 percent.18 As such, the analysis corroborates that income is
likely positively affected by equitable inheritance customs, though the theoretical
expectations were shown to be ambivalent.
Having established a positive historical and contemporary association between
18In the Supplementary Information, I test the robustness of this finding using data from the
Socioeconomic Panel (Table 2.8). Here, too, equitable inheritance predicts income positively.
These data are, of course, less reliable as they rely on survey evidence, not administrative
tax records. The analysis is worthwhile, however, as it addresses potential concerns about an
ecological fallacy, given that I measure income at the municipality-level though the treatment
operates on a family-level.
44
Figure 2.6: Equitable inheritance and wages in Prussia
Rural wages, 1892
(N = 198)
Urban wages, 1892
(N = 190)
Rural wages, 1901
(N = 194)
Urban wages, 1901
(N = 190)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Notes: The Figure plots the difference (dot) between equitably and inequitably inheriting munic-
ipalities regarding wages in Prussia in 1892 and 1901. Estimates are based on OLS regressions,
controlling for longitude and latitude. Outcomes are standardized. The line represents the 95
percent confidence interval.
Figure 2.7: Equitable inheritance, absolute income and income inequality
Log SD of income
(N = 5644)
Log GINI
(N = 5644)
Log median income
(N = 5644)
Log mean income
(N = 5644)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Notes: The Figure plots the difference (dot) between equitably and inequitably inheriting munic-
ipalities regarding absolute income and income inequality based on a paired t-test after adjacency
matching of municipalities. The line represents the 95 percent confidence interval. Coefficients
can be interpreted as a percentage change.
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equitable inheritance and income, I turn to my final outcome of interest: income
inequality. The French and American revolutionaries did not specifically expect
income equality to rise as a result of equitable inheritance. On the contrary, if
equitable inheritance ensures that the most able—not the firstborn son—advances,
incomes and income inequality may well rise.
In Figure 2.7, I assess whether equitable inheritance is associated with greater
income inequality in 2014 (data on historical income inequality is, to my knowl-
edge, not available). Specifically, I use the aforementioned adjacency matching
between equitably and inequitably inheriting communities, and conduct paired t-
tests. The Figure shows that equitable inheritance is associated with an increase
in inequality by roughly one percent (GINI) to six percent (log of SD). This marks
a substantively meaningful estimate. It also underlines that social and economic
equality are two distinct dimensions of equality. Indeed, the evidence implies that
while equitable inheritance levels the societal playing field, it does not level in-
comes. The most likely explanation, in the words of de Visme Williamson (1976,
102), is that equitable inheritance leaves “inequalities of ability and work,” which
may in turn spur unequal incomes.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has revisited a century-old hypothesis about the determinants of in-
equality in Western societies. Namely, that social equality is a product of equitable
inheritance customs. Exploiting fine-grained variation in inheritance customs in
West Germany, I found that equitably inheriting municipalities have more women
and ethnic minorities in local councils and fewer aristocrats in elite Rotary clubs.
I assessed two mechanisms that may help explain this finding: Equitable inher-
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itance may lower wealth inequality and foster pro-egalitarian preferences. Using
historical as well as contemporary data, I confirmed that equitably inheriting com-
munities had lower levels of land inequality in 1895 and more left-leaning political
preferences in 1933 as well as in recent years. In a final step, I explored the effects
of inheritance customs on incomes and income inequality. Here, I found that eq-
uitably inheriting municipalities have higher incomes as well as income inequality.
As such, the overall effects of equitable inheritance can be interpreted as leveling
the playing field by rewarding talent not hereditary status.
Three findings are particularly noteworthy. First, I demonstrated equitable
inheritance to be associated with greater incomes and income inequality. The
precise mechanism underlying this link, however, was beyond the scope of this
study. I have alluded to two potential logics: Equitable inheritance may lower
labor supervision costs as well as population growth. My own preliminary analyses
(see Appendix Figure 2.11) show fertility to be higher in equitably inheriting
municipalities. But, historical data is necessary to firmly rule out this link and to
solidify the true causal relationship.
Second, my chapter has pointed out a novel determinant for pro-egalitarian
preferences, and, by extrapolation, redistribution. This link adds to a literature
on preferences for distribution (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Broadly
speaking, I know too little about the determinants of preferences, particularly
the impact of long established institutions such as inheritance. How inheritance
customs shape pro-egalitarian preferences, again, was beyond the scope of this
chapter. One hypothesis, cited above, is that it affects the structure of families,
instilling in people a belief that equality is desirable. Just as important, however,
inequitable inheritance customs could foster a desire to make society more equal.
Future studies could help parse out with greater clarity how inheritance affects
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preferences for equality, for instance, by using survey experiments that expose
individuals to different scenarios of inheritance.
Last, however, I should add a skeptical remark. All estimates in this chapter
were “statistically significant.” But, are they substantively significant? I estimated
the effect of inheritance on the representation of women and minorities to be be-
tween 1 and 3 percentage points. The effect on the mechanisms—land inequality
and pro-egalitarian preferences—was more pronounced. The mere fact that esti-
mates are significant—in a sample of over 8,000 observations—tells us little about
substantive significance. It is here that qualitative studies that delve more deeply
into the societal effects of inheritance customs could provide a valuable contri-
bution. There can be little doubt that inheritance customs had stark effects on
social outcomes throughout history. But just how politicized inheritance customs
are today remains unanswered and is worthy of further scholarly attention.
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Table 2.8: Equitable inheritance and SOEP household income
Log monthly household income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equitable 0.038 0.029 0.076 0.045
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
Male 0.018 0.018
(0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Unmarried -0.308 -0.307
(0.010) (0.010)
Student 0.032 0.031
(0.029) (0.029)
Retired -0.386 -0.384
(0.018) (0.018)
Unemployed -0.456 -0.451
(0.022) (0.022)
Years of education 0.068 0.069
(0.002) (0.002)
State FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 17,758 13,573 17,758 13,573
Notes: Coefficient of equitable refers to change in log monthly
household income associated with switching from equitable to inequitable
inheritance. Data source is SOEP 2002. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 2.8: Map of German peasant wars
Notes: German peasant wars (c. 1522-1525), taken from Putzger (1970)
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Figure 2.9: Map of German soil suitability
Notes: Taken from Atlas der Deutschen Agrarlandschaft)
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Figure 2.10: Map of peasant wars by county
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Peasant war
involvement, 1422−25
Notes: Peasant war involvement by county. Digitized map based on Putzger (1970). See also
Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.11: Equitable inheritance and fertility rates (matching)
Fertility
(Females 14-44)
(N = 2674)
Fertility
(Total population)
(N = 2674)
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
Notes: The Figure shows the difference (dot) between equitably and inequitably inheriting
municipalities regarding fertility rates after adjacency matching of municipalities. The first
outcome is the crude fertility rate, i.e. the total number of newborns divided by total municipality
population. The second outcome is the general fertility rate, i.e. the total number of newborns
divided by the number of women that are of reproductive age (aged 14–44). Effect sizes are
changes in standard deviations.
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Figure 2.12: Survey instrument of Röhm.
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Missionaries and Community
Cohesion
3.1 Introduction
Religious beliefs and practices have long been argued to affect community cohe-
sion (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Wuthnow, 2002). Protestantism, in
particular, has been found to correlate positively with generalized trust (Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales, 2003; Inglehart, 1999; Veenstra, 2002) and cooperation
(Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Silva and Mace, 2014; Fernández, 2014). In the
context of developing countries, scholars have repeatedly pointed out the role of
Protestant missionaries in spurring outcomes pertaining to community cohesion.
Lankina and Getachew (2011, 475), discussing Protestant missions in India, write
that “missionary organizational activity [...] contributed to the development of
civil society.” And Woodberry (2012, 253) notes that Protestant missionaries “in-
still[ed] voluntarism and charity in their congregants to survive,” given that they
were unable to tax their members.
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A different set of scholars, however, points out that religious groups, includ-
ing Protestant missions, have a tendency to disintegrate, and subsequently divide
communities along religious lines (Zaleski and Zech, 1995). Historical evidence is
ample. It ranges from the Great Schism to the French Wars of Religion (Lewis
and Lewis, 2009). The logic behind such religious splintering is simple: Because
religious groups offer excludable goods, religious entrepreneurs gain from found-
ing new churches (Berman, 2000). The tendency to split apart is particularly
pronounced among Protestants, who “tend toward separation and independence”
(Shah and Woodberry, 2004, 48). As a result, argues Schwadel (2005, 159),
churches “limit network heterogeneity and thus limit the opportunity for bridging
social capital.”
How does one make sense of these conflicting accounts? In this chapter, I re-
visit the relation between Protestant missions and community cohesion. I define
community cohesion as levels of trust, cooperation and identification in a local
community (Chan, To and Chan, 2006). I add to the current research agenda
by focusing on modern-day Protestant missions, and by exploring causal mech-
anisms. Specifically, I observationally explore to what degree the two indicated
mechanisms—pro-social preferences and social networks—may mediate the rela-
tion between Protestant missions and community cohesion. I do so through the
prism of an in-depth study of 16 villages in southeastern Peru, which were exposed
to different Protestant missions.
Combining qualitative interviews and a review of the theoretical literature,
I point out competing logics about Protestant missionaries’ effects on pro-social
preferences, social networks and community cohesion. On the one hand, I note that
Protestant missionaries’ focus on charity and forgiveness plausibly strengthens pro-
social preferences. They may also exhibit positive effects on social networks given
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that they establish regular venues of social interaction such as church services
and reading groups. On the other hand, Protestant missionaries may plausibly
weaken pro-social preferences given that they tend to shift converts’ attention
toward individual salvation and the after-life. Moreover, they may also weaken
social networks by dividing villages along newly established religious lines. Taken
together, the main effect of Protestant missionaries on community cohesion is
hence unclear.
To empirically test these conflicting logics, I exploit exogenous variation in
missionary activity in Peru’s Cusco region. Activities of the guerrilla movement
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) meant that the valleys under study were off lim-
its to missionaries throughout the 1980s. The defeat of the rebels in the early 1990s
led to a sudden rise in Protestant missionary activity in the region. Importantly,
the proselytism was haphazard. Church planting by competing missionary groups
followed no discernible strategy. As a consequence, villages were near-exogenously
exposed to missionaries. Using detailed census data from 1993, geographic vari-
ables and qualitative interviews with history experts, I buttress this exogeneity
assumption and show that villages are statistically indistinguishable but for their
exposure to the missionaries.
The evangelized villages were exposed to two different kinds of missionary
groups: mainline Evangelicals and Pentecostals. My comparison group are vil-
lages that were not evangelized and remained nominally Catholic. Importantly,
the two groups differentially activated both hypothesized mechanisms. Mainline
Evangelical missions arguably had a greater impact on social networks due to their
broad proselytism strategy. And, Pentecostal missions arguably exhibited more
pronounced effects on pro-social preferences, given their distinct focus on salva-
tion. The differential activation of the two mediators thus affords a more credible
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mediation analysis.
Using lab-in-the-field experiments and survey evidence, I find that villages ex-
posed to Protestant missions have lower levels pro-social preferences and sparser
social networks. I also find that community cohesion is less pronounced in these
villages. When moving to a causal mediation framework, I estimate that the
aggregate treatment effect is predominantly mediated through the network mech-
anism. The pro-social preference mechanism plays a negligible role. As such, the
estimates support a logic whereby Protestant missions reduce community cohesion
by dividing social networks and, to a lesser degree, by lowering pro-social pref-
erences. Interestingly, using a priming experiment, I find that the reduction in
community cohesion is equally present within the respective missionary communi-
ties. The finding calls the “religion as a club good”-hypothesis into question (e.g.,
Berman and Laitin, 2008), which would predict that Protestant missions merely
shift cohesion from the village to the church community.
This chapter adds to a literature on religious organizations in comparative pol-
itics in three ways. First, relying on fine-grained local-level qualitative evidence,
I present novel and rivaling logics about the effects of Protestant missions on
community cohesion so as to strengthen the theoretical literature. Second, to my
knowledge, the chapter is the first to provide causally identified evidence regarding
the effects of Protestant missions on community cohesion. Third, my analysis adds
to a broader academic literature that assesses the determinants of community co-
hesion. Recent empirical studies have found community cohesion to correlate with
economic development (Casey, Glennerster and Miguel 2012; Avdeenko and Gilli-
gan 2015, 428), governance (Mansuri and Rao, 2012) and lower wartime violence
(Cohen 2013, 464). In another vein, the findings may also contribute to a de-
bate whether governments and local communities should grant access to Christian
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evangelists (Grant, 2001). In recent years, several governments have denied access
to Protestant missionaries. The Chinese government, for example, has forced hun-
dreds of South Korean missionaries out of the country on the grounds that they
disturb the public order (Vanderklippe, 2014).
3.2 Protestant Missionaries and Community Co-
hesion
The relation between Protestantism and community cohesion (as well as social cap-
ital) is a recurring topic in the social sciences (e.g., Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti,
1993; Wuthnow, 2002; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003; Inglehart, 1999; Veen-
stra, 2002; Silva and Mace, 2014; Fernández, 2014). In developing countries, a
number of authors have pointed to Protestant missionaries as a likely source of
variation in community cohesion (Woodberry, 2012; Lankina and Getachew, 2011).
Focusing on Latin America, Bot (1999, 165) pointedly asks: “Should the upsurge
of Protestantism be seen as a community movement with a religious dimension,
or rather as an ‘anti-social-movement’, the expression of sectarian, inward-looking
behaviour”? Before presenting different logics that may explain associations be-
tween Protestant missions and community cohesion, I first lay out my definition
of community cohesion.
3.2.1 Definition
This chapter’s main outcome of interest is community cohesion. I follow Chan, To
and Chan (2006) and adopt a definition of community cohesion that is minimal
in scope, and close to ordinary usage. In particular, I define community cohesion
as levels of trust, cooperation and identification in a local community. This defini-
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tion reflects core elements adopted in several influential studies. Notably, Fearon,
Humphreys and Weinstein (2009, 288) measure community cohesion by “assess-
ing levels of trust, patterns of community activity, and the extent of associational
life.” Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii (2014, 609) focus on four components, namely
“(1) altruism, (2) a sense of obligation to contribute to ones community welfare,
in particular to contribute to the community’s collective good, (3) trust in one’s
community members, and (4) trustworthiness with one’s community members.”
To what degree, then, do Protestant missionaries affect community cohesion?
And what mechanisms give rise to any observed correlation? In the following, I lay
out my theoretical arguments. Based on three months of qualitative field work and
a review of the scholarly literature, I argue that two mechanisms are particularly
pivotal in mediating a potential relationship between Protestant missions and
community cohesion. The first mediator, which I label the preference mechanism,
captures the effects Protestant missions have on pro-social preferences. The second
mediator, which I label the structure mechanism, captures the missionary impact
on local-level networks. The theoretical arguments are condensed in the graph
in Figure 3.1. For both mediators, I uncover two competing logics that may help
explain why community cohesion could fall or rise as a result of missionary activity.
3.2.2 Preference Mechanism: Pro-Sociality
The first mechanism by which Protestant missions may affect community cohesion
are pro-social preferences. Pro-social preferences—preferences over another indi-
vidual’s material payoffs—may drive community cohesion for a number of reasons.
For one, taking an interest in the material benefit of others is arguably a necessary
condition for individual-level identification with a greater community (Frey and
Meier, 2004a). Pro-social preferences also likely spur trust in fellow community
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members (Simpson and Willer, 2015). Similarly, pro-social preferences may in-
duce individuals to cooperate as well as to forgive when such cooperation is not
reciprocated (Frey and Meier, 2004b). There is compelling experimental evidence
that religious organizations have profound effects on individual preferences (Wulff,
1991; Jelen, 1993; McKenzie and Rouse, 2013; McClendon and Riedl, 2015; Gross-
man, 2015). How, then, may Protestant missions affect pro-social preferences?
Figure 3.1: Conceptual model
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Charity. A core preaching of Protestant missions is that converts must do
good unto others. Social scientific observational and experimental studies have
linked pro-sociality among Christian believers to the belief in a God who demands
“charity” and punishes deviant behavior (Saroglou et al., 2005; Tan, 2006; Purzycki
et al., 2016). While systematic evidence from missions is sparse, historical accounts
regularly display Protestant missions as strong advocates of pro-social preferences.
As Little (2005, 207-208) notes, the “Protestant missionary ethos originally focused
on the glory of God [and] [...] charity.” Personal accounts from Protestant missions
highlight the extent to which such charity is propagated by churches on the ground.
The missionary S. Joseph Kidder, for example, writes that missionaries “need to
come to the point of loving as Jesus loves; he commanded us to even love our
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enemies” (2012, 125). Some authors have noted that the missionary propagation
of charity may be a product of missionary self-interest. Woodberry (2012, 253),
for instance, writes: “(b)ecause they do not have the ability to tax their members,
nonstate religious groups had to instill voluntarism and charity in their congregants
to survive.”
Accounts from Latin America confirm this picture. Olson (2006, 897) notes
that Protestant missions propagate “clear guidelines for behavior, including [...] [a]
strong community.” The author continues that such values “have been identified
as characteristics of Evangelical movements [across] Latin America”. In a study
of Protestantism in rural Colombia, Brusco (2011, 128) notes that Protestant
communities place strong emphasis on Biblical teachings, including forgiveness and
charity. The author attributes this to Evangelicals’ focus on Biblical teachings.
He writes: “[a]mong evangelicals, then, the “priesthood of all believers” exists not
only on a doctrinal level but also is put into extensive practice and establishes an
ethnic of reading, contemplating and analysis.”
In the communities studied in this chapter, I visited numerous church services
in addition to conducting semi-structured interviews with missionaries and con-
verts. Sermons frequently included reference to forgiveness and the need to “do
good unto others.” Ministers kept reminding fellow believers of the importance to
put the community first. One minister said his prime social teaching was to abstain
from “antisocial behavior such as drinking, stealing and all the things that are bad
for the community.” Such behavior, another minister argued, “is demanded from
good Christians in order to make it to heaven.” Taking these accounts together,
Protestant missionaries’ focus on charity may thus increase pro-social preferences.
I formulate my first hypothesis accordingly.
• Hypothesis 1a: Protestant missions increase pro-social preferences in villages
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where they evangelize as compared to villages where they do not evangelize.
Individualism. Protestantism, however, is also frequently described as a reli-
gion that prizes the individual. Widely known is Max Weber’s thesis about the
relationship between Protestantism and the entrepreneurial, individualistic spirit
of capitalism (Weber, 2002). Protestant missions propel this spirit on the ground.
Shah and Woodberry (2004, 48) note that Protestant missionaries believe that
“people can acquire saving faith only as they personally and individually appropri-
ate God’s word.” Reuschling attributes this individualism to a strong “experiential
component in how Evangelicalism is defined with regard to one’s personal accep-
tance of [...] Jesus Christ” (2005, 61). Similarly, Woodberry (2012, 249) writes that
Protestants “expected lay people to make their own religious choices. They be-
lieved people are saved not through sacraments or group membership but by ‘true
faith in God’.” The Protestant emphasis of individual liberation—traditionally
defined as “the liberation of the individual believer from a mass of institutional
controls and traditional restraints” (Wolin, 1957, 428)—is particularly pronounced
and surprisingly homogenously advocated within Pentecostal denominations. Mc-
Clendon and Riedl (2016), for instance, analyze a random sample of Pentecostal
churches in Nairobi, Kenya, and demonstrate that “Pentecostal and Charismatic
churches are leading their members to prioritize the individual.”
In Latin America, several commentator have confirmed Protestantism’s em-
phasis on individualism. In one anthropological study of conversion processes
toward Protestantism among Mayas in Guatemala, Goldin and Metz (1991, 34)
trace out a distinct emphasis on “individualism and the bettering of oneself by
relying on one’s own efforts and hard work.” Bot (1999), too, notes that popu-
lar Protestantism in Latin America leads to a “new approach to religion [that]
take[s] place at the level of the individual.” She further writes that Protestantism
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is accompanied by “a radical transcendence: God is apart from the world, not
immanent to it, and salvation is only to be found by renouncing the world.” Gill
(1993, 182) attributes this individualism to the increasingly atomized realities of
modern life: “Given the growing atomization of social life, it should come as no
surprise that the ideology of many new religious organizations, particularly those
espousing Protestant fundamentalism, emphasizes individualism and self-sacrifice
as a means of personal improvement.” Other commentators have gone as far as
labeling Latin American Protestants “apolitical conservatives who leave the in-
justices of the world to the Lord’s care” (Ireland, 1993, 4). Perhaps as a result,
argues Gill (2001, 129), “Latin American Protestantism has not shown the political
activism of other fundamentalisms.”
In the communities under study a similar picture emerged. I frequently wit-
nessed ministers making references to individual salvation. The primacy of hard
work—coupled with abstinence from social gatherings—was a recurring theme.
All this based on the idea that “salvation lies within,” as one minister said. One
village president in an evangelized village lamented “some of the religious groups
advocate against villagers speaking with one another.” And almost all village
presidents noted a tendency among Protestants to stay away from communal fes-
tivities. Taken together, then, Protestant missionaries’ focus on individualism may
lead to a reduction in pro-social preferences. I therefore formulate the following
rivaling hypothesis.
• Hypothesis 1b: Protestant missions reduce pro-social preferences in villages
where they evangelize as compared to villages where they do not evangelize.
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3.2.3 Structure Mechanism: Social Networks
The second mechanism through which Protestant missions may affect community
cohesion are social networks. Dense social networks have long been argued to be a
key underpinning of social cohesion (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Friedkin, 2004).
Local-level cooperation thrives when individuals can rely on strong local ties in
their many daily interactions (Tortoriello, Reagans and McEvily, 2012). While
the effect on identification and trust is less mechanical, such outcomes, too, likely
suffer when networks are sparse. To what degree may Protestant missions affect
social networks?
A long research tradition, particularly in economics, has pointed out pro-
nounced effects of religious organizations on network structures (Lewer and Van den
Berg, 2007; Berman and Laitin, 2008; Becker and Woessmann, 2013). Histori-
cal evidence abounds. One apparent product of the European Reformation and
counter-reformation was a profoundly re-configured central European society. The
religious schisms led to prolonged political conflict over the distribution of the Holy
Roman Empire and culminated in the Thirty Years’ War (Wilson, 2009).
Political scientists, too, have assessed the structural repercussions of religion.
Huber and Stanig (2011), for example, present evidence that organized religion
lends itself to group-based distributive politics as the rich and the religious poor
can form electoral coalitions at the expense of the secular poor. Similar arguments
are made by Scheve, Stasavage et al. (2006), who demonstrate that religion and
state spending are substitutes that insure believers against adverse events. Re-
latedly, Berman (2000) argues that religiosity signals commitment to the church
community, which provides insurance to its members. Underlying these accounts is
the view that churches work as exclusive “clubs” that re-configure and sometimes
polarize the greater societal network.
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Scholars of missions have made similar arguments. They highlight in particu-
lar the profound reconfiguration of social structures that results from missionary
activity. (Rambo, 1993; Falola, 1998). Sanneh (2015), for example, argues that
local communities that rely on dense social networks and carefully balanced polit-
ical power-structures are particularly affected by missions. Missionary preachers
aim to alter existing religious identities and may thereby weaken existing ties. It
therefore comes as little surprise that missionaries were historically approached
with skepticism and outright hostility from local power holders, who feared that
social networks would be weakened as a result of the missionary activity (Forsythe,
1971). McCauley (2012), focusing on Pentecostal missions in sub-Saharan Africa,
too, argues that missionaries prize establishing new patronage-like relationships,
which may cut through existing networks.
In Latin America, the effect of Protestant missions on local networks is widely
recognized. Bot (1999, 168) notes that missionary groups “proliferate in a disin-
tegrating social and economic fabric” and have “success in penetrating even well
structured and homogeneous indigenous communities.” She further notes that
“Pentecostalism first takes root among the poorest, the most marginalised and
the most disempowered, along fault lines which for a time are thereby deepened
even if at a later stage they are overcome and community cohesion is restored”
(1999, 168). The author thus highlights that cohesion is undermined at first be-
fore, perhaps, being restored. In a similar vein, Goldin and Metz (1991, 334), in
the aforementioned analysis of Guatemala, note that Protestant communities ad-
vocate “the promotion of solidarity and formation of clearly identifiable networks
(e.g., addressing each other as “brother” and “sister’).” These networks, however,
are within the missionary group—not outside—thus showcasing the potential of
missions to divide rather than unite. Stoll (1993, 15), reflecting on Latin America
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more broadly, notes that “Evangelical groups have often been criticized in Latin
America for separating their members from the larger society.” Yet, the author
also points out that “numerous local studies suggest that evangelical congrega-
tions have at least become a way for significant minorities of Latin Americans to
reform themselves,” thus creating “new kinds of social cohesion which empower
members.”
The degree to which Protestant missions affect social networks is, thus, a
question of significant debate. The advent of a Protestant mission need not be
detrimental to a local network. If missionaries only target a select few individuals,
or, alternatively, convert an entire village, effects on network structures may be
positive or, in the words of Stoll (1993, 15) “empower individuals.” Yet, Protestant
missions seldom convert entire villages, and may thus equally likely polarize and
weaken existing networks. Taken together, these theoretical considerations point
to two different ways in which Protestant missions may affect networks and, in
turn, community cohesion. If missions fail to convert entire villages, or upset
historical power-structures, their effect on network structures is likely detrimental.
At the same time, if missions convert the masses, or target only a select few
individuals, they may strengthen a local network.
In the communities under study, respondents in qualitative interviews were
largely undecided about the effects of Protestant missions on village networks. In
untreated control villages, village presidents deemed social ties to be strong. Asked
about social networks in particular, one president said “everything is normal, ev-
eryone is talking to everyone.” In evangelized villages the picture was ambivalent.
In one village evangelized by the Seventh Day Adventist church, a respondent
found converts to take a rather welcoming approach toward those that had not
joined the mission. In another village evangelized by the Pentecostal Iglesia Cris-
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tiana Maranatha mission, respondents repeatedly complained about separation
and sectarianism. In yet other villages, respondents noted few changes. In the
words of one respondent: “religion isn’t everything.” Given these conflicting theo-
retical predictions and inconclusive local-level evidence, I therefore formulate the
following two competing hypotheses.
• Hypothesis 2a: Protestant missions strengthen social networks in villages
where they evangelize as compared to villages where they do not evangelize.
• Hypothesis 2b: Protestant missions weaken social networks in villages where
they evangelize as compared to villages where they do not evangelize.
3.3 Empirical Design
Testing the mechanisms by which Protestant missions affect community cohesion
requires a causally identified research design that can adjudicate between different
causal mechanisms. Most studies on the effects of missions, thus far, have used
observational evidence (e.g., Shah and Woodberry, 2004; Trejo, 2009; Nunn, 2010;
Woodberry, 2012; Caicedo, 2014). Such research designs, however, may fall victim
to unobserved confounding. Notably, Evangelical missions have historically clus-
tered in colonized areas, which differ from non-colonized areas in several ways of
which some are unobservable. This chapter addresses the problem of unobserved
confounding by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in missionary activity
that took place in the Peruvian Andes in the late 1980’s.
3.3.1 Variation in Protestant Missionary Activity
The rise and fall of the guerrilla movement Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) af-
forded temporal variation in the exposure of communities in southeastern Peru to
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Protestant missions. The Shining Path, an offshoot of Peru’s Communist Party,
was founded in the late 1960s. The group fought against Peru’s “bourgeois democ-
racy”. Its goal was to implement a dictatorship of the proletariat (Stern, 1998).
The subsequent burning of ballot boxes during a national election marked the
inception of a violent insurgency.
In the following years, the group made significant territorial advances. The
rebels gained support from peasants, particularly in economically disadvantaged
regions of Peru’s central provinces. Initially, government response to the uprising
was limited, which allowed the Shining Path to steadily increase its influence
(Switzer, 1993). By 1990, the group had gained control over large areas of Peru’s
central and southern districts. The capture of its leader, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992
marked the beginning of the groups’ gradual decline, exacerbated by increasing
military action from the Peruvian government.
In contrast to the rise of Evangelical proselytism across South America in the
1970s and 80s, the Shining Path marked a hindrance to Protestant missions in
several regions of Peru. While the interaction between the rebels and mission-
aries has received little scholarly attention (Ferguson, 2005, 248), most existing
accounts highlight the hostile relationship between the two groups. One account
by del Pino (1996) points out that in the Apurimac region—the bordering region
of my sample—Pentecostals viewed the Sendero as “demons,” and took up arms
to fight them. In a more systematic overview, Klaiber (1988) documents system-
atic Protestant victimization by rebel and counterinsurgency forces. According
to Strong (1992) this victimization was inevitable because the Evangelicals, too,
aspired to be the leaders of the peasant class.
Vivid accounts are also found among Peruvian theologians. Samuel Escobar
(1986, 10) writes:
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“The militants of Sendero have [...] been ruthless in their effort to
eliminate any opposition in the areas that came under their control.
Hundreds of policemen and peasants have been killed in cruel spectac-
ular ways by the terrorists. Evangelical pastors and lay leaders who
were perceived as ideological enemies were also killed mercilessly.”
Missionaries, indeed, were a prime target of the rebels. Several leading figures were
killed (Cadorette, 1994). Switzer recounts a particularly gruesome attack: “In
response to increased foreign presence, Sendero Luminoso stepped up its violence
against foreigners. In August 1990, for example, it attacked and killed two Mormon
missionaries near Huancayo. A handwritten note left near the bodies demanded
that all ‘Yankee invaders’ leave Peru” (1993, 61). While the Cusco region—the
case study of this chapter—was only mildly affected by the insurgency, it, too,
witnessed less missionary activity than was common in counties not bordering the
rebel’s territory.
It was not until the capture of Guzmán that missionaries re-discovered the
region as an area for proselytism. Once the area was considered safe, several
Protestant churches embarked on a race to bring the gospel to the communities,
which, at that point in time, were nominally Catholic. This Catholicism, however,
was largely dormant. The missionary rush was particularly prevalent in villages
near the city of Cusco. The historical process thus prevented careful missionary
planning, which might mean that conversion was pursued independent of village
characteristics (Dunning, 2012). Importantly, the situation also meant that some
communities were left untreated, which serve as the control category in this chap-
ter.
Interviews conducted with local and international missionaries in the region
confirmed the random and hectic nature of the church planting. A Baptist mis-
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sionary from the US conveyed to me that “missionaries trickled in and picked
communities in an arbitrary manner.” In a similar vein, a minister of the Sev-
enth Day Adventist church stated that Protestant missionaries “chose the ones
[villages] no one had gone to as quickly as they could.” When asked why a Pen-
tecostal church had picked one particular village, a Catholic nun replied: “The
missionaries are only driven by the holy spirit.”
In addition to conducting statistical tests that underline the randomness of
the process (see Balance section), together with a team of research assistants I
conducted structured interviews with church officials and presidents in all com-
munities studied in this chapter. These interviews, which I revisit in the discussion
section and in the supplementary information, yield two important pieces of in-
formation regarding the church planting process.
First, to understand whether missionaries followed a specific strategy when
selecting villages, I asked the following open ended question: “Why did you set up
the church in this village?” Buttressing the argument that villages were treated
independent of village characteristics, no church official listed a concrete example
why a given village had been chosen. Two officials could not think of a reason, four
said that the village simply had had no mission, four stated that other missions
were too far away for believers to go to, and five mentioned abstract reasons of
the form “it is necessary to be in all parts where God is.”
Second, to understand whether the treatment was exclusive, I asked officials
whether there had ever been another mission: “Have there ever been other churches
present in this village?” Impressively, 15 out of 16 church officials said no. One
pastor claimed that a mission had been present but had discontinued its operation
after a few months. In addition, all officials said no to the question “Have there
ever been other missionaries present trying to convert people.” The assignment of
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the missions can therefore be viewed as exclusive and exogenous, which allows us
to attribute observed differences across villages to the Protestant missions.
3.3.2 Sample
The overall population of interest consist of the Agrarian communities in two val-
leys in the state of Cusco in southeastern Peru. The sample in this study includes
16 villages, which were carefully selected from over 50 communities so as to guaran-
tee isomorphic pre-treatment conditions. Specifically, selection of villages followed
two main criteria. First, I chose communities that are similar regarding observed
pre-treatment covariates, including geographic, linguistic, and agricultural charac-
teristics. Second, I chose communities large enough to allow random sampling of
at least 64 respondents, a size necessary to administer several randomized instru-
ments. The sample sites are reported in Figure 3.9 in the supplementary material.
I should also point out that 16 villages is a rather low number of clusters, which
puts statistical power at risk. Yet, the case at hand did not allow for selecting
more than 16 villages, given the strict sampling procedure, the historical setup,
and my intention to do an in-depth field study.
3.3.3 Treatment
The final set of 16 villages includes five conceptually different treatments reported
in Table 3.1. First, the Control treatment depicts villages that were never exposed
to a Protestant mission. Akin to all communities in the sample, the villages in
this category have old Catholic church buildings that are no longer in use. The
reason for the Catholic church’s gradual decline in the communities under study
are manifold. They range from poor central planning, limited resources to re-
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cruitment shortages.1 Control villagers, all of whom still identify as Catholic,2
sometimes visit Catholic parishes in cities where services are still offered. The
Control communities thus serve as the counterfactual. They allow us to under-
stand what evangelized villages would look like today had they not been exposed
to Protestant missions. The reasons why these villages never received a mission
are unclear. In qualitative interviews I could not obtain definitive answers from
village presidents and church officials. Suffice it to say that the Control villages are
statistically indistinguishable from the proselytized villages (see Balance section).
The Adventist treatment depicts villages where the mainline Evangelical Sev-
enth Day Adventist church set up missions. These villages are exposed to rather
mild forms of Evangelical theology. Church services are considered mandatory,
but the sermons are shaped by a somewhat more critical engagement with the
scripture. Speaking in tongues and other charismatic practices are largely absent.
Adventist villages are also shaped by more outgoing and politically active church
leaders who take an interest in their communities.
Table 3.1: Treatment indicators
Treatment Conversion N Clusters Theology
Control 95.8% 192 3 Limited exposure to Catholic
gospel; no church services
Adventists 51.0% 192 3 Limited spirituality, no speak-
ing in tongues, shorter service
Peruana 57.3% 192 3 High spirituality, some speak-
ing in tongues, long service
Maranatha 49.6% 256 4 High spirituality, speaking in
tongues, very long service
Mixed 57.3 % 192 3 Combination of the above
1For detailed analyses regarding the Catholic church’s decline in Latin America see Stoll
(1990) and Gill (2008).
2Only 1.4 percent of 1024 survey respondents belong to no church. Similarly, 95.4% of the
sample pray regularly.
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The Peruana treatment depicts villages that were exposed to a Peruvian Pen-
tecostal church, called Iglesia Evangélica Peruana. Spirituality in the Peruana
church is noticeably more pronounced. Church services include charismatic el-
ements like speaking in tongues and divine healing. The Peruana church is a
strongly biblical church. As Olson (2006, 890) writes, “IEP follows the ‘bib-
lical Christianity’ commonly associated with Evangelical Christian churches in
the United States and other Evangelical churches of Latin America.” (see also,
Barreda, 1993). In comparison to Adventists, Peruana services are also signifi-
cantly longer, and regularly last for more than 3 hours. Church leaders are less
politically active and demand strict obedience to the scripture and an active en-
gagement with the church. As such, the Peruana prizes “personal relationships
with God through the ‘Word’ as put forth in the Bible” and “events in society are
to be judged and interpreted through the Bible” (Olson, 2006, 890).
The Maranatha treatment depicts villages that received a mission post from
a Pentecostal church called Iglesia Cristiana Maranatha. The church labels itself
as charismatic. Church services are very long and include manifold charismatic
elements such as widespread use of speaking in tongues, shared crying of the
congregation, divine healing, and divine revelations. Church leaders and ministers
in the Peruana church are even less concerned with secular issues as compared
with the Peruana church. In contrast to all other churches, my interview requests
with church leaders were met with skepticism, and regularly denied.
Finally, the Mixed treatment category includes villages that received several
Evangelical missions, all of which are either Adventists, Maranatha or Peruana
missions.3 The treatment strength (i.e., the proselytism strategy and theological
strictness) therefore ranges somewhere in the middle.
3In one village, 18 converts belonged to a small mission called Israelita, which is comparable
to the Adventists in their theological approach.
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In Table 3.1, I summarize the five treatment statuses. The third column states
how many individuals were sampled in each treatment category. Table 3.4 in the
Supplementary Information gives a more comprehensive overview of the sample’s
treatment status and religious affiliation. Column 2 reports conversion rates. I de-
fine conversion as villagers reporting to belong to the mission in a given village. On
average, 50 percent report to belong to a mission—a rather high number. Barro,
Hwang and McCleary (2010), studying a sample of developed nations, show that
conversion rates in Western countries, at most, reach 16 percent (United States;
1998). The conversion rate in this study is thus significantly higher. Two rea-
sons may help explain the apparent missionary success. First, as indicated, the
Catholic church had essentially stopped preaching in the area under study, which
left believers without spiritual guidance and thus ready to accept new theologi-
cal guidance. Second, the villages under study are secluded and rather cohesive
to begin with. One would thus expect a fervent missionary to succeed in con-
verting people in larger numbers. I should also note that there was likely little
selection into treatment. The share of “migrants” in the Census data (see Table
3.7) is a mere 1 percent, on average, across villages. This number corresponds to
my own survey instrument on traveling outside the immediate Cusco department
(Table 3.5), which 50 percent claim to have done. Taken together, the concern
of “selection into treatment” is thus likely limited and the missionaries seemingly
succeeded in converting large numbers of individuals.
3.3.4 Sampling
In addition to qualitative surveys, I administered a population survey in all 16
villages, enrolling 64 subjects per village. To do so, I visited each of the 16 villages
prior to surveying and obtained consent from village presidents. In 12 villages, I
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presented the work in front of the village assembly. In the remaining four villages,
the presidents informed villagers that surveying would take place. I was assisted
by 21 local Masters students who were carefully selected from a pool of 50, and
were covered under Columbia University’s IRB.
The entire sample includes 1,024 respondents. 1.3 percent of all outcome mea-
sures among participants are missing. To ensure as representative a sample of the
villages as possible, the sampling employed two levels of randomization. First, all
64 respondents per village were sampled using a random-walk procedure.4 Second,
enumerators were randomly assigned to villages and to each block within a village
in order to avoid enumerator effects.
Surveys were conducted in the late afternoons and at night to maximize partic-
ipation. Though very time-consuming, sampling during the day was not possible
as most villagers take their cattle to the fields. Non-participation was at 7.8%.
Failure to participate was largely due to respondents’ time constraints. Given the
small size of the villages (an average of 68 families), the vast majority of eligible
respondents was sampled. Respondents were paid 5 Peruvian Sols ($1.75)—about
a day’s earnings.
3.3.5 Balance
My key identifying assumption is that assignment to treatment was independent
of potential outcomes. I took five steps to buttress this assumption empirically.
First, I gained access to the Peruvian census from 1993, aggregated at the
village-level. The data, thus, falls broadly within the period when the mission-
aries began their conversion in the communities. The census includes data on 91
4In particular, the research team divided each village into four equally sized blocks. In each
block, the surveyors randomly determined which road to follow. Individuals on each road were
drawn using a detailed randomization dictionary.
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variables including indicators on education, demographics and economic develop-
ment. These data are reported in Table 3.7 in the supplementary information. To
assess balance across the different treatment statuses as compared with the control
villages, Figure 3.2 plots absolute t-values assessing differences-in-means across the
five treatment statues and the non-treated control villages. As can be seen, the
vast majority of variables are not significantly different. Indeed, only 3 variables
are consistently different in the treatment villages, namely, individuals between
1 and 4 years of age, married individuals and individuals living together. The
low incidence of systematic pre-treatment differences on a host of administrative
variables, thus, buttresses my key identifying assumption.
Second, I gathered additional information on pre-treatment variables in semi-
structured qualitative interviews with history experts in each village. These indi-
viduals were recommended to us by village presidents. We asked them to think
back to the year 1992 and asked them whether their village, at the time, had had a
school, hospital, post station or football field. The variables are reported in Table
3.6. In order to ensure that the experts recalled the correct villages, we reminded
them that the year 1992 was the year prior to the census, which all experts recalled.
These variables, too, confirm that the villages were broadly similar pre-treatment.
None of the villages had schools, hospitals or post stations, except for one village
in the Peruana treatment category. Football fields were more widespread at the
time, ranging from 33 percent in the untreated control villages to 100 percent in
the Peruana villages. Importantly, all villages confirmed that the Shining Path
had been active in the village in the 1980s. These data, then, provide additional
qualitative evidence regarding pre-treatment balance.
Third, I collected five geographic variables from all villages. I recorded a
given village’s road and geodesic distance to Cusco (in km) as well as a given
80
Figure 3.2: Balance across treatment statuses
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Evangelical Maranatha Mixed Pentecostal Peruana
Age 1−4
Age 15−64
Age 5−14
Age below 1
Age over 64
Analphabets (female)
Analphabets (male)
Analphabets (total)
Average children per mother
Average household size
Blind
Employed in primary sector
Employed in secondary sector
Employed in tertiary sector
Employer
Family Employment
Female
Flats incl. unoccupied homes
Flats no electricity
Flats with electricity
Flats with only 1 room
Handycap
Head household (female)
Head household (male)
Higher education
Households
Households only dormitories
Households with commercial rooms
Households with shared toilet
Independent houses
Independent worker
Living alone
Living in other form
Living together
Male
Married
Mental issues
Migrants
Natives
No domestic appliances
No education
Occupation: Agriculture
Occupation: Hawker
Occupation: Manufacturing, Mining, Construction
Occupation: Other
Occupation: Other services
Occupation: Retail
Only radio
Other handycaps
Other houses
Overdeveloped extremities
Ownership: other
Ownership: own
Ownership: rental
Polio
Preschool
Primary education
Radio & TV
Roof: corrugated steel
Roof: mats
Roof: other
Roof: straw
Sanitary: privy pit
Sanitory: none
Sanitory: other
Secondary education
Sewing machine
Single mothers
Single mothers 12 19
Single mothers 20−29
Single mothers 30−49
Total population
Tricycle
Underdeveloped extremities
Wage earner
Walls: cement
Walls: other
Walls: stone
Walls: wood
Water: other
Water: public well
Water: tankwagon
Women with more 4 children
Workers 6−14
Workers over 14
Workers over 14 (employed)
Workers over 14 (unemployed)
Working in household
Young mothers
0 3 6 9 0 3 6 9 0 3 6 9 0 3 6 9 0 3 6 9
Absolute t−values versus control
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Value of t−statistic
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●
<1.96
>=1.96
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village’s elevation and its longitude and latitude. These data are reported in
Table 3.6 and offer an objective way to assess balance given that the data are
administrative and cannot be affected by the treatment. The table underlines
that there are no apparent imbalances between treatment and control villages.
On average, distance to Cusco is 22 km in Control villages as compared with 28
km in Adventist and Mixed villages, 34 km in Peruana villages and 17 km in
Maranatha villages. Elevation is roughly 12 thousand feet in all villages, except
for the Peruana villages (13 thousand feet).
Fourth, one can scrutinize balance across treatment and control villages in the
random population sample. The sample’s individual-level variables are reported
in Table 3.5 in the supplementary information. Many of these variables could
plausibly be affected by the treatment (e.g., education, income, relationship status,
professions and propensity to travel). The variables that cannot be affected by
the treatment, however, are balanced across the treatment statuses. In particular,
the average age is 41 years in Control villages, 39 years in Adventist villages, 40
in Mixed villages, 37 in Peruana villages and 38 in Mixed villages. Gender, too, is
perfectly balanced. Finally, 5 percent of residents in Control villages have internet
access compared with 8 percent in Adventist villages, 3 percent in Mixed villages,
5 percent in Peruana villages and 2 percent in Maranatha villages.
Last, a word should be said about the potential for geographic clustering. My
key identifying assumption is that Protestant missions selected villages indepen-
dent of observable characteristics owing to a “missionary race.” It could be the
case, however, that assignment was exogenous, but at higher levels than the vil-
lage. Put differently, it may be the case that assignment to treatment was subject
to geographic clustering. A cursory glance at the map in Figure 3.9 does not
indicate that such clustering is present. A more systematic manner to assess ge-
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ographic clustering is to estimate the extent of spatial autocorrelation in my key
outcome of interest. The most common measure of such autocorrelation is Moran’s
I. To calculate Moran’s I, I need to construct a matrix of inverse distance weights
between the villages. I do so using the available longitude and latitude data of the
villages.5 Specifically, I first create a distance matrix and then take the inverse
of that matrix, replacing the diagonal entries with zero. In a next step, I then
calculate Moran’s I.6 So doing, does not allow me to reject the null hypothesis
that there is zero spatial autocorrelation (p-value of 0.88).
Taken together, I interpret the balance across a host of pre-treatment variables—
census data, expert interviews, geographic data and the population survey—and
the absence of geographic clustering in favor of my key assumption, namely, that
missionaries visited communities independent of potential outcomes. It should
also be highlighted that only two variables exhibit imbalance (notably, marital
status, and individuals between 1-4 years of age)—a fraction to be expected by
chance alone.
3.3.6 Measurement
This section introduces the strategy to measure community cohesion, pro-social
preferences and network structures at the individual level. I exclusively rely on
behavioral measures for all core theoretical concepts for two reasons. First, I
want to circumvent social desirability bias, given that converted individuals may
5NB: in so doing, I treat the villages as though lying on a plane. In reality, there are differences
in altitude across the villages.
6Moran’s I is defined as I =
∑
i
∑
j
wij(yi−µ)(yj−µ)∑
i
(yi−µ)2
, where y is my outcome of interest
(i.e., social cohesion) and µ is the average of y in my sample. Doing so requires that I define a
connectivity matrix w, which denotes the degree to which villages are connected, which I discuss
in the text.
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have internalized a norm that pro-social behavior is desirable.7 Second, I want
to measure actual behavior that is of relevance in the communities under study,
rather than attitudes about behavior. In the following, I begin by discussing my
measures for community cohesion—trust, cooperation, and identification. I then
go over pro-social preferences and network density. All behavioral measures were
applied during a random point during the survey,8 unless otherwise specified. The
instruments are available upon request.
I measure trust using the well-known trust-game (Berg, Dickhaut and Mc-
Cabe, 1995). In particular, each survey respondent was given the opportunity to
send any amount of the 2 Dollar participation compensation to the next respon-
dent. The sender was informed that, should the receiver send any money back,
the researchers would double that amount. In order to streamline the surveying
activities, enumerators did not implement the second part of the trust experiment
(the sending back of money by the next respondent) in order to streamline the sur-
veying and because I am only interested in the decision of the respondent whether
to invest. As can be seen in Table 3.2, 28 percent of respondents sent money to
the next respondent.
Table 3.2: Community cohesion measurement
Trust Cooperation Identification
Invested in Signed proposal Donated toward
trust game to reciprocate public good
Mean 27.6% 34.8% 54.7%
I measure cooperation with a novel compliance experiment aimed at captur-
ing reciprocal services in the community. In particular, respondents were asked
7Note that the survey team did not communicate to respondents that the project was about
missionaries in order to circumvent demand effects.
8Specifically, enumerators were instructed to interrupt the survey at a random point during
the survey to play the different behavioral games.
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if they would be willing to support a proposal the researchers had arranged prior
to surveying activities. In the proposal, village or church members (the endorsers
were randomly assigned to respondents) proposed to establish a regular meeting
to discuss church or community matters. We then asked respondents if they would
sign the proposal. The specific script was as follows: “Some members of [random:
this community / your church] want to establish a meeting to discuss [random:
community / church] issues. I have here a letter, which supports this idea. Do
you want to sign it?” On average, 35 percent of individuals gave their signature
(Table 3.2).
I measure identification using a public donation game aimed at measuring
whether respondents were willing to anonymously contribute any amount of their
final compensation fee toward the church or village community (the recipients
were, again, randomly assigned to respondents). The contributions were paid
out six months later when my team of research assistants gathered additional
qualitative data. On average, 55 percent of respondents donated an amount toward
the respective community (Table 3.2).
The three behavioral items are combined to a comprehensive community cohe-
sion index by standardizing the items and averaging across them. It ranges from 0
to 1 (Cronbach’s α of 0.64). I employ the index in the empirical analyses in order
to avoid multiple comparisons concerns, and to ascertain a robust measurement
of community cohesion.
I measure pro-social preferences using the non-strategic Random Allocation
Game (Purzycki et al., 2016), which provides an unobtrusive measure of whether
an individual is willing to betray others. In particular, respondents were given a
six-sided die and given two envelopes. One envelope was to be given to the com-
munity / church (fully randomized), the other was to remain with the individual.
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Respondents were then asked to throw the die ten times and distribute ten 10
PEN coins, which they were given, into the envelopes. In particular, the person
was to put a coin into the community / church envelope whenever the die showed 3
or less; and to put a coin into the own envelope when the die showed more than 3.
Respondents played the game in private and were instructed to seal the envelopes
after the game. In statistical expectation, 5 coins should land in both envelopes.
If the personal or community envelope receive more than half the coins, this is
evidence of bias towards the respective entity. On average, individuals allocated
5.2 (SE 0.06; see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3) coins to themselves, indicating a slight
tendency to put their own interest first.
Table 3.3: Mechanism measurement
Pro-social preferences Networks
Amount of money Found out
allocated to oneself neighbor’s age
Mean 5.2 61.9%
Figure 3.3: Random allocation game distribution
RAG allocation to oneself
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0
Notes: The figure plots the frequency distribution of the investment in the random allocation
game toward the “own” envelope.
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Finally, I measure network density using a local-level behavioral game in-
tended to measure respondents’ ability to obtain relevant social information. In
particular, we asked respondents to find out their neighbor’s (head of household)
age within a time frame of five minutes (respondents where not incentivized this
task). Respondents claiming to know the answer—a small minority—were asked to
confirm their information. The logic behind this measure is as follows. Given that
we implemented the surveys on work days, most surveys were conducted outside
of respondents’ homes at their places of work (e.g., in the fields or at construction
sites). Finding out one’s neighbor’s exact age thus required respondents to quickly
mobilize their network to get the answer within the allotted time. On average, 62
percent of individuals found out their neighbor’s age (Table 3.3). Originally, I had
intended to check the provided answers. This did not prove feasible, however, as
neighbors, too, were frequently not at home.
3.4 Results
To assess the effect of Protestant missions on community cohesion, I analyze the
intention-to-treat effect at the village-level. The primary linear model—estimated
using OLS—is as follows:
Yil = β0 + β1Adventistil + β2Mixedil + β3Peruanail + β4Maranathail + Xilβ+ εil
(3.1)
where Yil represents the outcome of individual i in village l, Adventist, Mixed, Pe-
ruana, and Maranatha represent dummies for the respective treatment statuses,
and Xil represents a vector of individual-level and community-level control vari-
ables.
Given the large number of possibly prognostic control variables, there is signifi-
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cant discretion over which variables to include in the models.9 I therefore focus on
variables entirely unaffected by the treatment. At the individual-level (Table 3.5),
this includes age and gender. At the village-level (Table 3.6-3.7), this includes
all geographic variables (i.e., road and geodesic distance to Cusco, elevation, lon-
gitude and latitude). Additionally, it includes historical pre-treatment variables
drawn from interviews with history experts (i.e., whether a village had a school,
hospital, post station and football field in 1992 and whether the Sendero Luminoso
was active in the village). Finally, it includes all census variables listed in Table
3.7. Overall, there are thus well over 100 possible pre-treatment covariates at my
disposal. In order to minimize “researchers degrees of freedom” when determining
the prognostic value of covariates and to avoid multicollinearity, I therefore report
models without covariate adjustment as my preferred benchmark specification. In
addition, I report models that include individual-level control variables unaffected
by the treatment, namely, age and gender. In the supplementary information,
I perform sensitivity analyses, estimating models where covariates are gradually
and randomly added to my models. Figure 3.10 in the Supplementary Information
presents the average estimated effects and standard errors randomly drawing 1-10
number of covariates, 1,000 times each, which buttresses my reported effect sizes
and uncertainty levels.
The estimation of standard errors merits discussion. As is widely known, OLS
tends to underestimate the true standard errors when assignment is clustered.
The common approach to tackle this problem is to apply sandwich estimators,
which permit for the errors to be heteroskedastic and also to be correlated within
clusters. Problematically, these estimators are only correct when the number of
clusters approach infinity. The present study, however, only has 16 clusters. To
9The design of the study presented in this chapter was not pre-registered.
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bridge this problem, an influential study by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008)
proposes the use of wild cluster bootstrap-t procedures to estimate the standard
errors. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the authors show that this procedure
performs significantly better even when the number of clusters is less than ten. In
this chapter, I therefore apply their method to estimate standard errors.
3.4.1 Community Cohesion
I begin by assessing the primary outcome of interest, community cohesion, which
I measure using three behavioral items that capture trust, cooperation and identi-
fication. As Figure 3.5 demonstrates, the aggregate community cohesion index is
systematically lower in treated villages. The treatment effect is particularly pro-
nounced in Pentecostal villages—i.e., a combination of Maranatha and Peruana—
as can be seen in the lower figure. Respondents in Pentecostal villages are roughly
20 percent less likely to sign the village / church proposal, and 22 percent less likely
to invest in the trust game. Regarding the four individual missions, I find that
the Peruana treatment is associated with a sizable reduction in trust, identifica-
tion, and cooperation. The effects are both significantly bounded away from zero,
and substantively meaningful. Villages exposed to the Maranatha or Mixed treat-
ment witness slightly less pronounced treatment effects, but effects continue to be
significantly bounded away from zero. On the other hand, Adventist villages—
those exposed to comparatively milder forms of theological preaching—are not
systematically different as compared with the control communities. Indeed, most
Adventist estimates are remarkably close to zero. For the aggregate community
cohesion index, the estimate is even slightly positive (though insignificant).
In a second step, I corroborate these findings using clustered randomization in-
ference, aggregating the treatments at the Evangelical and Pentecostal level. The
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analysis in Figure 3.4 shows that Pentecostal missions, in particular, are associ-
ated with a decrease in community cohesion. Regarding cooperation, I estimate
that villages exposed to Pentecostal missions have a 14 percentage points lower
likelihood of signing the village / church proposal (p-value of 0.07). The effect
is positive, though insignificant, for the Evangelical missions. Regarding identifi-
cation, I estimate that Pentecostal villages are 13 percentage points less likely to
donate toward a public good (p-value of 0.07). Again, the effect is positive, but
insignificant, for Evangelical villages. Finally, I estimate that Pentecostal villages
are 10 percentage points less likely to invest in the trust game (p-value of 0.13).
The finding, again, is slightly positive among Evangelical villages. In sum, then, I
show that Protestant missions reduce community cohesion, particularly so when
missionaries label themselves Pentecostal. All results are robust to the inclusion of
pre-treatment covariates. Indeed, the pre-treatment covariates do not appreciably
change the estimates—as would be expected in a study where the treatment is
plausibly exogenous.
Three points merit discussion. First, recall that all three community cohe-
sion outcomes are unobtrusive behavioral measures. They thus capture actual
behavior, such as signing a village petition. Second, there is a clear trend that
the treatment effects are more pronounced in Pentecostal villages. I should note,
however, that the differences between the different estimates are not themselves
statistically significant. In addition, the Mixed and Maranatha estimates seem
broadly similar, despite the fact that the latter displays a stricter theology. By far
the strongest treatment effects are consistently found in Peruana villages. Last,
the evidence produced here marks a causally identified counterpoint to several ob-
servational studies that have produced a positive correlation between missionaries
and community cohesion (or outcomes sufficiently close to community cohesion,
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Figure 3.4: Protestant missions and community cohesion (randomization infer-
ence)
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Notes: The Figures plot the estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of the indicated treatment
(Evangelical or Pentecostal) on the three outcomes depicting community cohesion using clustered
randomization inference under 10,000 simulations. I report the corresponding one-sided p-value.
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Figure 3.5: Protestant missions and community cohesion
(a) All treatment conditions
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(b) Pentecostal vs. Evangelical
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Notes: The figures plot point estimates (dot / square) and 95 percent confidence intervals (lines)
of regressions of the four treatments on the indicated outcomes of the community cohesion
measures. Dots represent regressions with covariate adjustment, squares represent regressions
without covariate adjustment (age and gender). Standard errors estimated using wild cluster
bootstrap-t procedure.
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including trust). To better understand the drivers behind the reduced form find-
ing, the following section tests the theorized mechanisms.
3.5 Mediation
Next, I turn to the mechanisms that give rise to the observed reduction in com-
munity cohesion. I approach mediation in two steps. First, I analyze whether the
treatment affects the two mediators. Such an exploratory analysis is useful be-
cause causal mediation analysis relies on strong assumptions. Yet, even the critics
of causal mediation analysis note that “if certain pathways are unaffected by the
treatment, one may begin to argue that they do not explain why (the treatment)
works,” and that such “exploratory investigation may provide some useful clues
to guide further experimental investigation” (Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010, 207).
In a second step, I then estimate a causal mediation model, which—under a set of
strong assumptions—can help us understand to what degree the observed nega-
tive correlation between Protestant missions and community cohesion is mediated
through the two hypothesized mechanisms. As in chapter 2, I must caution that
these assumptions are unlikely to be met in the present chapter. Thus, the me-
diation analysis is exploratory in nature and must not be interpreted as causal
evidence
First, I regress the preference mechanism on the four treatment indicators. As
Figure 3.6a showcases, being exposed to a Protestant mission is associated with
a significant drop in pro-social preferences. On average, individuals in treated
villages contribute 0.5 fewer coins toward the community (RAG). The effects hold
across all four treatment statuses. They are also robust to the inclusion of pre-
treatment covariates. The treatment effects do not, however, gain in strength
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Figure 3.6: Protestant missions’ effects on two mediators
(a) All treatment conditions
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(b) Pentecostal vs. Evangelical
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Notes: The figures plot point estimates (dot / square) and 95 percent confidence intervals (lines)
of regressions of the four treatments on the indicated outcomes. Dots represent regressions
with covariate adjustment, squares represent regressions without covariate adjustment (age and
gender). Standard errors estimated using wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure.
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as one moves from Adventist to Maranatha missionaries (see also Figure 3.6b).
Notwithstanding, the evidence provides support for Hypothesis 1b.
Second, I regress the structure mechanism on the four treatment indicators.
As Figure 3.6a demonstrates, network density—measured using respondents’ abil-
ity to find out their neighbor’s age—is consistently lower in evangelized villages.
Despite the Adventists adopting the broadest proselytism strategy, the treatment
effect is strongest in Maranatha villages. Here, individuals are 18 percent less likely
to find out the age of their neighbor. All estimates are robust to the inclusion of
pre-treatment covariates. The evidence is thus in with Hypothesis 2b.
3.5.1 Causal Mediation
The analyses thus far have shown that missionaries reduce overall community
cohesion, and also negatively affect the two hypothesized mechanisms: pro-social
preferences and network density. To explore the role that these mechanisms play,
I now move toward the causal mediation framework proposed by Imai, Keele and
Yamamoto (2010). To do so, I state my case in the potential outcomes framework.
Let mediation be a process whereby a treatment, T , affects an outcome, Y , through
a mediator, M . In addition, let Yi(t) denote the outcome of individual i when
treated (t = 1) or not treated (t = 0). The average causal effect, estimated before,
is then E[Yi(t = 1)− Yi(t = 0)].
I hypothesized that two variables mediate the relation between the missions,
T , and community cohesion, Y . Specifically, let the outcome of these mediators be
Mi(t = 1) when assigned to treatment, and Mi(t = 0) when assigned to control.
The indirect causal mediation effect is then δi(t) = Yi(t,Mi(1))− Yi(t,Mi(0)). It
represents the indirect effect of the treatment on the outcome through the mediator
(average causal mediation effect). The effect not captured by the two hypothesized
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mediators is then given by ζi(t) = Yi(1,Mi(t)) − Yi(0,Mi(t)). It represents the
direct effect of the treatment on the outcome (average direct effect). The total
effect—assuming that causal mediation and direct effects do not vary as functions
of treatment status (no-interaction assumption; Imai, Keele and Tingley 2010,
312)—is then πi = δi + ζi.
In order to causally identify both effects, researchers must invoke two strong
assumptions (sequential ignorability). First, one must assume that the treatment
is ignorable given pre-treatment covariates. I have defended this assumption in the
preceding sections by arguing that the assignment toward treatment and control
was plausibly exogenous. In any event, I will adjust for pre-treatment covariates
in the following analyses. Second one must assume that the mediators—pro-social
preferences and network density—are ignorable given the observed treatment and
pre-treatment covariates. That is, one must assume that the mediators, them-
selves, are exogenous. In other words, the ignorability of the mediator implies
that among villages, which share the same treatment status and the same pre-
treatment characteristics, the mediator can be regarded as if it were random.
The second assumption is difficult to invoke convincingly in observational as
well as experimental studies (Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010) as it cannot be directly
tested from the observed data (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010, 313). In the present
study, however, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic that the missionaries
activated the two mediators to varying degrees. In particular, I have argued
that the Pentecostal (Maranatha and Peruana) missionaries are more likely to
affect the preference mechanism—due to their increased focus on individualism—
while the Evangelical (Adventist and Mixed) missionaries are more likely to affect
the structure mechanism—given their broader proselytism strategy. This is, of
course, not to say that the mediators are exogenous. After all, there may still be
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unobserved variables that affect the mediator as well as the outcome. As such,
the present mediation analysis is exploratory in nature.
In Figure 3.7, I plot the ACME for the two mediators. As can be seen, de-
spite the fact that the mediators, taken in isolation, are negatively correlated with
the treatment, they only marginally mediate the relationship between Protestant
missions and community cohesion. When taken at face-value, the network mech-
anism accounts for roughly 7 percent of the observed variation in the Maranatha
condition. The preference mechanism, on the other hand, seems to exhibit no
causal role. All estimates are remarkably close to 0 across the four treatment
conditions. As such, the estimates imply that the network effects exhibits a more
pronounced effect as compared with the preference mechanism, but only in Pente-
costal villages. While this finding is in line with my theoretical considerations and
qualitative evidence from the field, several words of caution are in order. First,
the ACMEs reported here are estimated with significant uncertainty and not sig-
nificantly bound way from zero. This is predominantly due to the low number
of clusters. Second, the ACME relies on the assumption that the mediators are
exogenous—an assumption that is ambitious even in the present study where the
mediators were plausibly exogenously activated. Third, even if the effects are
causal and precisely estimated, they are rather low.
3.6 Testing the Club Argument
Thus far, I have presented evidence that villages exposed to Protestant missions
are shaped by lower levels of community cohesion, likely mediated by weaker
networks. Before concluding, one widely discussed theoretical question should be
addressed. Namely, whether Protestant missions merely shift cohesion from the
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Figure 3.7: Mediation analysis
(a) All treatment conditions
Mediator: Network density Mediator: Pro−social preferences
Maranatha
Peruana
Mixed
Adventist
−0.010 −0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010 −0.010 −0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010
Controls included Controls not included
(b) Pentecostal vs. Evangelical
Mediator: Network density Mediator: Pro−social preferences
Pentecostal
Evangelical
−0.010 −0.005 0.000 0.005 −0.010 −0.005 0.000 0.005
Controls included Controls not included
Notes: The figures plot average causal mediation effect estimates (dot / square) and 95 per-
cent Bayesian confidence intervals (lines) of regressions of the four treatments on the indicated
mediators. Dots represent regressions with covariate adjustment, squares represent regressions
without covariate adjustment.
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greater village to the church community. Following this reading, the communities
under study may have lower aggregate community cohesion, but stronger cohesion
within the missionary community. If this logic were to hold, one should observe
greater trust, cooperation, and identification within the missionary community in
treated villages.
To assess this question, I can draw on the fact that two pivotal outcome mea-
sures of community cohesion—cooperation and identification—randomized the re-
spective group with which the respondent cooperated or identified. As was de-
scribed before, respondents were asked whether they wanted to donate money to-
ward the church community or the village community (identification). Similarly,
respondents were asked whether they would be willing to sign a church or a village
proposal (cooperation). In both instances, the community was fully randomized
across respondents, and blocked on gender. The priming experiment thus allows
us to test the “club”-hypothesis that missions merely shift community cohesion
from the village toward the church. Specifically, I test whether the primes—the
church or village community—produce different effect on cooperation and iden-
tification levels between evangelized and non-evangelized villages. If Protestant
missions merely shift cohesion from the greater village to the church community,
we should see a positive effect size in treated villages for the church prime.
In Figure 3.8, I plot the cooperation and identification measures, as well as
an aggregated index, under the two priming conditions. The figure shows that
there are more pronounced negative treatment effects when individuals are primed
with the village condition. For instance, while donations are not significantly
bound away from zero in the church condition, they are significantly lower when
donations go toward the village community (the differences in the estimates are
not significant). Differences regarding cooperation are not discernible.
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Figure 3.8: Community cohesion within church and village community
(a) Church community
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Cohesion index church Cooperation (signed church proposal) Identification (donated toward church)
Maranatha
Peruana
Mixed
Adventist
−0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 −0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 −0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50
● With controls Without controls
(b) Village community
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Notes: The figures plot point estimates (dot / square) and 95 percent confidence intervals (lines)
of regressions of the four treatments on the indicated outcomes. Dots represent regressions
with covariate adjustment, squares represent regressions without covariate adjustment (age and
gender). Standard errors estimated using wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure.
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Importantly, however, one should note that the treatment effects, as can be
seen when scrutinizing the aggregate church and village community cohesion in-
dexes, are negative even under the church condition. This shows that missions
reduce community cohesion not just within the village, but also within the respec-
tive church community as compared with the control condition where religion plays
a minor role. Therefore, I can rule out the “club”-hypothesis. Both the village
and the church community are shaped by lower levels of community cohesion.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has revisited a growing number of empirical studies that point to
a positive relation between Protestant missions and community cohesion. Focus-
ing on modern-day Protestant missions in southeastern Peru, I presented different
logics that can explain a rise and fall in community cohesion as a result of Protes-
tant proselytism. Presenting evidence from an in-depth study of villages in Peru,
I found that villages exposed to Evangelical or Pentecostal missions are shaped
by lower levels of community cohesion. I found weaker social networks to be a
salient mediator of this relation. A reduction in pro-social preferences played no
apparent mediating role, though they, too, were lower in treated villages. I also
demonstrated that the reduction holds even within the respective church commu-
nities, thereby rejecting the well-known “club good” hypothesis.
After collecting the quantitative evidence, I cross-checked the empirical find-
ings by conducting qualitative, semi-structured interviews with all community
presidents and one missionary in case a communities was treated. In line with
the quantitative findings, the qualitative interviews with village presidents con-
firmed that Catholic control communities have witnessed little behavioral change.
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When asked what had changed in recent years—perhaps due to the religion of
the village—all three presidents of Catholic villages could not think of any sig-
nificant differences. Regarding community cohesion, two of the three Catholic
presidents confirmed that their villages were not separated. The absence of an in-
dividualization of preferences, too, was confirmed. None of the Catholic presidents
complained about selfish behavior among villagers.
In the proselytized villages, this picture was largely reversed. While Adven-
tist presidents discerned only mild behavioral changes—one president noted no
change, the remaining two cited non-descriptive changes—presidents in the Mixed
and Pentecostal villages overwhelmingly noted that people worked harder and con-
sumed less alcohol. Regarding overall community cohesion, presidents noted that
villagers had become more selfish and displayed stronger religiosity. One Peruana
village president complained “they (the residents) changed when the Evangelicals
came, we no longer drink alcohol and we are committed to our work and no longer
focus on parties.” The weakening of networks was noted specifically. One president
stated “sometimes, some churches forbid people of different religions to talk to one
another.” The preference mechanism was also acknowledged by some presidents
in treated villages. For instance, one president noted that “within the churches
they don’t help one another, there is also a lot of egoism within the missions.”
While the qualitative interviews largely confirmed the quantitative findings, I
want to conclude this chapter by highlighting three potential shortcomings and
thus areas of improvement of this study.
First, while I argued that the assignment of missions to villages was plausibly
exogenous, the careful case and village selection came at a cost: The number of
clusters was low. This is problematic as it increases the risk that effect sizes do not
translate to the greater population due to sampling variability. The estimation
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of standard errors is also anything but straightforward. I tried to ameliorate
this problem by also gathering qualitative, within-case evidence to corroborate
the quantitative findings. In addition, the fact that estimates were largely in
line with the theoretical considerations builds trust in the results. Future studies
on religious conversion, however, would undoubtedly benefit from increasing the
number of units under study.
Second, the declared goal of this study was not only to provide causally identi-
fied evidence, but to assess the mechanisms that underlie the observed correlation.
In so doing, I explored two specific mechanisms: preferences and networks. The
rather low average mediated effect of these mechanisms, however, demonstrates
the need to investigate more carefully the full universe of plausible mechanisms.
Several mediators come to mind. While education plays a minor role, the fact that
missionaries spur abstract spirituality and time devoted to reading scripture may
affect to what degree individuals are cognitively willing to engage with others in
their community.
The analysis of mechanisms, however, remains a daunting task. Any mecha-
nism may be separated into further sub-mechanisms, few of which can be exoge-
nously varied by a researcher. The analyst of missions thus face a trade-off between
causally identified evidence and mechanism analysis. Notwithstanding, by mea-
suring a more comprehensive set of mechanisms, researchers could plausibly show
which mechanisms are not affected by missionary activity—a finding arguably as
interesting as weakly identified positive evidence. Qualitative interviews may then
offer further guidance on which mechanisms are at work, and which are not.
Third, the present study has only rudimentarily described the content of the
missionary work and preaching. Though I only found weak evidence that prefer-
ences mediate the causal relationship between missions and community cohesion,
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I did confirm a strong negative correlation between pro-sociality and the pres-
ence of missions. This is valuable evidence for the conjecture that religion affects
individual-level preferences. One promising pathway to better understand this
relation is to scrutinize sermons in a more systematic descriptive way. When
missionaries preach to believers in hour-long sermons, they likely have profound
effects on preferences of interest to social scientists. To what degree such effects
depend on the content of theological preachings and ideas has received all too little
empirical scrutiny in the social sciences.
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3.8 Supplementary Information
Figure 3.9: Research sites
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Table 3.4: Treatment and conversion
Treatment Control Adventist Mixed Peruana Maranatha Total
Conversion
Catholic 184 72 78 73 114 521
% 95.8 37.5 40.6 38.0 44.5 50.9
Adventist 1 98 41 5 3 148
% 0.5 51.0 21.4 2.6 1.2 14.5
Peruana 2 15 34 110 4 165
% 1.0 7.8 17.7 57.3 1.6 16.1
Maranatha 0 0 17 1 127 145
% 0.0 0.0 8.9 0.5 49.6 14.2
Israelita 0 0 18 0 1 19
% 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.0 0.4 1.9
Other 5 7 4 3 7 26
% 2.6 3.7 2.1 1.6 2.7 2.5
Total 192 192 192 192 256 1024
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Table 3.5: Individual-level covariates and outcomes
N Control Adventist Mixed Peruana Maranatha
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Individual-level covariates
Age (#) 1021 40.9 14.5 39.1 15.1 40.3 15.3 37.2 12.1 38.4 14.4
Male 1024 50.0 50.1 50.0 50.1 50.0 50.1 50.0 50.1 50.0 50.1
Education (1-5) 1023 2.3 0.8 2.2 0.9 2.3 0.8 2.4 0.8 2.5 0.7
Income (PEN) 1012 52.0 95.0 61.6 108.1 44.1 63.0 81.1 131.8 49.4 78.6
No income 1012 28.2 45.1 41.9 49.5 30.9 46.3 31.6 46.6 29.8 45.8
Married 1024 48.4 50.1 62.0 48.7 65.1 47.8 63.5 48.3 63.3 48.3
Relationship 1024 28.1 45.1 10.9 31.3 9.9 29.9 8.3 27.7 12.9 33.6
Single 1024 17.2 37.8 24.0 42.8 18.2 38.7 26.0 44.0 19.9 40.0
Farmer 1024 46.9 50.0 40.6 49.2 52.1 50.1 57.3 49.6 49.2 50.1
Housewife 1024 34.4 47.6 34.4 47.6 29.7 45.8 23.4 42.5 33.6 47.3
Internet access 1010 5.3 22.5 7.8 26.9 2.6 16.0 4.8 21.5 2.4 15.2
Traveled 1020 55.3 49.9 59.4 49.2 57.8 49.5 68.1 46.7 65.5 47.6
Outcome measures
Investment incidence 1024 35.4 48.0 34.9 47.8 25.5 43.7 9.4 29.2 31.6 46.6
Sign proposal 992 48.6 50.1 50.3 50.1 23.5 42.5 20.0 40.1 32.5 46.9
Signed church proposal 495 48.4 50.2 52.7 50.2 20.7 40.7 21.3 41.1 38.4 48.8
Signed village proposal 497 48.9 50.3 47.9 50.2 26.4 44.3 18.8 39.2 26.6 44.4
Donation incidence 1024 63.0 48.4 68.2 46.7 49.5 50.1 45.3 49.9 49.2 50.1
Donation incidence village 512 72.9 44.7 63.5 48.4 51.0 50.3 42.7 49.7 40.6 49.3
Donation incidence church 512 53.1 50.2 72.9 44.7 47.9 50.2 47.9 50.2 57.8 49.6
RAG themselves 983 5.6 1.8 4.9 2.0 5.0 1.9 5.2 1.8 5.1 1.7
Found out neighbor’s age 1017 71.2 45.4 60.5 49.0 65.8 47.6 58.9 49.3 55.1 49.8
Notes: Mean and standard deviations of individual-level covariates and outcome measures gathered in the random
population survey. Variables given in percentages unless stated otherwise.
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Table 3.6: Village-level descriptive statistics from expert surveys
N Control Adventist Mixed Peruana Maranatha
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Geographic data
Distance Cusco street (km) 16 21.6 14.8 27.5 11.1 27.7 11.6 33.9 6.9 17.0 1.3
Distance Cusco geodesic (km) 16 16.3 9.5 12.5 1.0 15.1 6.8 12.9 0.9 9.9 3.1
Elevation (’000 feet) 16 11.95 0.59 12.34 0.48 12.26 0.30 12.56 0.38 12.04 0.52
Lon (#) 16 -71.9 0.1 -71.9 0.0 -71.9 0.0 -71.9 0.0 -71.9 0.0
Lat (#) 16 -13.6 0.1 -13.4 0.0 -13.4 0.1 -13.4 0.0 -13.5 0.1
Expert interviews – current measures
Tourism 16 33.3 57.7 33.3 57.7 33.3 57.7 33.3 57.7 25.0 50.0
Families 16 55.0 13.2 81.7 12.6 63.3 20.8 73.3 11.5 67.5 8.7
Paved place 16 33.3 57.7 33.3 57.7 33.3 57.7 33.3 57.7 25.0 50.0
Tenure village president (m) 15 22.0 3.5 16.7 12.7 20.0 6.9 20.0 6.9 22.0 3.5
Village assemblies per year (#) 16 12.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 12.0 0.0
Relation pres village (1-10) 16 8.3 1.5 4.3 4.2 9.3 1.2 10.0 0.0 6.2 3.6
Relation pres Protestants (1-10) 16 – – 6.0 4.4 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 3.2 4.5
Expert interviews – historical data
School 1992 16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 57.7 0.0 0.0
Hospital in 1992 16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 57.7 0.0 0.0
Post station in 1992 16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 57.7 0.0 0.0
Football field in 1992 16 33.3 57.7 66.7 57.7 66.7 57.7 100.0 0.0 50.0 57.7
Activity shining path 11 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Notes: Mean and standard deviations of village-level covariates gathered during the expert surveys and using
geographic data. Variables given in percentages unless stated otherwise.
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Table 3.7: Village-level descriptive statistics from 1993 Census (part 1)
N Control Adventist Mixed Peruana Maranatha
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Total population 16.0 185.3 74.0 449.0 129.3 427.7 298.8 435.0 162.9 225.0 61.2
Male 16.0 49.0 0.5 49.1 2.9 48.8 2.6 49.9 3.4 49.7 1.7
Female 16.0 51.0 0.5 50.9 2.9 51.2 2.6 50.1 3.4 50.3 1.7
Age below 1 16.0 4.0 0.6 2.3 1.7 3.1 0.7 3.8 1.8 3.7 0.6
Age 1-4 16.0 15.8 0.8 13.4 1.9 13.0 1.8 10.4 1.5 13.7 1.7
Age 5-14 16.0 27.0 3.3 28.5 0.6 29.4 1.3 28.3 3.5 27.6 5.4
Age 15-64 16.0 47.5 1.5 51.5 2.5 50.3 1.5 52.2 2.3 49.2 2.9
Age over 64 16.0 5.6 1.8 4.3 1.9 4.2 1.1 5.4 0.6 5.9 3.0
Natives 16.0 98.6 1.1 98.1 1.2 98.8 1.1 98.4 0.7 98.5 0.3
Migrants 16.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5
Foreigners 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Handycap 16.0 1.3 0.7 15.3 24.6 1.3 0.4 10.7 11.7 1.1 1.5
Blind 16.0 0.3 0.5 13.0 22.5 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6
Mental issues 16.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.3 2.5 1.9 0.3 0.4
Polio 16.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.6 2.8 0.0 0.0
Underdeveloped extremities 16.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.6 0.1 0.2
Overdeveloped extremities 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.4 0.0 0.0
Other handycaps 16.0 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.4 2.3 2.5 0.2 0.4
Analphabets (total) 16.0 30.4 7.5 37.7 16.8 34.1 10.5 34.3 7.0 29.6 8.1
Analphabets (male) 16.0 36.3 0.7 33.2 4.4 33.3 6.6 34.0 5.0 33.8 4.3
Analphabets (female) 16.0 63.7 0.7 66.8 4.4 66.7 6.6 66.0 5.0 66.2 4.3
No education 16.0 22.0 10.4 33.9 19.5 28.9 8.9 28.2 11.5 24.1 4.8
Preschool 16.0 4.4 1.4 2.9 3.1 4.0 0.4 4.1 3.6 2.3 1.4
Primary education 16.0 42.5 3.7 37.9 17.3 43.7 6.3 42.1 3.9 45.0 2.2
Secondary education 16.0 9.2 6.8 6.0 2.8 6.4 2.7 8.3 6.1 9.5 4.8
Higher education 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3
Workers 6-14 16.0 0.3 0.5 3.3 5.0 1.2 1.1 2.3 2.9 0.7 0.6
Workers over 14 16.0 24.7 2.5 33.9 13.0 32.4 15.4 39.8 14.0 25.4 7.4
Workers over 14 (employed) 16.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2
Workers over 14 (unemployed) 16.0 2.1 2.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 3.0 3.6
Occupation: Agriculture 16.0 13.9 8.3 24.5 2.6 27.2 10.5 21.5 2.5 18.3 8.7
Occupation: Construction 16.0 1.1 1.4 0.6 0.7 2.7 4.7 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.6
Occupation: Retail 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Occupation: Hawker 16.0 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7
Occupation: Other services 16.0 7.8 5.4 5.2 9.0 0.0 0.1 6.1 5.3 3.9 2.2
Occupation: Other 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7
Wage earner 16.0 6.6 5.7 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 2.1 2.4
Independent worker 16.0 13.6 8.4 22.8 0.7 28.1 14.1 21.1 2.1 18.5 10.2
Employer 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Family Employment 16.0 3.1 1.0 8.8 9.0 3.9 1.5 15.3 10.9 4.0 2.1
Working in household 16.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
Employed in primary sector 16.0 18.4 9.6 30.0 8.5 27.2 10.5 27.3 6.7 21.8 8.3
Employed in secondary sector 16.0 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.5 2.6 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.3
Employed in tertiary sector 16.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.2
Living together 16.0 26.3 1.4 12.5 1.9 9.5 4.7 10.9 3.0 8.0 3.8
Married 16.0 13.4 3.5 28.4 2.3 26.8 1.3 30.6 1.9 30.2 7.0
Living alone 16.0 14.0 0.5 16.4 4.3 17.7 2.2 15.7 6.1 18.8 1.5
Living in other form 16.0 5.3 1.7 5.4 0.8 7.1 0.3 6.2 2.0 5.2 2.3
Heads of household 16.0 43.3 16.7 108.7 28.3 100.7 74.2 100.3 31.7 49.0 11.7
Head household (male) 16.0 84.8 7.7 83.6 5.1 80.6 3.4 84.4 2.5 87.7 5.7
Head household (female) 16.0 15.2 7.7 16.4 5.1 19.4 3.4 15.6 2.5 12.3 5.7
Average children per mother 16.0 7.3 2.1 5.7 0.6 6.3 0.6 6.3 2.5 6.3 1.7
Women over 4 children 16.0 7.1 3.0 6.0 1.2 7.5 1.4 5.2 3.5 6.6 2.1
Single mothers 16.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Single mothers 12 19 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Single mothers 20-29 16.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Single mothers 30-49 16.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Young mothers 16.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.4
Flats incl. unoccupied homes 16.0 48.3 20.5 108.7 28.3 107.0 84.8 103.3 30.2 52.8 7.8
Households 16.0 43.3 16.7 108.7 28.3 100.7 74.2 100.3 31.7 49.0 11.7
Average household size 16.0 4.3 0.6 4.1 0.1 4.3 0.2 4.3 0.3 4.6 0.6
Independent houses 16.0 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.2
Makeshift 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other house 16.0 22.7 19.9 4.3 7.4 0.0 0.0 8.3 14.4 4.6 4.9
Ownership: own 16.0 73.9 16.2 66.7 52.1 98.5 1.7 62.4 49.1 71.4 33.0
Ownership: rental 16.0 3.8 4.1 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.9 2.1 2.6 4.2
Ownership: occupied 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ownership: other 16.0 21.4 18.4 32.2 53.0 0.4 0.6 35.7 49.2 26.0 30.1
Walls: cement 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Walls: quincho 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Walls: stone 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 2.6 3.2 1.1 2.2
Walls: wood 16.0 1.1 1.9 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.9 0.0 0.0
Walls: mat 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Walls: other 16.0 98.0 1.8 99.7 0.5 99.5 0.9 96.3 3.3 98.9 2.2
Roof: concrete 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Roof: corrugated steel 16.0 4.4 7.6 3.2 2.9 8.5 7.8 13.9 18.4 2.3 3.1
Roof: mats 16.0 2.6 4.6 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.4 0.7 1.4
Roof: straw 16.0 50.6 35.9 66.1 29.7 58.9 20.9 47.8 28.4 39.5 39.1
Roof: other 16.0 41.5 23.0 30.4 26.6 32.6 13.7 37.5 32.3 57.4 38.2
Water: private 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Water: public well 16.0 39.0 45.8 6.7 7.3 49.8 24.0 43.8 34.2 34.6 28.9
Water: tankwagon 16.0 4.3 7.4 0.8 1.4 0.0 0.0 3.8 6.6 0.0 0.0
Water: other 16.0 55.9 46.2 92.5 8.6 50.2 24.0 52.3 27.9 65.4 28.9
Notes: Mean and standard deviation of covariates. Variables given in percentages unless stated otherwise.
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Village-level descriptive statistics from 1993 Census (part 2)
N Control Adventist Mixed Peruana Maranatha
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Sanitary: connected grid 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sanitary: privy pit 16.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.7 10.9 10.7 0.5 0.9 26.1 31.1
Sanitary: other 16.0 0.9 1.5 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8
Sanitary: none 16.0 98.2 3.0 97.9 2.0 89.1 10.7 99.5 0.9 73.5 30.6
Flats with electricity 16.0 0.0 0.0 22.7 30.2 47.4 46.9 53.1 46.2 40.2 48.6
Flats no electricity 16.0 99.1 1.5 77.3 30.2 52.6 46.9 46.9 46.2 59.8 48.6
Flats with only 1 room 16.0 51.0 17.0 59.8 4.3 52.8 10.7 51.0 26.2 33.7 16.5
Households only dormitories 16.0 59.6 26.3 59.8 4.3 50.1 14.2 50.2 26.9 25.3 19.1
Households with shared toilet 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.4
Households with comm rooms 16.0 3.0 3.2 1.2 1.2 2.6 2.5 4.5 4.5 1.9 2.7
No domestic appliances 16.0 19.0 15.4 37.3 20.3 30.3 9.8 24.7 5.8 21.0 9.5
Only radio 16.0 58.4 19.8 59.0 17.3 52.1 11.9 48.7 18.5 51.4 13.3
Radio and TV 16.0 81.0 15.4 62.7 20.3 68.9 9.0 75.3 5.8 79.0 9.5
Sewing machine 16.0 31.5 28.6 5.8 4.6 17.4 7.4 19.7 13.8 29.4 11.3
Fridge 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tricycle 16.0 0.9 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.4 28.1 31.6
More than 4 appliances 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: Mean and standard deviation of covariates. Variables given in percentages unless stated otherwise.
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Figure 3.10: Robustness to covariate adjustment
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Notes: The figure plots average point estimates (dots) and cluster robust standard errors (lines)
of regressions of the cohesion index on the four missionary treatments including x number of
randomly drawn covariates running 1,000 iterations. I use cluster robust standard errors, rather
than wild cluster bootstrap-t standard errors, to ease computation.
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4
Missionaries and Social Capital
4.1 Introduction
A variety of scholars have hypothesized that religious organizations increase social
capital (notably, Putnam, 2000). The reasons are manifold. Above all, religious
communities function as civic associations and may thus increase associational
activity (Curtis, Baer and Grabb, 2001). Moreover, religious doctrines affect how
believers relate to other members of society, perhaps spurring pro-social behavior.
Indeed, in the U.S. context religious groups are asserted to “have more potential to
contribute to America’s social capital than any other institution in American soci-
ety” (Smidt, 2003, 2). Protestant missionaries are particularly highlighted as key
catalysts of social capital. As Woodberry (2012, 252), focusing on Great Britain
and the United States, notes: “CPs [conversionary protestants] disproportionately
mobilized and signed petitions [...], and they organized and led virtually all the
organizations and movements that formalized these tactics in the early 1800s.”
Despite a rich historical and theoretical literature, causal evidence regarding
the role of Protestant missionaries in social capital formation is scarce. This par-
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ticularly holds true for the missionaries who are active in Sub-Saharan Africa
today. The few studies that exist rely on observational historical data and dis-
cuss foreign missionaries. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Above
all, Protestant missionaries carefully select communities rather than converting
people at random. For instance, Nunn (2010, 147), discussing missionaries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, writes: “[a] number of factors played a role in determining
a mission’s location. Among the most important were access to a clean water
supply, the ability to import supplies from Europe, and an abundance of fertile
soil that could be used to grow crops.” Besides such selection, historical data
sources may fall victim to reporting biases and can only crudely proxy modern
conceptualizations of social capital. Moreover, given a staggering rise of Protes-
tantism across Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Marshall, 2009), we lack evidence about
the effects of today’s evangelizers, particularly those who are not foreign imports.
This is surprising. After all, notes Killingray (2011, 93), “African Christians, not
foreign missionaries, have been largely responsible for the spread of the Christian
Gospel across the continent.”
To advance this debate, this chapter presents evidence from a randomized
field experiment implemented in Eastern South Sudan. I partner with a local
Protestant missionary group to scientifically evaluate the consequences of their
evangelism. The group adopts a strategy whereby villages are evangelized for two
to four weeks in the hopes that individuals will then regularly join the group’s
main church compound in a nearby town. Evangelism takes the form of intensive
preaching sessions twice a week. Evangelists touch on core Christian topics and
make explicit recommendations about behavior.
Using a cluster-randomized design, I randomly assigned 601 geographically
1The experiment is currently still ongoing and will conclude in July 2017. Therefore, the
empirical part only includes 38 villages.
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matched village pairs to a first and a second treatment phase to be subsequently
visited by the missionary group (waitlist design). To control for time trends,
the village pairs were also put in random order. Two weeks after the evange-
lism in a given village had concluded, a team of local enumerators conducted a
complete population-level survey in the respective treatment and control village
pair. The survey included attitudinal items as well as lab-in-the-field experiments
to measure social capital. Specifically, it focused on networks, trust, cooperation,
information, cohesion, and empowerment (Woolcock, 1998). Additionally, the enu-
merators inquired about general attitudes toward the local Toposa tribe’s beliefs
and traditions, thus measuring broader cultural effects. To minimize the potential
for “fishing” (Humphreys, de la Sierra and Van der Windt, 2013), I pre-registered
the design, hypotheses and estimation strategy at Evidence in Governance and
Politics (EGAP), and made all data publicly available.
Comparing outcomes across treated and untreated villages, I first document
that missionaries have profound effects on local traditions and beliefs. A compre-
hensive tradition index scores 0.2 standard deviations lower in treated villages.
Protestant missionaries led individuals to wear fewer witchcraft items, to pray
more regularly, and to become more skeptical of long-held cultural practices such
as polygamy and dowries. Traditional animism, such as believing in minor spirits
and frequenting witch doctors, is also shown to be significantly lower. Moreover,
the evangelists have a positive effect on knowledge about Christianity. A Christian
knowledge index scores 0.2 standard deviations higher in evangelized villages.
With this strong effect on local traditions, beliefs and knowledge in mind, I
assess the pre-registered battery of social capital indicators. Surprisingly, I find
that the aggregate social capital index is unaffected by the missionary interven-
tion. However, upon closer inspection—drawing on post-hoc “researchers’ degrees
114
of freedom” (Simmons, Nelson and Simonsohn, 2011)—I uncover two significant
counteracting forces in the index. All group-level social capital outcomes are neg-
atively affected by the missionaries. This includes the village network size, safety,
petitioning and generalized trust. By contrast, all individual-level social capital
outcomes are positively affected. For example, residents in evangelized villages
invest greater amounts in a trust game, and need less time to obtain information
from other village members compared to villages not evangelized.
I argue that this result portrays evangelism as a network interruption treat-
ment. Missionaries undermine deep seated cultural beliefs and practices, which
reduces overall social capital. Yet, at the individual-level, their preachings of char-
ity and forgiveness work to foster pro-social behavior. The effect of missionaries
on social capital is hence ambiguous. While further research spanning different
missionary groups, time frames and locales is necessary to elaborate on this effect,
the estimates show why the debate on protestant missionaries and social capital
continues to be contested.
This chapter adds to the literature on social capital and religious organizations
in two important ways. First, I present field experimental evidence assessing the
consequences of Protestant proselytism. Given the pronounced historical effects
of missionaries, which has been highlighted by other scholars (e.g., Lankina and
Getachew, 2011; Woodberry, 2012; Lankina and Getachew, 2013; Caicedo, 2014;
Meier zu Selhausen, 2014; Sanneh, 2015), I add to the literature by providing
causally precise estimates. Second, I contribute to an ever-growing literature on
the determinants of social capital (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2000;
Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002; Kaasa and Parts, 2008), by pointing out the
role of Protestant missionaries in spurring and hindering social capital formation.
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4.2 Missionaries and Social Capital
4.2.1 Definition
Popularized by Bourdieu (1984) and Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), so-
cial capital is a core interest of a wide array of social scientists. It has been
linked to numerous salient social outcomes such as economic growth (Beugelsdijk
and Van Schaik, 2005) and democratization (Paxton, 2002, 254). Across several
disciplines, Protestant missionaries have been pointed out as one determinant of
outcomes pertaining to social capital (e.g. Neill, 1966; Dietrich, 1992; Macdon-
ald, 1993; Peel, 1995; Steinmetz, 2008; Porter, 2004). After all, notes historian
Makdisi (1997), missionaries are not merely “purveyors of modern medicine and
print technology.” Rather, proselytism represents a “fragile process of staking out
claims of cultural and historical belonging,” which affects longstanding societal
modes of conduct.
Precisely what is meant by “social capital,” however, continues to be a source of
controversy. As Portes (2000) notes, sociologists have traditionally conceptualized
social capital as benefits accruing to individuals. By contrast, political scientists,
beginning with Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), have traditionally trans-
posed the concept onto larger social units, viewing social capital as an attribute
of the community or nation state that facilitates collective action.
In this chapter, I adopt a definition of social capital that has found its way
into many empirical studies. Specifically, I rely on the influential World Bank
guide to social capital (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). It defines social capital
along six dimensions: “Groups and networks; trust and solidarity; collective action
and cooperation; information and communication; social cohesion and inclusion;
empowerment and political action” (Grootaert et al., 2000, vii).
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For the purpose of this study, I collapse these dimensions into networks, trust,
cooperation, information, cohesion and empowerment. In so doing, I note that
this definition closely maps onto other influential definitions. For example, Karlan
(2005, 1689) writes “trust and trustworthiness are two critical traits encompassed
by individual social capital.” Paldam (2000, 629) argues that social capital relies on
the fact that “people build trust in and networks to others and come to cooperate
with them” (see also, Coleman, 1988; Sobel, 2002; Lin, 2002).
4.2.2 Hypotheses
Why might Protestant missionaries affect social capital? In the pre-registration
document, I laid out six hypotheses about the effects of Protestant missionaries
based on qualitative interviews in South Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria region—this
chapter’s empirical focus. Since the end of the second South Sudanese civil war
in 2005, the region has seen a growing influx of missionary groups (more below in
the Setting section). It thus allowed me to form expectations about the effects of
Protestant missionaries on social capital. I will discuss the resulting pre-registered
hypotheses in turn.
First, I expected networks to be weakened as a result of Protestant evan-
gelism. Partly drawing on my own research (chapter 3), I expected Protestant
missionaries to cut through existing social networks by providing a new religious
identity, which some follow fervently, while others remain skeptical. The expecta-
tion was also motivated by a burgeoning literature conceptualizing religious groups
as “clubs.” Such theories highlight that religious groups, like families, produce and
consume religious goods, which generates collective benefits. Problematically, this
makes religious groups—including missionary groups—vulnerable to free-riding.
As a result, religious groups, writes Iannaccone (1994, 740), use “gratuitous costs
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(‘sacrifice and stigma) [...] to mitigate free rider problems” (Douglas, 1966; Ruffle
and Sosis, 2007). Indeed, the missionary groups under study in this chapter use
public acts—such as the public burning of witchcraft items—to screen true believ-
ers from not-so-true believers (more below). As a consequence, village networks
may become polarized and likely weakened due to the missionary activity.
Second and partly as a result, I expected trust within the community to de-
crease. Legal scholars and economists highlight that exchanges between individu-
als depend on the identity of one’s partner, particularly when legal frameworks are
not well developed (Carr and Landa, 1983, 135-136). If the availability of a new
religious identity creates two new groups, aggregate trust will likely be reduced.
This is particularly likely when new converts enter the equation. Carr and Landa
continue: “[c]onverts [...] are generally treated with suspicion. Converts are not
trusted to the same extent that bona fide long-standing coreligionists are” (1983,
154). At the same time, Protestant missionaries are frequently portrayed as strong
proponents of pro-social trusting behavior(McCracken, 2008). Based on my quali-
tative interviews and evidence from Peru (see chapter 3), however, I pre-registered
a hypothesis that expects trust to decrease as a result of the missionary activity.
Third, I expected village-level cooperation to decrease. Religious groups, in-
cluding the missionaries studied in this chapter, require converts to direct mental
and physical resources toward the missionary community. This includes making
offerings during services as well as providing material support for those in need.
The fact that religious groups provide “insurance” to its members has been high-
lighted by theoretical as well as empirical papers (Clark and Lelkes, 2006; Scheve
and Stasavage, 2006; Dercon et al., 2006; Stegmueller, 2013). Scheve, Stasav-
age et al. (2006), for instance, note that religion and state spending are substitute
mechanisms to insure members against adverse events. As such, missionary groups
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may crowd out support for and cooperation with the greater village (see also, Hu-
ber and Stanig, 2011). While there are a variety of studies that show cooperation
to be greater within religious groups (e.g., Sosis and Ruffle, 2003; Bulbulia and
Sosis, 2011), this may come precisely at the cost of lowering cooperation between
new converts and those not converted. In addition, missionaries in the region are
not entirely welcoming of local traditions and beliefs, which may further weaken
established modes of cooperation.2
Fourth and closely related, I expected both information and cohesion to
be reduced by missionary groups. If networks are sparser, trust less pronounced
and cooperation reduced, one would, almost by definition, expect cohesion and
information flows to be lower, too. The degree to which religious groups affect
cohesion, however, is determined by a variety of factors. As Wald, Owen and
Hill Jr. (1990, 197) note about political cohesion in U.S. congregations: “‘Strong’
churches, defined by a combination of theology, social practices, and demographic
characteristics, apparently possess the necessary resources to promote attitudinal
conformity.” At its worst, writes Gellner (2000, 153), “[r]eligion employs an idiom
of unequal patronage,” while the broader political sphere “speaks a language of
participatory brotherly or cousinly equality.” While the missionaries studied in
this chapter can hardly be labeled as speaking the idiom of unequal patronage,
they may still undermine general cohesion and information-flow within the greater
village network, owing to the substitution effect laid about above.
Finally, I hypothesized that empowerment within evangelized villages would
increase. In line with Duflo (2012, 1053), I define empowerment as “the ability
to [...] access the constituents of development—in particular [...] political par-
2See Block (1994) for a careful treatment of the effect of missionaries on cooperation and the
broader culture of indigenous tribes in the upper Amazon.
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ticipation.”3 This hypothesis was based on my field work in the region. When
observing church services and local evangelism, converts expressed joy about their
newly found belief. Stories of “being saved” and “liberated” were common. Just as
important, non-converts went on with their daily life. There was thus no crowding
out effect. Moreover, I based the hypothesis on the missionary self-description as
being “liberating powers through the gospel” (Danfulani, 2001, 7). Local mission-
aries portrayed their work as “saving individuals” and “bringing a story of love
and redemption.” Similar evidence about the “liberating” aspect of the Protestant
theology is provided by authors from other contexts (e.g., Marshall, 2009). Psy-
chological studies, too, have found a link between religiosity and empowerment
(Maton and Wells, 1995; Brodsky, 2000; Park, 2005).
ne definition is given by McClendon and Riedl (2015, 1047) who note that
“Pentecostal churches in Sub-Saharan Africa [...] [have] an emphasis on individ-
ual self-worth and empowerment—that is, a stressing of the God-given potential
for earthly achievement present in each individual listener.” Salt and Light, too,
stresses the potential of the Christian belief to lead to earthly achievements, in-
cluding the overcoming of hunger and poverty. Still, since the Toposa tribe does
not in large parts identify as Christian, most of the missionary work focuses on
teaching core Christian values that arguably most Christian denominations adhere
to.
3I note that this definition is in line with other influential accounts. For instance, Rowlands
(1995, 102) defines empowerment as “bringing people who are outside the decision-making pro-
cess into [...] political structures”. Similarly, Blattman et al. (2014, 35) measure empowerment,
i.a., as “self-reported social and community engagement”.
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4.3 Design
4.3.1 Setting
To explore the effects of Protestant missionaries on social capital, I draw on em-
pirical evidence from South Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria state. The state shares
international borders with Kenya in the east, Uganda in the south, and Ethiopia
in the north-east (see Figure 4.1a). The precise borders between South Sudan and
Kenya, however, remain disputed. The capital of the state is Torit. The present
study focuses on the area around the town of Kapoeta (see Figure 4.1b). The
area is predominantly inhabited by the Toposa tribe, a Teso-Turkana subgroup
of Eastern Nilotic peoples. The overall population of Toposa is estimated to be
around 50,000-100,000 individuals, though precise numbers are not available.
The Toposa are commonly portrayed to hold animist beliefs (Longokwo, 1981;
Roth and Kurup, 1990). This is despite the fact the tribe has not been spared from
missionary activity. A history of evangelism in the Toposaland is hard to come by.
Few scholarly accounts have systematically traced the evolution of Christianity in
the region and in South Sudan more broadly. One rare account is provided by
Sanderson (1976). The author studies the missionary history of the Sudan Inte-
rior Mission (see also, Kumm, 1918; Eshete, 1999). The Sudan Interior Mission,
founded in the late 1890s in Canada, was the largest Protestant interdenomina-
tional mission in Africa at least until 1942 (Faught, 1988, 121). Sanderson points
out the “very tight administrative control of missions which prevailed in the Su-
dan” to explain the relative ineffectiveness of missionaries (1976, 14). The Sudan
Interior Mission made explicit attempts to proselytize “in the ‘Open Sphere’ in
Equatoria.” But, continues Sanderson (1976, 18), “the Government preferred more
work to be done in the more ’backward’ areas of Upper Nile province.” The tight
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restrictions also undermined missionary efforts by other groups. Sanderson writes:
“The Sudan Interior missionaries were to find the Sudan a particu-
larly difficult country for missionary enterprise. So had the Church
Missionary Society and the Roman Catholic Verona Fathers from the
early years of Condominium rule. [...] They were not given freedom
to go wherever they chose in the Sudan.”
Sanderson (1976, 13)
In my own interviews, I learned that the first missionaries came to the Topos-
aland in 1935, and remained there until 1962/3.4 These missionaries were Italian
Catholics of the Comboni Mission. Indeed, the area was officially designated to
Catholicism (Sanderson, 1976, 17).5 This came as a result of a ruling from the
British authorities at the time. As Griswold (2010, 102) writes: “Shortly after
forbidding missionaries from evangelizing among Muslims in the north [...], the
British authorities divided the territory south [...] into three main spheres of
Christian influence—Catholic, Anglican and American (Presbyterian).”
The Catholics in the Toposaland, by many accounts, took a mild approach
to proselytism. As one interviewee relayed to me: “the Catholics baptized some
people and built schools, but did not otherwise actively evangelize.” In 1962, the
Sudanese military junta expelled the Catholics along with all other foreign mission-
aries. As Tier (1982) documents “the government in 1962 expelled, at 48 hours’
notice, about 335 foreign missionaries consisting of 272 Roman Catholic Verona
and Mill Fathers, and 63 Protestants of the American Church Inland Mission and
4It should be noted, however, that the Sudan, including Eastern Equatoria, had sporadically
been visited by Catholic missionaries before (see, for example Gray, 1967).
5I confirmed this in a personal interview, where one missionary stated: “The Catholic church
was the first one to be here. Somewhere back in the day [...] Southern Sudan was divided up
into regions. And each different region got their own denomination. So the Toposa got Catholic,
Roman Catholicism.”
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the Sudan Interior Mission.”
In 1977, another group of Catholics—part of the Irish St Patricks Mission-
ary Society—started a new mission in Eastern Equatoria. Yet, as the Catholics
themselves write on their website “the Church here is still at its cradle” (Ihunnia,
2017). Longokwo (1981, 185), in one of the few careful anthropological studies of
the Toposa, confirms that the impact of missionaries was very limited: “the whole
missionary preoccupation was more numerical than qualitative” and attributes
this to “the semi-nomadic and continuous movement of the Toposa in search for
food and water for people and animals.”
Attempts by Protestant missionaries in the region were limited as well. One
group, part of the missionary organization SIL International (formerly known
as the Summer Institute of Linguistics), came to a town north of Kapoeta and
stayed for three years in the 1980s, before the ongoing civil war put an end to
the missionary work. In additional interviews, interlocutors mentioned another
group of Protestant missionaries, likely coming from Australia, that took root in
the same area for a number of years in the early 1980s. I did not, however, come
across documented evidence. And, local elders provided conflicting accounts on
the activities of the group.6
Taken together, then, missionary activities among the Toposa have been rel-
atively limited—particularly, when compared to other nations in Sub-Saharan
Africa (see Gallego and Woodberry, 2010). Thus, concludes Griswold (2010, 102),
“Christians never caught on as a cohesive identity in the south.” Besides the
aforementioned government interventions, there are two other reasons that help
explain the relatively low activity of missionaries in the region. First, there were
6I confirmed the scarce remnants of Protestantism pre-2005 in several interviews. For in-
stance, one local missionary stated: “They [the Protestant missionaries] didn’t leave a legacy
behind.”
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two long civil wars between separatists in the South and the government in Khar-
toum (1955 to 1972; and 1983 to 2005), which made the area an unlikely target
for missionaries. Second, writes Griswold (2010, 102), “the greatest impediment
to Christianity’s spread in the south was that the so-called border pagans were
hostile to outsiders and their beliefs,” which the author attributes to local tribes
being accustomed to fending off slave traders.
(a) Map of South Sudan and its bordering states
●
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Treatment
● Catholic
Site
(b) Map of evangelism area around Kapoeta
Figure 4.1: Map of research area
Since the end of the second civil war in 2005, however, there has been a growing
influx of missionary groups into the Equatoria region. Therefore, the Toposa, like
many neighboring tribes, have been exposed to increasing attempts by Protestant
missionaries to convert individuals to the Christian belief system. This makes the
area a unique case study for the effects of missionaries on the social fabric of local
villages.
In early 2013, I approached several local missionary groups about the prospects
of conducting a research project on Christian proselytism in the area. I chose
the area for two key reasons. First, as already stated, the area has witnessed
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concerted efforts by several missionary groups to convert the local Toposa tribe
to Christianity. While traditional foreign missionary work in Sub-Saharan Africa
has been in decline ever since decolonialization went into full force (Killingray,
2011, 96), Eastern Equatoria continues to see a surprisingly active involvement of
Christian proselytizers.
Second, while the rest of South Sudan descended into civil war in December
2013—a time when the research project was well under way—the Toposaland
has, to this day, remained peaceful, though economic consequences can be felt.
The reasons for this stability are manifold. In personal interviews, local residents
pointed to the ethnic homogeneity of the region. Interlocutors also argued that
the current civil war is, in essence, an ethnic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer
tribes. Indeed, the civil war broke out when South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir,
a member of the Dinka tribe, accused his deputy Riek Machar, a member of the
Nuer tribe, of attempting a coup d’état. The Toposa leadership has, time and
again, stated its intention to abstain from the civil war. Finally, local residents
highlighted that geographic factors make it unlikely for the Toposaland to be
affected by the civil war. The area is tucked away in the southeastern corner of
the country and protected by an impenetrable swamp area with no road access to
the north.
4.3.2 Sample
During my first research visit to the region in the summer of 2014, I reached out
to three missionary groups that are active in the region: the already-mentioned
Roman Catholic St. Patricks Mission hailing from Ireland, a Southern Baptist
missionary group from the United States, and a local Pentecostal missionary group
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called Salt and Light Outreach Church/Ministries (henceforth, Salt and Light).7
All groups signaled interest in my study. They subsequently agreed to share the
geographic coordinates of the areas where they had proselytized.
Salt and Light’s missionary efforts were particularly pronounced. I therefore
scheduled several meetings with the church leadership to explore the potential of
obtaining a list of active evangelism areas—Salt and Light calls them “preaching
sections”—which they were planning on visiting in the next years. The group
agreed to do so. They subsequently shared a list of 30 geographic sites with
numerous villages. The sites cover a balanced area south, east, west and north
of the town Kapoeta. I then inquired whether they were willing to allow me
to conduct an independent study about the consequences of the evangelism. In
particular, I asked whether they would be open to the idea of having ‘a coin flip
decide which villages to visit first, and which to visit thereafter.’ Salt and Light’s
head minister appreciated the idea and agreed to the research project.
Based on the list of preaching areas, Salt and Light identified 60 villages that
were to be evangelized, two per preaching area. The term “village” requires some
explanation. The Toposa are semi-nomadic. During a typical day, young men take
the cattle out into the vast open area of Eastern Equatoria. Older men typically
sit under so-called shade trees and discuss important matters of the community
(Müller-Dempf, 2009, 190). Women predominantly engage in agriculture, prepare
food and take care of young children. Most families, however, have stable settle-
ments. These settlements or “villages,” typically consist of 20-30 huts. Several
villages will then cover one “area.” Given that there are no paved roads in the
7To my knowledge, the three groups are the only ones actively involved in proselytism in the
area. There are other churches active in the main town, Kapoeta. This includes a Baptist church
founded by a Kenyan missionary as well as a Pentecostal church founded by a U.S. citizen. Both,
according to my interviews, have roughly been active since 2010. These churches, however, do
not evangelize in the Toposaland.
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area, I was only able to visit 18 villages personally.8
4.3.3 Randomization
The 30 village pairs were combined in one comprehensive spreadsheet. Thereafter,
as was laid out in the pre-registration document, the village pairs were put in
random order. I then randomly assigned one village per pair to phase one, and
the remaining village to phase two. This randomization scheme—known as a
“waitlist design”—has the advantage of being relatively simple. It also ensures
that exposure to the treatment is not withheld from any individual or village.
Put differently, the empirical design merely changes the temporal sequence of the
evangelism—a decision that I took for ethical reasons (more below). Moreover, by
randomizing within blocks (pairs) of highly similar villages, I further ensure that
unobserved difference between villages are minimized. Finally, by randomizing
the order of the village pairs, I ensure that potential time trends are of minimal
concern. This is important given that the evangelism took place over a 30-week
span, and surveying took place two weeks after a village had been visited by the
evangelists. Taken together, the empirical strategy thus relies on a mix of matching
and random assignment in order to ascertain comparable treatment and control
groups.9
4.3.4 Ethical Considerations
At this point, it is imperative to reflect on the ethics of conducting a randomized
field experiment with a missionary group. A long literature has critically eval-
uated Christian missionaries and their effects on local communities and nation
8An area photograph of the Toposaland and exemplary villages is given in Figure 4.7 in the
Supplementary Information.
9The code used for this exercise is provided in the pre-analysis plan.
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states. Scholars have found that missionaries of different denominations affect
literacy (Graff, 1982), education (Lankina and Getachew, 2013), pro-social be-
havior (Caicedo, 2014) and democratization (Woodberry, 2012). Leaving aside
whether these effects are desirable, they represent sufficiently stark social changes
that researchers, such as myself, may not want to be involved in them. At the
same time, if Protestant evangelism has such profound effects, the research and
policy community arguably has an interest in obtaining reliable and up-to-date
local-level evidence. Indeed, to my knowledge, all published articles discussing
the consequences of proselytism have thus far relied on observational, historical
data, most often spanning countries or even continents. This is problematic given
that observational studies can fall victim to unobserved confounding. Moreover,
we currently lack recent evidence about the consequences of today’s evangelism.
For this reason, I deemed the present project to be of sufficiently high scholarly
relevance to justify cooperating with a missionary group.
I took three steps to reinforce my scholarly independence. First, I consistently
communicated with the missionary group that the research project would adopt
a critical scientific method and might produce results that the group might find
undesirable. Second, as stated, I opted for a waitlist design, which merely changes
the temporal sequence of the evangelism. This ensures that the research does
not affect whether individuals are exposed to evangelism, but only when they are
exposed. Third, I minimized my interaction with the treatment villages in order to
stay out of the missionary work. Taken together, I thus believe the present study
to be sufficiently critical and non-invasive in order to provide reliable estimates
about the consequences of Protestant evangelism.
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4.3.5 Evangelism
The explanatory variable of interest is the evangelism by Salt and Light in East-
ern Equatoria. Salt and Light was officially registered with the Republic of South
Sudan’s Bureau of Religious Affairs in 2012 (see Figure 4.8 in the supplemen-
tary information). The group, however, has been active in the region since 2006.
Salt and Light has a large church building in Kapoeta (see Figure 4.1b). The
missionaries actively evangelize across numerous Toposa settlements in Eastern
Equatoria. Evangelism for Salt and Light takes the form of preaching in local vil-
lages twice a week for a period of two to four weeks in the hopes that individuals
will then actively participate in the church compound in Kapoeta and establish
local Christian communities within the Toposaland.
For the purpose of this study, Salt and Light suggested to visit each community
twice for two weeks, for an overall exposure of four visits. To minimize researcher
interference with Salt and Light’s activities, the research team did not accompany
the missionary group. However, the evangelists did record several sermons in
the local Toposa language. In personal interviews with the author, they also
stated that the evangelism follows a rather standard procedure—though deviations
are undoubtedly regular. According to these interviews, and corroborated by
analyzing the recordings (available upon request from the author), Salt and Light’s
evangelism typically unfolds as follows.
In a first step, the evangelists—usually two South Sudanese trained theolo-
gians from the church’s main compound in Kapoeta—visit a village and ask the
elders for permission to tell stories from the Bible. If granted permission, the
evangelists introduce themselves and schedule a time when to get the village to-
gether. Typically, this happens after dinner around 6 p.m. The evangelists then
convene the village and tell key stories from the Bible. This includes the birth
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of Jesus, miracles of Jesus, salient ethical preachings (e.g., the mountain prayer)
as well as Jesus’ crucifixion. Resources permitting, the evangelists show a Jesus
film that was translated into the Toposa language. The evangelism also touches
upon culturally sensitive topics such as polygamy and witchcraft. Indeed, an im-
portant element of the proselytism is the destruction of so-called witchcraft items
(bracelets and necklaces). The evangelists also preach that believers should not
drink alcohol and smoke tobacco. Baptisms are also frequently performed. Other
elements of the evangelism include communal prayers as well as singing Christian
hymns.
Using qualitative interviews with Salt and Light as well as the Southern Baptist
missionary group, I delved into the logistics and content of the evangelism in
greater detail. The strategy of both missions is to teach young evangelists who
“take the word of God to the villages.” These trainings have been going on for
several years. As a results, both missions have a large group of evangelists. The
following quote from the head minister of the Southern Baptist church illuminates
this:
“We meet at our place [...] on Sundays for church. And how that’s
really come about is many churches from the villages will end up coming
together on Sunday. So, they have church, they’re meeting together at
night in their areas. And on Sunday morning they’re all kind of coming
together, the ones that are fairly close. So, after worship time, I pull
in all the leaders and I have about an hour of teaching. [...] We’re
about to the fourth or fifth generation of leaders training leaders. [...]
I probably have like 75 people or so that are trained, that could go out
and start groups. They don’t all do it, but they have been trained.”
Head missionary of the Southern Baptist mission
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Salt and Light has a distinct emphasis on biblical scripture. They also explic-
itly focus on changing the local culture toward Christianity. One evangelist, for
instance, stated:
“There is all of these things that they [the Toposa] have been taught
that are not Biblical. And so when I came here my big thing was ‘I’m
not here to change the culture’ [...]. But God’s word will eventually
change the culture. And you have to make a decision one day to either
to follow his word or continue with your culture, because what happens:
the two collide. So you can’t say ‘I am a believer in Jesus,’ and still
kill people and raid cattle.”
Broadly speaking, Salt and Light adheres to a literal form of Protestantism and
self-identifies as Pentecostal. The scholarly discussion of Pentecostalism abounds
(e.g., Miller and Yamamori, 2007). One definition is given by McClendon and
Riedl (2015, 1047) who note that “Pentecostal churches in Sub-Saharan Africa
[...] [have] an emphasis on individual self-worth and empowerment—that is, a
stressing of the God-given potential for earthly achievement present in each indi-
vidual listener.” Salt and Light, too, stresses the potential of the Christian belief
to lead to earthly achievements, including the overcoming of hunger and poverty.
Still, since the Toposa tribe does not in large parts identify as Christian, most of
the missionary work focuses on teaching core Christian values that arguably most
Christian denominations adhere to.
4.3.6 Sampling
To assess the short-term effects of Salt and Light’s evangelism on attitudes and
behavior relating to social capital, I organized a village-level survey two weeks
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after the final evangelism in a given village had taken place. The survey was then
implemented in both the treatment and control village in a given village pair. I
decided on two weeks for two key reasons. First, local residents migrate frequently
in order to attend cattle and to do business, which poses a spillover risk. I therefore
wanted to record outcomes sufficiently quickly in order to parse out treatment
effects. At the same time, I wanted to rule out priming effects, which may have
been present had enumerators visited village pairs too soon. Second, given the
volatility the country was experiencing coupled with the logistical and financial
challenges of conducting a survey in the region,10 I had to keep to a swift schedule.
Conducting the survey several months later would have posed additional logistical
challenges. For instance, the enumerators relied on guidance by the missionaries
about the exact whereabouts of the villages. Given the absence of official roads,
the recollection of missionaries about the best way to get to villages would thus
have been less reliable had surveying taking place at a significantly later point.
The detailed schedule of the treatment and surveying activities is provided in the
Supplementary Information.
The survey was implemented by a trained team of four local enumerators
who were covered under Columbia University’s Institutional Review Board. The
enumerators underwent a rigorous training in Kapoeta about the proper conduct
of human subjects research, including the administration of oral consent. They
also administered a pre-test of the survey items among 70 respondents. This pre-
test was pivotal as many items had to be adapted to the cultural context. For
example, experimental games such as the trust game typically ask respondents to
invest cash. The Toposa mostly barter goods and services. This made it necessary
10It should be pointed out that the area under study has no electricity, scarce supply of oil
and gas and very limited cellphone reception. Therefore, conducting surveys was both time-
consuming and expensive. Moreover, standard techniques (such as collecting GPS coordinates)
were impossible to implement due to budgetary restrictions.
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to adapt the dictator game such that the investment amount was sugar, not cash.
At any given day, the enumerators were split into two teams and randomly
assigned to the 30 villages. The enumerators were not told about the treatment
status of the villages. Moreover, while the enumerators knew the project was
largely about Christianity, I did not communicate specific hypotheses so as to avoid
enumerator effects. As such I am reasonably confident that the measurement was
accurate.11 In each village, the enumerators first approached the elders and asked
to perform a social scientific survey. They then surveyed all individuals above
18 years of age that were present and willing to participate. Roughly 20 percent
of residents could not be reached. In any given village, roughly one in every 20
individuals did not want to participate in the survey. Surveys were conducted on
hand-held phones. The data was pushed unto a password-protected cloud server
using satellite internet.
4.3.7 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the sample are given in Table 4.1. The average age
(Age) is 31 years and 53 percent of the sample are men (Male). 80 percent of
individuals are married (Married) and individuals have an average of six children
(Number of children). 53 percent of the sample are predominantly engaged in
cattle herding (Job: Cattle herder), while 36 percent identify as farmers (Job:
Farmer). The vast majority of respondents have no formal education (94 percent;
Edu: None) and their ability to write, scored on a Likert-scale from 1 (very poorly)
to 5 (very well), is, on average, 1.7 (Ability to write). Well over 80 percent answered
11I should note, however, that I did not deceive subjects about the content of the survey. That
is, it was communicated that the survey is, i.a., about Christianity and social capital. It was
thus not a “seemingly unrelated” survey. This could mean that subjects connected the survey
to the recent evangelism. I have no anecdotal evidence, however, that would corroborate this
concern.
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two algebraic questions correctly, which were administered in order to proxy for
education (Math ability 1 and Math ability 2 ). The average number of cows
owned—the key indicator of status and wealth in Toposa society—is 43 (Cows
owned).
4.3.8 Balance
Thanks to the random assignment of villages to the treatment phases, potential
outcomes of respondents across treatment and control villages should, in statis-
tical expectation, be identical. To test this assumption, Figure 4.2 plots t-values
from t-tests assessing differences-in-means for the indicated variables across the
treated and untreated villages, aggregating individual-level data at the village-
level. As can be seen, no t-value exceeds the critical threshold of 1.96 (dotted
vertical lines). Balance is thus solid across treatment and control areas. The
same picture emerges when comparing the individual-level variables’ means and
standard deviations across the treatment and control samples in Table 4.1. The
F -statistic of a regression of the treatment on all covariates is also insignificant
(F-statistic: 1.01). The balance allows me to attribute any observed differences
across the villages to the evangelism of the mission.
4.3.9 Measurement: Cultural Beliefs and Practices
The first outcome of interest is whether the missionaries do, indeed, affect local
traditions and beliefs. I included ten survey items that measure core cultural
traditions and beliefs. They are reported in Table 4.2. In the Supplementary
Information, I report the same table aggregating variables at the village-level (Ta-
ble 4.10). First, the enumerators unobtrusively counted the number of witchcraft
items respondents were wearing (Witchcraft items). The outcome is, thus, be-
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of sample
Overall sample Treatment group Control group
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age (#) 641 31.4 8.9 31.2 8.7 31.5 9.0
Male 641 52.6 50.0 51.0 50.1 54.1 49.9
Single 641 9.2 28.9 9.4 29.2 9.1 28.8
Relationship 641 4.2 20.1 6.1 24.0 2.4 15.4
Married 641 79.9 40.1 77.7 41.7 81.9 38.6
Widowed 641 6.4 24.5 6.8 25.2 6.0 23.9
Number of children (#) 641 5.6 3.9 5.5 3.9 5.6 4.0
Job: Cattle herder 641 52.9 50.0 53.9 49.9 52.0 50.0
Job: Farmer 641 36.3 48.1 33.9 47.4 38.7 48.8
Job: Stays home 641 5.0 21.8 5.2 22.2 4.8 21.5
Unemployed 641 5.1 22.1 6.5 24.6 3.9 19.5
Edu: None 641 94.1 23.6 93.2 25.2 94.9 22.1
Edu: Elementary 641 5.5 22.7 6.5 24.6 4.5 20.8
Edu: Secondary 641 0.5 6.8 0.3 5.7 0.6 7.8
Edu: High school 641 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Edu: University 641 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Math ability 1 641 87.2 33.4 88.1 32.5 86.4 34.3
Math ability 2 641 84.9 35.9 84.5 36.2 85.2 35.6
Ability to write (1-5) 641 1.7 0.6 1.7 0.6 1.7 0.6
Cows owned (#) 641 42.9 29.4 42.5 29.3 43.3 29.5
Notes: Mean (Mean) and standard deviations (SD) of all outcome measures across the overall
sample as well as treatment and control groups.
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Figure 4.2: Pre-treatment balance
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control villages for the indicated variables. Data aggregated at the village-level to reflect clustered
treatment assignment.
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havioral and as such unaffected by social desirability bias. Witchcraft is openly
opposed by Salt and Light and other missionary groups in the area. Second, re-
spondents were asked how often they consumed tobacco (Tobacco), assessed on
a 4-point scale ranging from never to often. Salt and Light encourages believ-
ers to not consume tobacco. Third, respondents were asked about their alcohol
consumption assessed on the the same 4-point scale (Alcohol). Alcohol, too, is
opposed by the missionary group. Fourth, respondents were asked how often they
had visited the witch doctor in the last year (Witch doctor). Again, Salt and Light
preaches that individuals not consult the witch doctor—a common practice among
the Toposa. Fifth, respondents were asked how often they pray per week (Praying
times). Sixth, respondents were asked whether they believed in so-called minor
spirits (Minor spirits). These spirits are an important part of the Toposa religion.
While the Toposa believe in an abstract superior being, they also hold ancestral
spirits in high regard. These so-called minor spirits are not part of the Christian
preaching and thus opposed by missionary groups in the area, including Salt and
Light. Seventh, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed that young
Toposa men and women should participate in the traditional tooth extraction
(Tooth extraction), scored on a 5-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
The tooth extraction tradition is part of a rite of passage into adulthood among
the Toposa and many neighboring tribes (Willis, Harris and Hergenrader, 2008).
Eighth, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed that men and women
should be allowed to have sex before marriage (Sex before marriage), scored on
the same 5-point scale. Sex before marriage is strongly opposed by the mission-
ary group. Ninth, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed that the
practice of dowry should be abolished (Dowry), scored on the same 5-point scale.
The practice of dowry among the Toposa merits discussion. Müller-Dempf (2009,
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194) writes that among the Toposa “old men often, instead of allocating animals
to their sons as a dowry so that they can marry, prefer to use these animals for
their own convenience, i.e. to marry another young wife.” In order to establish
stable and monogamous marriages, the missionaries therefore argue against the
practice of dowry. Tenth, respondents were asked whether men should only have
one wife (Polygamy), scored on the same 5-point scale. Polygamy, too, is opposed
by most missionary groups, including Salt and Light (Longokwo, 1981, 186). I
combine the ten variables to a comprehensive Tradition Index by standardizing
all variables and averaging across them. Variables are coded such that greater
values reflect greater agreement with traditional Toposa traditions and beliefs.12
I use this index in order to address multiple comparisons concerns. The intercor-
relations of the index are shown in Figure 4.9 in the Supplementary Information.
4.3.10 Measurement: Knowledge about Christianity
The second outcome of interest is whether the missionaries succeed in educating
people about Christianity. I included three survey items that measure individuals’
knowledge about Christianity. They are reported in Table 4.2. In the Supplemen-
tary Information I report the same table aggregating variables at the village-level
(Table 4.10). First, the enumerators asked individuals to state what the holy trin-
ity meant and recorded the answer by hand (Trinity knowledge). Knowledge for
this item was very low (1.7 percent). Second, the respondents were asked about
Pentecost, giving them four answer choices (“Jesus went up from the grave”; “The
disciples received the holy spirit”; “Jesus walked on water”; “The last supper”).
On average, 76 percent of individuals knew the correct answer choice (number 2).
Third, respondents were asked how many disciples Jesus had had, again recording
12Specifically, the variable Praying times, Dowry, and Monogamy were coded in reverse.
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the answer open-ended. On average, 71 percent of individuals knew the correct
answer (12). I combine the three variables to a comprehensive Christianity Index
by standardizing all variables and averaging across them. Variables are coded such
that greater values reflect greater knowledge of Christianity. The intercorrelations
of the index are shown in Figure 4.10 in the Supplementary Information.
4.3.11 Measurement: Social Capital
My prime outcome of interest is social capital within the evangelized and to-be-
evangelized villages. Based on Woolcock (1998) and Coleman (1988), I conceptual-
ize social capital along six dimensions: networks, trust, cooperation, information,
cohesion and empowerment. Using a widely accepted and frequently adopted def-
inition of social capital has the key advantage that results can be cross-checked
against existing studies. Again, I combine these six dimensions of social capi-
tal to a comprehensive index by standardizing the variables and averaging across
them. All six dimensions were measured using one behavioral and one attitudinal
outcome.
I measure networks as follows. First, we asked respondents to write down all of
their friends and then counted the number of names (Total friends). Second, we
asked respondents how many close friends they have (Close friends). I measure
trust, again, using one behavioral and one attitudinal item. First, the enumerators
administered the well-established trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995).
Here, respondents were given 200g of sugar and asked whether they would be will-
ing to send any amount to the next respondent. The respondent was informed
that whatever amount s/he sends will be doubled by the experimenter and that
the next respondent would be asked how much money to send back. The variable
Trust amount depicts the amount invested (in approximate grams). Second, we
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Table 4.2: Outcome measurement
Overall sample Treatment group Control group
Min Max N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Cultural outcomes
Witchcraft items (#) 0 12 638 2.4 2.2 307 2.0 2.1 331 2.8 2.2
Tobacco 1 4 641 2.8 1.3 310 2.8 1.4 331 2.9 1.3
Alcohol 1 4 640 1.9 0.9 309 1.7 0.8 331 2.0 0.9
Witch doctor (#) 0 100 641 12.2 17.3 310 9.8 16.7 331 14.3 17.6
Praying times (#) 0 30 641 3.6 4.2 310 4.0 4.5 331 3.1 3.8
Minor spirits (%) 0 1 641 93.0 25.6 310 90.6 29.2 331 95.2 21.5
Tooth extraction 1 5 641 3.3 1.1 310 3.3 1.0 331 3.3 1.1
Sex before marriage 1 5 641 2.5 1.3 310 2.4 1.2 331 2.6 1.3
Dowry 1 5 641 1.2 0.7 310 1.3 0.7 331 1.2 0.6
Polygamy 1 5 641 1.7 1.0 310 1.9 1.0 331 1.5 0.8
Tradition Index -1 1 637 0.0 0.4 306 -0.1 0.4 331 0.1 0.4
Christian knowledge outcomes
Trinity knowledge 0 1 641 1.7 13.0 310 1.9 13.8 331 1.5 12.2
Pentecost knowledge 0 1 641 75.7 42.9 310 81.9 38.5 331 69.8 46.0
Disciples knowledge 0 1 641 71.3 45.3 310 77.7 41.7 331 65.3 47.7
Christianity index -1 3 641 0.0 70.8 310 10.2 65.5 331 -9.5 74.2
Social capital outcomes
Total friends (#) 1 11 641 4.6 2.2 310 4.5 2.1 331 4.7 2.2
Close friends (#) 0 30 641 7.8 7.4 310 7.2 7.2 331 8.4 7.5
Trust amount (g) 0 200 641 91.2 34.5 310 94.4 29.8 331 88.3 38.3
General trust 1 5 641 2.1 0.9 310 2.1 0.9 331 2.2 0.9
Cooperation signature 1 5 641 3.5 0.5 310 3.6 0.5 331 3.5 0.5
Cooperation likelihood 1 5 641 4.7 0.6 310 4.8 0.5 331 4.7 0.7
Information time (10s) 1 220 638 12.5 18.1 307 10.2 9.9 331 14.6 23.1
Information strangers (#) 0 20 641 11.2 6.9 310 11.1 7.0 331 11.3 6.8
Finding opponent (%) 0 1 641 69.1 46.2 310 74.5 43.6 331 64.0 48.1
Safety perception 1 5 641 4.7 0.6 310 4.6 0.7 331 4.7 0.6
Change proposal (10s) 0 1248 638 13.0 84.1 307 18.0 114.0 331 8.3 39.4
Change petitioning 1 4 641 3.0 1.0 310 2.9 1.0 331 3.0 1.0
Social Capital Index -1 2 638 0.0 0.4 307 0.0 0.4 331 -0.0 0.4
Notes: Mean (Mean) and standard deviations (SD) of all outcomes across the overall sample as well as
treatment and control groups. Min and Max depicts minimum and maximum values in the overall sample.
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asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement “most people
can be trusted,” scored on the already-mentioned 5-point agreement scale (General
trust). I measure cooperation as follows. First, individuals were asked whether
they would be willing to sign a petition that calls on the Toposa to establish a
regular meeting in Kapoeta to discuss matters relating to security (Cooperation
signature). Since literacy is very low among the Toposa and to streamline the sur-
veying, enumerators were instructed to judge respondents’ perceived willingness to
sign the petition. We scored this on a scale from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely
yes).13 Second, we asked respondents how likely it would be for the community to
come together and cooperate in case a child got sick. Here, respondents were given
a 5-point scale ranging from extremely unlikely to extremely likely (Cooperation
likelihood). I measure information as follows. First, individuals were asked to find
an individual that knew how many individuals lived in the given village. When
respondents already knew the answer, we asked them to nonetheless confirm the
information with a reliable source. Using the survey software’s built-in tool, we
recorded the amount of time it took respondents to obtain this information (Infor-
mation time). Second, we asked respondents how often, in the past month, they
had talked to strangers to obtain information (Information strangers). I measure
cohesion as follows. First, respondents were, toward the end of the survey, asked
to find a person that they are frequently in disagreement with. Again, individuals
were timed how long it took them (Finding opponent). Second, we asked respon-
dents how safe they felt in their villages. The answer choices, on a 5-point scale,
ranged from unsafe to safe (Safety perception). Finally, I measure empowerment as
13For instance, respondents asking for a pen were given a 5, while those giving answer such
as “in principle, yes” were given a 4. During the pre-test, I tested this procedure by having
respondents sign a petition (in the town of Kapoeta, where literacy is higher) and asking enu-
merators to still judge ex ante whether a person would, indeed, sign. Since enumerators did
an excellent job at guessing whether respondents would sign the petition, I opted to drop the
physical signature part form the survey.
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follows. First, respondents were asked to state a list of changes they felt needed to
be implemented. Enumerators recorded the amount of time individuals discussed
these matters with the enumerator (Change proposal). Second, respondents were
asked how often, in the last 12 months, people had come together to petition gov-
ernment officials for the benefit of the community (Change petitioning). Again,
to circumvent over-testing, I combine all 12 items to a Social Capital Index by
standardizing individual items and averaging across them. The intercorrelations
of the index are shown in Figure 4.11 in the Supplementary Information.
4.4 Results
To assess whether Protestant missionaries affect social capital, I estimate the
following model:
Yil = β0 + β1Missionil + Xilβ + εil (4.1)
Where Yil represents the outcome of individual i in village l, Mission is a dummy
taking the value one if the village was assigned to be evangelized14 and zero other-
wise, and Xil represents a vector of individual-level control variables unaffected by
the treatment, which are added in select robustness checks. Specifically, I include
all variables listed in Table 4.1 save those with no variation (i.e., edu: secondary,
edu: high school, and edu: university). In line with Cameron, Gelbach and Miller
(2008), I estimate standard errors using the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure,
which takes into consideration the clustered treatment assignment. Additionally,
I conduct clustered randomization inference as a robustness check for they key
outcomes, namely, the social capital and tradition indexes.
14It should be noted that the experiment had full compliance.
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4.4.1 Cultural Beliefs and Practices
Before turning to this chapter’s main outcome of interest, social capital, I first
analyze whether the missionaries affected attitudes toward cultural outcomes that
they are primarily concerned with. Table 4.3 reports results from a linear re-
gression of the indicated outcomes on the treatment dummy. The tradition index
(Model 11) experiences a sizable reduction as a result of the missionary evangelism.
Specifically, the index is 0.2 points lower in treated villages. The reduction thus
demonstrates that missionaries profoundly affect cultural beliefs and practices.
When looking at the subcomponents of the index (models 1-10), all indicated
estimates point in the expected direction. Most estimates are sizable and statisti-
cally significant. Above all, enumerators count 0.8 fewer witchcraft items among
respondents in evangelized villages (model 1). While alcohol and tobacco are only
mildly affected (models 2 and 3, respectively), weekly praying times increase by
0.9 (model 5). Traditional cultural practices such as tooth extraction, dowry and
polygamy, too, are less likely to be accepted in evangelized villages (models 6,
9 and 10, respectively). The highly consistent effects and plausible effect sizes
thus underline the profound consequences of the evangelism. All results are ro-
bust to the inclusion of individual-level covariates (Table 4.4). I also confirm the
results when using clustered randomization inference (Figure 4.3). Here, I obtain
a one-sided p-value of 0.01.
4.4.2 Christian knowledge
In a next step, I assess whether missionaries succeed in bringing people “the good
news.” In Table 4.5,I report results from a linear regression using OLS of the
indicated outcomes on the treatment indicator. Overall, the Christianity index
(Model 4) sees a strong reduction owing to the missionary activity. The index
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Table 4.5: Treatment effects on Christian knowledge (no covariates)
Trinity Pentecost Disciples Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mission 0.004 0.121 0.125 0.197
0.010 0.043 0.047 0.065
Range binary binary binary -1-1
R2 0.0003 0.020 0.019 0.019
N 641 641 641 641
Notes: OLS. Wild cluster bootstrap-t SEs in parentheses
(adjusted for 38 villages). Covariates not included.
Table 4.6: Treatment effects on Christian knowledge (covariate adjusted)
Trinity Pentecost Disciples Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mission 0.005 0.123 0.128 0.203
0.009 0.036 0.034 0.052
Range binary binary binary -1-1
R2 0.033 0.219 0.219 0.221
N 641 641 641 641
Notes: OLS. Wild cluster bootstrap-t SEs in parentheses
(adjusted for 38 villages). Covariates included.
is 0.2 points higher in treated villages. This demonstrates that the evangelists
succeeded in fostering Christian knowledge within their area of proselytism.
The subcomponents of the index largely confirm this picture (models 1-3). All
estimates are positive, i.e., knowledge increased after the missionary intervention.
The estimates are particularly sizable for knowledge about Pentecost as well as
Jesus’ disciples. The increase is small, though positive, for the Trinity question.
On average, individuals are 12 percentage points more likely to know what hap-
pened on Pentecost in treated villages. Moreover, individuals in treated villages
are also 12 percentage points more likely to know the number of disciples Jesus
had. All results are robust to the inclusion of individual-level covariates (Table
4.6). I further corroborate the results by using clustered randomization inference
(Figure 4.3). Here, I obtain a one-sided p-value of 0.07.
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Figure 4.3: Effect on tradition index (randomization inference)
ATE: −0.164   
P−Value: 0.01
0
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Notes: Estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of the evangelism intervention on the tradition
index and corresponding one-sided p-value using clustered randomization inference under 10,000
simulations.
Figure 4.4: Effect on Christianity index (randomization inference)
ATE: 0.197   
 P−Value: 0.07
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Notes: Estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of the evangelism intervention on the Chris-
tianity index and corresponding one-sided p-value using clustered randomization inference under
10,000 simulations.
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4.4.3 Social Capital
Do missionaries affect social capital after a relatively short intervention of two
weeks? Table 4.7 reports results from a linear regression of the indicated so-
cial capital outcomes on the treatment dummy. As can be seen, the evidence
is largely inconclusive. The comprehensive social capital index is increased by
0.02 points as a result of the missionary intervention, but the effect size is small
and not significant. The individual sub-components paint a similarly inconsistent
picture. Specifically, I estimate a reduction in networks (both total friends and
close friends; models 1 and 2, respectively) that is in line with my first hypothe-
sis. But, both estimates are noisy. All other measures yield inconsistent findings
that do not confirm the pre-registered hypotheses that were based on my quali-
tative interviews. While evangelized villages invest significantly more in the trust
game (6.1 grams of sugar; model 3), they express lower levels of generalized trust
(insignificant; model 4). Cooperation is slightly higher in evangelized villages—
both statements about cooperation likelihood as well as perceived willingness to
sign a cooperation petition (models 5 and 6, respectively). Again, however, es-
timates are not significant. Information yields an ambivalent picture as well. In
evangelized villages, individuals take significantly less time to obtain information
from strangers (model 7). Yet, they also report that they, in general, speak to
strangers less frequently (model 8). Similarly, respondents in evangelized villages
find opponents more quickly (model 9), but express less trust in the safety of the
villages (model 10). Both estimates, however, are small and insignificant. Finally,
respondents in evangelized villages speak longer about possible changes for the
village (model 11), but report less petitioning on behalf of the village (model 12).
I confirm the overall insignificant treatment effect on the aggregate social capital
index in Figure 4.5 using clustered randomization inference.
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Figure 4.5: Effect on social capital index (randomization inference)
ATE: 0.009   
P−Value: 0.46
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Notes: Estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of the evangelism intervention on the social
capital index and corresponding one-sided p-value using clustered randomization inference under
10,000 simulations.
In sum, then, I document inconsistent evidence regarding the effects of social
capital. Several reasons for this theoretically inconsistent and noisy result come
to mind. First, the intervention was mild (two weeks) and may have done little
to change the social fabric of villages. This explanation, however, is not entirely
convincing. After all, I find a sizable treatment effect on cultural beliefs and
traditions—outcomes that are arguably as difficult to move. Second and related,
it could be the case that outcomes were collected too soon after the intervention,
leaving too little time for social changes to unfold. The fact that evangelized
villages report significantly fewer friends speaks against this explanation, though
it is largely untestable. Third, it could be the case that the experiment is under-
powered. Here, it should be noted that the present chapter reports on the current
status quo of the experiment. 22 villages remain to be treated. Still, however,
since villages were put in random order, there is little reason to believe that effect
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sizes should change, though uncertainty may be reduced thanks to a larger number
of clusters.
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4.4.4 Ex Post Analysis
An alternative explanation is that the missionaries affected social capital in ways
I had not hypothesized. Indeed, upon closer analysis, the results are in line with
a theory of Protestant missionaries and social capital that sees group-level social
capital weakened, while individual-level pro-social behavior is strengthened. To
see this, note that there are negative treatment effects for all variables that depict
village-level social capital outcomes (i.e., models 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12). Specif-
ically, individuals describe a sparser network (models 1 and 2), lower generalized
trust (model 4), report a lower incidence of seeking out to strangers (model 8),
perceive the village as less safe (model 10) and witness less petitioning on behalf
of the village (model 12). All estimates are negative, though they remain noisy.
And, only one measure describing village-level social capital is positive, namely,
cooperation likelihood (model 6). By contrast, I find positive effect sizes for all
individual-level social capital measures (notably, models 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11), par-
ticularly those that measure behavior. Again, these estimates are noisy, but are
consistently positive. I confirm this finding again using clustered randomization
inference (see Figure 4.6).
Table 4.9: Treatment effects on individual- and group-level social capital
Group-level
social capital
index
Individual-level
social capital
index
(1) (2)
Mission −0.054 0.094
(0.039) (0.043)
N 641 638
Notes: OLS regressions. Wild cluster bootstrap-t SEs
in parentheses (adjusted for 38 villages).
When combining the variables to an individual-level social capital index and
151
a group-level social capital index, I detect sizable and significant effect sizes (see
Table 4.9). Specifically, the individual-level index is increased by 0.1 points, while
the group-level index is reduced by 0.1 points. It is important to point out,
however, that this analysis represents a stereotypical case of what Gelman and
Loken (2013) term “forking paths.” That is, since this analysis was not pre-
registered, the uncertainty around the estimates may not accurately reflect the
“researchers degrees of freedom,” which this analysis draws on.
Still, the analysis points to two forces that are at work when missionaries
evangelize, which are laid out in Chapter 3: preferences and networks.
On one hand, evangelists may reduce aggregate social capital by intruding in
local networks. The fact that I find significant effects on traditions, beliefs, and
Christian knowledge showcases the profound impact of the evangelists on the social
fabric of the villages. Research in the social sciences more broadly has confirmed
the sustained effects of religious organizations on local networks (e.g. Galbraith,
Rodriguez and Stiles, 2007). A popular view links religious and other ethnic
groups to “clubs,” which redistribute public goods within clearly defined borders
(Huber and Stanig, 2011; Scheve, Stasavage et al., 2006). Notably, as outlined
in Chapter 3, Berman (2000) argues that religiosity is a signaling device to a
religious community, which provides much-needed insurance to its members. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, McCauley (2012) argues that missionaries strive to establish
new patronage-like relationships. These, by necessity, cut through existing social
networks and power structures.
The Toposa tribe is governed by generation sets (Müller-Dempf, 2009), not one
chief (Baldwin, 2015). Yet, the message of “Christian brotherhood” and “equality
among all men” still presents a challenge to the elites in charge. The missionaries
therefore attempt to convert elders and to persuade them to join the church at
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an early stage. But, anecdotal evidence from my own field work suggests that the
missionaries are most successful among younger individuals. Indeed, certain elders
depicted the evangelization as “story telling for children.” This depiction may be
overly critical. But it shows that elders view the missionaries with skepticism.
They fear that their influence might be undermined, and worry that the carefully
balanced networks and power structures are put at risk. As a result, it is thus not
surprising, and in line with my hypotheses, that the evangelists lead to seemingly
sparser networks (Models 1 and 2 in Tables 4.7 and 4.8), lower safety perceptions
(Model 10), less pronounced village-wide petitioning (Model 12), and lower gen-
eralized trust (Model 4). Individuals in evangelized villages also seemingly have a
harder time to obtain information (Models 4 and 8).
These effects are surprising inasmuch as the intervention was rather short. It
should be noted, however, that I rely on survey evidence, which may be influenced
by perceptions of individuals. And perceptions were undoubtedly affected by the
evangelizers. As much is detectible from the pronounced effects on cultural beliefs
and practices as well as Christian knowledge. Thus, the intervention may have
first changed perceptions (e.g., who is and who is not a friend), which explain
changes in outcomes that one would typically assume to take longer than four
weeks.
On the other hand, the preaching of the evangelists is distinctly pro-tolerance.
While I had hypothesized that the evangelism has a detrimental effect on overall
trust, I noted that the Toposa evangelists, in line with other Protestant missionar-
ies, are strong proponents of social justice. After all, in the words of Little (2005,
207-208), the “Protestant missionary ethos originally focused on [...] charity.”
Cross-country studies also confirm a positive association between Protestantism
and trust (Bjørnskov, 2007; Delhey and Newton, 2005). Moreover, missionaries,
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including the Salt and Light evangelizers, preach the value of cooperation, partic-
ularly between rivaling tribes. This is particularly timely among the Toposa tribe,
which has had a long-standing rivalry with the neighboring Turkana tribe. This
rivalry plays itself out in frequent and deadly cattle raids (Hendrickson, Mearns
and Armon, 1996). The Salt and Light evangelists thus emphasize the shared
human bond between the two tribes. They specifically encourage intra- and inter-
tribal cooperation. And, they strive to reconcile tribal differences by facilitating
meetings between the two groups. Taken together, the missionary emphasis on
cooperation, trust and reconciliation may thus help explain the positive finding
regarding trusting behavior (Model 3 in Tables 4.7 and 4.8), the propensity to
cooperate (Model 5) and the willingness to find an on opponent (Model 9) as well
as to propose change (Model 11).
With this finding in hand, it may also be worthwhile to reflect on the theol-
ogy of the Salt and Light missionaries. In Chapter 3, I found that, on average,
Protestant missions reduce community cohesion. Importantly, however, I found
the result was particularly strong among Pentecostal groups. By contrast, the
Adventist mission—a rather all-encompassing religious group with little focus on
individualism—showed positive effects on pro-social preferences. While Salt and
Light considers itself Pentecostal, my own time in the field displayed them as
a rather out-going, universalist group. This may be owing to the fact that they
need to adopt their theology to the local conditions. More importantly, however, it
means that the individualistic element of Protestantism, which is typically hypoth-
esized to be particularly salient among Pentecostals, may not matter as decisively
among Salt and Light’s evangelizers. Interpreted in this light, the positive effects
on trust, cooperation and reconciliation is thus in line with Chapter 3. Namely,
that a reduction in pro-social preferences is noticeable among strict Pentecostal
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groups, while the opposite can be said about more universalist missions. Above
all, then, the result showcases that there is significant variation in the relationship
between Protestant missions, community cohesion and social capital.
Figure 4.6: Effects on individual- and group-level social capital
ATE: −0.05     
P−Value: 0.34
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(a) Village-level index
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(b) Individual-level index
Notes: Estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of the evangelism intervention on indicated
social capital sub-indexes and corresponding one-sided p-value using clustered randomization
inference under 10,000 simulations.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has added to a growing literature on the effects of Protestant mis-
sionaries on social capital. Using a field experiment implemented in cooperation
with a missionary group in South Sudan, I found that Protestant evangelism has
a stark effect on attitudes and toward local cultural practices. Effects on social
capital were not found when scrutinizing an aggregate, pre-registered social cap-
ital index. When assessing the components of the index, however, I documented
two noteworthy effects. Group-level indicators of social capital were found to be
lower, while individual-level indicators of social capital were shown to be higher in
treated villages compared to control villages. I interpreted the findings to imply
that missionaries work akin to a network interruption. They undermine structural
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determinants of social capital, but increase individual-level pro-social behavior.
By providing, for the first time, causal estimates about the effects of Protestant
missionaries the present chapter is a significant addition to the heretofore obser-
vational literature. Still, four key caveats must not go unnoticed. First of all, one
should be cautious to extrapolate these findings to other contexts. The Toposa-
land, as was discussed, has a unique history of low levels of Christian evangelism.
This is, above all, owing to several civil wars that have plagued the country. To
make general inferences about Protestant missionaries or, worse, “religion” is thus
misguided. What the present chapter can provide, however, are causal estimates
about the consequences of Protestant evangelism in a sample of 38 Toposa settle-
ments.
A second concern is the relatively short intervention. In line with the strategy
of the local missionary group, villages were exposed to four evangelism sessions
across a two-week period. Outcomes were measured two weeks later. Undoubt-
edly, this design is more reliable than, say, a short priming experiment. Yet, the
findings are difficult to marry with the common perspective adopted by historians
of religion. They typically discuss decades or even centuries of missionary activi-
ties, not months or weeks. Such short missionary interventions are not uncommon
among the Toposa (and, likely, other areas in South Sudan). But the findings
are difficult to square with the missionary agenda of the large missionary societies
active during colonial times.
Third and related, social capital is an outcome unlikely to shift significantly
in the short term. As such, the fact that I documented changes (albeit small)
is surprising. What the evidence cannot do, however, is speak to long-term ef-
fects of Protestant missionaries on social capital. While I am inclined to rule out
mere priming effects, future research could help parse out long-term effects of mis-
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sionary activity on social capital in greater detail. With all this in mind, I will
caution, however, that field experiments of this size are logistically challenging
and financially costly, particularly in remote areas such as Eastern Equatoria in
South Sudan.
In conclusion, I hope that the evidence presented in this chapter motivates
researchers to apply modern empirical methods to the study of religious organi-
zations, including missionaries. The documented treatment effects—particularly
those of pertaining to cultural phenomena—offer a rich repository of questions for
follow-up studies. This would allow the scientific community to better understand
cultural changes in developing countries. For instance, if Protestant missionaries
do, indeed, change attitudes toward dowry or polygamy this likely has conse-
quences for greater societal structures. The Toposa are organized around age and
generation sets (Müller-Dempf, 2009), which would change irrevocably if dowry
or polygamy practices were to be altered. Another plausible venue for scientific
inquiry are missionary effects on local-level participation and democratization—
arguably one of the key debates in the study religion and politics.
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4.6 Supplementary Information
Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics of outcomes aggregated at village-level
Overall sample Treatment group Control group
Min Max N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Cultural outcomes
Witchcraft items (#) 0 5 36 2.5 1.1 18.0 2.1 1.0 18.0 2.8 1.0
Tobacco 1 4 36 2.9 0.6 18.0 2.8 0.7 18.0 2.9 0.6
Alcohol 1 3 36 1.9 0.4 18.0 1.8 0.3 18.0 2.0 0.4
Witch doctor (#) 0 41 36 10.9 8.8 18.0 9.5 9.7 18.0 12.4 7.7
Praying times (#) 1 17 36 4.2 3.4 18.0 4.6 3.9 18.0 3.7 2.9
Minor spirits (%) 1 1 36 93.2 9.9 18.0 91.5 12.3 18.0 94.9 6.5
Tooth removal 2 4 36 3.2 0.5 18.0 3.2 0.5 18.0 3.2 0.5
Sex before marriage 1 4 36 2.4 0.7 18.0 2.3 0.7 18.0 2.5 0.8
Dowry 1 2 36 1.3 0.4 18.0 1.3 0.4 18.0 1.2 0.3
Polygamy 1 3 36 1.8 0.6 18.0 2.0 0.7 18.0 1.5 0.4
Tradition Index 0 0 36 -0.0 0.2 18.0 -0.1 0.1 18.0 0.1 0.2
Christian knowledge outcomes
Trinity knowledge 0 0 36 1.8 4.6 18.0 2.1 5.5 18.0 1.5 3.7
Pentecost knowledge 0 1 36 71.2 26.7 18.0 78.8 18.4 18.0 63.5 31.7
Disciples knowledge 0 1 36 68.5 25.8 18.0 76.8 22.8 18.0 60.1 26.5
Christianity index -1 1 36 -5.4 43.2 18.0 7.5 34.8 18.0 -18.2 47.7
Social capital outcomes
Total friends (#) 2 7 36 4.1 1.9 18.0 4.0 1.9 18.0 4.2 1.9
Close friends (#) 2 22 36 8.3 5.0 18.0 7.8 5.6 18.0 8.9 4.5
Trust amount (g) 59 133 36 89.6 16.9 18.0 91.8 15.9 18.0 87.4 18.0
General trust 1 3 36 2.1 0.5 18.0 2.1 0.5 18.0 2.1 0.4
Cooperation signature 3 4 36 3.5 0.3 18.0 3.6 0.3 18.0 3.5 0.3
Cooperation likelihood 4 5 36 4.7 0.4 18.0 4.7 0.4 18.0 4.6 0.4
Information time (10s) 2 45 36 11.2 8.3 18.0 9.2 4.5 18.0 13.2 10.6
Information strangers (#) 2 19 36 10.5 4.2 18.0 10.3 4.7 18.0 10.8 3.8
Finding opponent (%) 0 1 36 70.6 28.4 18.0 74.1 28.9 18.0 67.0 28.2
Safety perception 3 5 36 4.6 0.5 18.0 4.5 0.6 18.0 4.7 0.4
Change proposal (10s) 1 131 36 11.2 25.9 18.0 14.3 33.5 18.0 8.2 15.4
Change petitioning 2 4 36 2.8 0.7 18.0 2.7 0.7 18.0 2.8 0.8
Social Capital Index -1 0 36 -0.1 0.3 18.0 -0.1 0.3 18.0 -0.0 0.3
Notes: Mean (Mean) and standard deviations (SD) of all outcome measures across the overall sample as well
as treatment and control groups. Min and Max depicts minimum and maximum values in the overall sample.
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Figure 4.7: Picture of the Toposaland and village pair
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Figure 4.8: Certificate of registration for Salt and Light
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Figure 4.9: Correlation matrix of tradition index
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Figure 4.10: Correlation matrix of Christianity index
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4.6.1 Schedule of Treatment and Surveying
• Week 1 (September 19, 2016 – September 25, 2016)
– Evangelism in Kide Emoru II
– Evangelism in Lotakawa I
– Survey in Lotakawa II
– Survey in Kide Emoru I
• Week 2 (September 26, 2016 – October 2, 2016)
– Evangelism in Kide Emoru II
– Evangelism in Lotakawa I
– No Survey
– No Survey
• Week 3 (October 3, 2016 – October 9, 2016)
– Evangelism in Kapelnyanga I
– Evangelism in Lokorumoru I
– Survey in Kapelnyanga II
– Survey in Lokorumoru II
• Week 4 (October 10, 2016 – October 16, 2016)
– Evangelism in Kapelnyanga I
– Evangelism in Lokorumoru I
– Survey in Lotakawa I
– Survey in Kide Emoru II
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• Week 5 (October 17, 2016 – October 23, 2016)
– Evangelism in Toemoru I
– Evangelism in Lolepan proper I
– Survey in Toemoru II
– Survey in Lolepan proper II
• Week 6 (October 24, 2016 – October 30, 2016)
– Evangelism in Toemoru I
– Evangelism in Lolepan proper I
– Survey in Kapelnyanga I
– Survey in Lokorumoru I
• Week 7 (October 31, 2016 – November 6, 2016)
– Evangelism in Nakoringoomo I
– Evangelism in Kide marino II
– Survey in Nakoringoomo II
– Survey in Kide marino I
• Week 8 (November 7, 2016 – November 13, 2016)
– Evangelism in Nakoringoomo I
– Evangelism in Kide marino II
– Survey in Lolepan proper I
– Survey in Toemoru I
• Week 9 (November 14, 2016 – November 20, 2016)
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– Evangelism in Nagolotome I
– Evangelism in Marino villange I
– Survey in Marino villange II
– Survey in Nagolotome II
• Week 10 (November 21, 2016 – November 27, 2016)
– Evangelism in Nagolotome I
– Survey in Nakoringoomo I
– Evangelism in Marino villange I
– Survey in Kide marino II
• Week 11 (November 28, 2016 – December 4, 2016)
– Evangelism in Longeleya I
– Evangelism in Tolkopo marino I
– Survey in Longeleya II
– Survey in Tolkopo marino II
• Week 12 (December 5, 2016 – December 11, 2016)
– Evangelism in Longeleya I
– Evangelism in Tolkopo marino I
– Survey in Nagolotome I
– Survey in Nagolotome I
• Week 13 (December 12, 2016 – December 18, 2016)
– Evangelism in Korea II
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– Evangelism in Nalemsokani I
– Survey in Korea I
– Survey in Nalemsokani II
• Week 14 (December 19, 2016 – December 25, 2016)
– Evangelism in Korea II
– Evangelism in Nalemsokani I
– Survey in Longeleya I
– Survey in Tolkopo marino I
• Week 15 (December 26, 2016 – January 1, 2017)
– Evangelism in Lotiir II
– Evangelism in Loriwo I
– Survey in Lotiir I
– Survey in Loriwo II
• Week 16 (January 2, 2017 – January 8, 2017)
– Evangelism in Lotiir II
– Survey in Korea II
– Evangelism in Loriwo I
– Survey in Nalemsokani I
• Week 17 (January 9, 2017 – January 15, 2017)
– Evangelism in Nakordula I
– Evangelism in Natiiryae II
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– Survey in Natiiryae I
– Survey in Nakordula II
• Week 18 (January 16, 2017 – January 22, 2017)
– Evangelism in Nakordula I
– Evangelism in Natiiryae II
– Survey in Lotiir II
– Survey in Loriwo I
• Week 19 (January 23, 2017 – January 29, 2017)
– Evangelism in Lokorikitoe II
– Survey in Lokorikitoe I
– Evangelism in Lowoyapuru I
– Survey in Lowoyapuru II
• Week 20 (January 30, 2017 – February 5, 2017)
– Evangelism in Lokorikitoe II
– Evangelism in Lowoyapuru I
– Survey in Nakordula I
– Survey in Natiiryae II
• Week 21 ( February 6, 2017 – February 12, 2017)
– Evangelism in Napelet I
– Evangelism in Nadomeyit I
– Survey in Napelet II
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– Survey in Nadomeyit II
• Week 22 (February 13, 2017 – February 19, 2017)
– Evangelism in Napelet I
– Evangelism in Nadomeyit I
– Survey in Lokorikitoe II
– Survey in Lowoyapuru I
• Week 23 (February 20, 2017 – February 26, 2017)
– Evangelism in Kadapangolol I
– Evangelism in Napelet I
– Survey in Napelet II
– Survey in Kadapangolol II
• Week 24 (February 27, 2017 – March 5, 2017)
– Evangelism in Kadapangolol I
– Evangelism in Napelet I
– Survey in Nadomeyit I
– Survey in Napelet I
• Week 25 (March 6, 2017 – March 12, 2017)
– Evangelism in Moruarengani II
– Survey in Moruarengani I
– Evangelism in Najiye II
– Survey in Najiye I
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• Week 26 (March 13, 2017 – March 19, 2017)
– Evangelism in Moruarengani II
– Evangelism in Najiye II
– Survey in Napelet I
– Survey in Kadapangolol I
• Week 27 (March 20, 2017 – March 26, 2017)
– Evangelism in Lopala proper I
– Evangelism in Natiir II
– Survey in Lopala proper II
– Survey in Natiir I
• Week 28 (March 27, 2017 – April 2, 2017)
– Evangelism in Lopala proper I
– Survey in Moruarengani II
– Evangelism in Natiir II
– Survey in Najiye II
• Week 29 (April 3, 2017 – April 9, 2017)
– Evangelism in Nakwaatal I
– Survey in Nakwaatal II
– Evangelism in Napeicole I
– Survey in Napeicole II
• Week 30 (April 10, 2017 – April 16, 2017)
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– Evangelism in Nakwaatal I
– Evangelism in Napeicole I
– Survey in Natiir II
– Survey in Lopala proper I
• Week 31 (April 17, 2017 – April 23, 2017)
– Nothing
• Week 32 (April 24, 2017 – April 30, 2017)
– Survey in Nakwaatal I
– Survey in Napeicole I
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5
Conclusion
This final chapter serves as a point of reflection. The three substantive chapters
of my dissertation—though they analyze different settings, independent variables
and outcomes—share related outcomes of interest: social inequality and cohe-
sion. They also share four challenges, which deserve a concluding remark: mea-
surement, mechanisms, uncertainty and external validity, and possible normative
consequences.
Measurement. The three substantive chapters have broadly assessed out-
comes pertaining to social cohesion and inequality. Both social cohesion and so-
cial inequality, however, are latent constructs. They cannot be directly observed
and must be inferred from a variety of empirical measures. This presents a mea-
surement problem, which must not be taken lightly. To the extent possible, the
chapters on Peru and South Sudan have relied on behavioral measures. Such mea-
sures are sensible given that they address social desirability concerns. Behavioral
games, however, are not without their problems. Above all, they lack in realism.
Trust games, for instance, place individuals in a rather contrived situation of hav-
ing to send money to a random person. This is not to say that the game does
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not predict trusting behavior. But just how high is this correlation? I, there-
fore, conclude this dissertation with a scientific urge to find behavioral outcomes
that are more realistic. One such outcome was the wearing of witchcraft items in
South Sudan. It was independently assessed by the enumerators. It could there-
fore not have been biased by demand effects. Whether such behavioral outcomes
exist for measures pertaining to social capital is a question of significant scientific
importance.
But, measurement challenges were also present in Chapter two. Here, my key
measures for social inequality—the share of women in local councils as well as
the share of aristocrats in Rotary clubs—were administrative. Yet, it remains to
be seen whether they are reliable measures of social inequality that the scientific
community interprets as such. The mere fact that there exist only few studies that
explicitly measure social inequality suggests that more work needs to be done in
this area. Possible paths forward in the measurement of social inequality are
the distribution of incomes and high-status jobs among social minorities. It is my
intention to fill this gap in future studies, perhaps by, again, accessing tax records,
which offer a rich repository for nuanced administrative outcomes.
Mechanisms. Chapters two and three have gone beyond estimating causal
effects of a treatment on an outcome. Specifically, in Chapter two I argued that the
relation between inheritance customs and inequality may be mediated by two in-
termediary outcomes: wealth equality and pro-egalitarian preferences. The prob-
lems of mediation are well-rehearsed (Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010). Above all,
mediators are typically endogenous phenomena. And, even if they were to be ex-
perimentally manipulated by a researcher, it is exceedingly difficult to claim that
only that very mediator (and not some other mediator) was manipulated. For
that reason, I refrained from conducting a mediation analysis in Chapter 2. In
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Chapter 3, however, I made the case that the Evanglical and Pentecostal missions
plausibly activated the two hypothesized mechanisms—pro-social preferences and
networks—to differing degrees. Even in this case, however, the analyses contin-
ues to be observational. After all, the mediators were not randomly assigned but
observed. There can thus be no doubt that such analyses do not reliably recover
causal effects. As such, my dissertation has instilled in me a desire to reflect more
deeply on how such observational findings can motivate future research. Are ob-
servational mediation analyses futile? Or can they inform where mediation may
occur? The dilemma gets at a fundamental problem, namely, to what degree one
is willing to view correlation as indicative of causation.
Aside from the question about causality, chapter two, to me, has highlighted
that social scientists conceptualize mediators quite differently. In particular, they
disagree on the extent to which mediation has a temporal component. Take the
classic “Vitamin C” example for mediation. As Green, Ha and Bullock (2010,
207) write: “the introduction of limes into the diet of seafarers in the eighteenth
century dramatically reduced the incidence of scurvy, and eventually twentieth-
century scientists figured out that the key mediating ingredient was vitamin C.”
In this reading, Vitamin C is but one dimension of the treatment that causes
a reduction in scurvy. This definition is what I had in mind when presenting
wealth equality as a mechanism—a mechanism that is part of the treatment, i.e.,
equitable inheritance. Yet, the second mechanism, pro-egalitarian preferences, are
not part of the treatment. Rather, they are an intermediate outcome, which may,
in turn, affect social inequality. The two mechanisms thus are conceptualized quite
differently. For that reason, I hope to further explore the between mediators as a
distinct part of the treatment and mediators as an intermediary outcome in future
research.
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Uncertainty and External Validity. The three chapters all are shaped
by a desire to recover causal effects. Undoubtedly, chapter four is the most likely
candidate to have done so. By randomly assigning villages to a short evangelism
intervention, the Chapter convincingly shows that missionaries affect local cultural
traditions and beliefs as well as knowledge about Christianity. The effect on social
capital, however, was mixed. An increase in pro-social behavior was juxtaposed
with a reduction in village-level social capital. This is not a problem. After all,
pre-registration does not prevent researchers from documenting such results. But,
the finding works as a careful reminder about just how much uncertainty there
is regarding the determinants of broader social outcomes such as social capital.
Indeed, the project has left me wondering whether broad social outcomes may
simply escape clear static laws.
Relatedly, I found the strongest effect sizes in Peru—where I studied a sam-
ple of 16 villages. By contrast, effect sizes were smallest in Chapter two, where
I analyzed 8,500 West German municipalities. The difference in effect sizes is
noteworthy. It reminds one that clear treatment effects (or theoretical predic-
tions) are most likely to be achieved in homogeneous settings where researchers
have larger control and theoretical oversight. This is interesting inasmuch as there
is often a perceived desire among scholars to generate “externally valid” results.
Yet, external validity is undoubtedly an unreachable ideal as separating signals
from noise in large, complex social settings is close to impossible. As such, large
observational studies face two distinct challenges: they seldom afford causal iden-
tification and are sufficiently complex to make it difficult to separate signal from
noise. Thus, while chapter two did demonstrate notable effect sizes—maintaining
a careful identification strategy—I have become more skeptical about the promises
of studies stretching broad social arenas.
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Normative consequences. My dissertation has tackled two broad outcomes,
inequality and social cohesion. My goal was to highlight possible determinants
of these rather broad social constructs. What was beyond the scope of work,
however, is to reflect on potential normative consequences of my findings. Are
social equality and cohesiveness necessarily desirable outcomes? This question is
far from trivial. After all, writes Abbott “when we say ‘inequality’ we usually
mean ‘injustice’ ” (2016, 234).
Two issues come to mind. First, if inequality and social cohesion are also nor-
mative constructs, this raises an issue of measurability. Abbot argues “that some
version of immeasurability may in fact be the identifying mark of the normative”
(2016, 234). My dissertation grappled precisely with this problem. In Chapter 2,
my outcome was the unequal treatment of women, minorities and aristocrats in
councils and elite clubs, respectively. While these three groups are traditionally
perceived as socially relevant strata (by Tocqueville and others), the demarcation
remains arbitrary. Put differently, other relevant markers of identity could have
been analyzed, making the measurement of equality somewhat dauting.
Second, the very norm underlying equality and cohesiveness warrants reflec-
tion. Scholars of development typically perceive greater levels of social capital and
cohesiveness to be a good thing. My experience in the field, however, also pointed
to negative repercussions of tightly knit communities. In Peru, for instance, one
village president lamented that “social control” made it difficult to have truthful
political competition. Such concerns were not raised by presidents in more “indi-
vidualistic” villages. Here, the market of ideas and goods seemed to thrive. Such
arguments are not new. Max Weber famously linked the ethos of Protestantism
to the entrepreneurial, individualistic spirit of capitalism (Weber, 2002). At a
minimum, my experience in Peru thus shows that the normative dimensions of
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concepts such as “cohesiveness” are undoubtedly context-dependent.
With these unoriginal and rather broad considerations I would like to conclude
my dissertation. I hope that the evidence and design choices will help inform
policy and academic debates. And I am hopeful that the coming years will allow
researchers (including myself!) to expand on my projects in ways that will allow
us to draw firmer conclusions about the determinants of societal cohesion.
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